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NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 7 May

LD0705062893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0507 GMT 7 May 93

[Text] Moscow May 7 ITAR-TASS—The press continues to analyse the tragic developments that took place in the capital on May 1. Various newspapers give diametrically opposed evaluation of the performance of law-enforcement agencies and demonstrators and come up with forecasts about possible developments on May 9, the victory day. The press also gives wide coverage of the Thursday [6 May] session of the Russian parliament.

"It is quite probable that the forthcoming developments of the next few days will influence most seriously the political situation in the country. Radicals from among the president's closest aides (members of the reform coalition) are so confident of having managed at last to induce Boris Yeltsin to start the last the most decisive battle, that they mentioned at their press conference the decrees and instructions prepared by the president even before they were officially published ... The probability of tough actions on the part of the president is rather high in the forthcoming several days, because another demonstration of opposition forces is due to take place on May 9. Its organisers intend to march along the Tverskaya Street from the Belorusskiy railway terminal to the Red Square where it is planned to hold a rally. The Tverskaya Street is far more narrow than the Leninskiy Prospekt, and in case of more clashes a greater number of people may be injured. However, the first step to the tragedy has been made. The Moscow mayor's office cut the route of the demonstration and allowed them to hold a rally at the Sovetskaya Square, which is far too small even for one thousand people. According to the information obtained from the political council of the National Salvation Front, the communist- patriots intend to hold the 'planned demonstration in accordance with the application submitted in due time.'" [no newspaper attribution as received]

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA frontpages a large article about the first anniversary of the creation of the Russian armed forces. A year after the president signed the decree on the creation of the Russian armed forces they are already functioning, the newspaper writes. "The Russian armed forces are a guarantor of stability in our country and of strategic security on our planet. They are shouldering peace ... No matter what is said about the Russian Army these days, no matter what ailments and problem it has today, still it is in progress, is developing," the newspaper stresses.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA carries an article by academician Stanislav Shatalin, president of the Reform Foundation, who comments on the results of the April 25 referendum. In his opinion, the referendum was "an absolutely meaningless and harmful" political action, which has not inflicted so far irreparable damage on Russian society. "Russia, its president and parliament were lucky: the nation showed once again that it is more intelligent than its rulers ... However, the ruling politicians should realise that it was the last time ... The most important thing now is not to get drowned once again in our own illusions," Shatalin writes.

According to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, it has become obvious that the Armenian side regards as unacceptable the plan of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, suggested jointly by Russia, America and Turkey. The Armenian side continues to insist that problems dealing with the establishment of armistice, the withdrawal of Nagorno-Karabakh troops from Kelbadzhar (Azerbaijan) and the beginning of negotiations should be discussed in one package.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and other newspapers report that Alexander Einseln, colonel of the U.S. Army, an American of Estonian extraction, has been appointed commander of the Estonian defence forces. The greatest number of points scored by him at the Estonian parliament are attributed to the fact that he took that post contrary to the objections of the U.S. Administration.

Visits by Warren Christopher, U.S. Senators Viewed

MK0605102093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 6 May 93 p 3

[Viktor Zamyatin, Natalya Kalashnikova report: "Visit of U.S. Secretary of State and Senators. Russia and United States Coordinate Next Steps"]

[Text] Possibilities of a rapprochement between the positions of Russia and the United States on the question of settling the Balkan crisis have opened up as a result of the talks held yesterday in Moscow. Specifically, Russia no longer intends to insist that the world community resolve this conflict by an exclusively political method. This was stated during meetings between Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who arrived in Moscow late on 4 May, and President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev. The same day a delegation of U.S. senators headed by Sam Nunn met with Russian parliamentarians.

The Yugoslav problems were the main subject of the Moscow talks between Christopher and the Russian president and foreign minister.

The United States is skeptical and Russia cautiously optimistic that the Bosnian Serbs' parliament will ratify the Vance-Owen plan (KOMMERSANT-DAILY will report the outcome of the discussion of this question, which was to have taken place late yesterday evening, in tomorrow's issue).

However, the problem of the world community's actions should the Vance-Owen plan not be ratified remains acute. During yesterday's talks Russia stated for the first time that it will not insist on the use of exclusively political methods of resolving the conflict.

All participants in the Moscow talks—the British foreign minister joined them during the night by telephoning Kozyrev—are inclined to think that there is still a chance that the peace plan will be approved by the Serbs. The initial version of the Vance- Owen plan is not without the influence of Moscow and Athens, and substantial corrections have already been made. Thus, in north Bosnia a 50-km corridor is envisioned to link local Serbs with the FRY and Serb Krajina in Croatia. For their part, Yeltsin and Kozyrev—the Russian minister also briefed the U.S. senators on this the previous day—expressed their readiness to send Russian military formations to the former Yugoslavia as part of the "forces to maintain peace" should the plan be adopted. Some of them could be stationed in this very corridor.

But if the Bosnian Serbs reject the Vance-Owen plan, Russia and the United States are prepared to discuss tougher measures and in this case, as noted in the joint statement of the Russian president and the U.S. secretary of state, "nothing can be ruled out." In the talks with Christopher, however, Yeltsin would not tie himself to any tough long-term commitments. The Russian leadership merely reaffirmed its position, according to which Russia will not come into conflict with the world community because of the Serbs.

Neither did the U.S. senators avoid the subject of Yugoslavia, although they were mainly interested in the situation regarding the ratification of START II. Sam Nunn, head of the delegation and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, noted in his address to representatives of the parliamentary international affairs committee that people on Capitol Hill are concerned not only by the Russian parliament's position but also by that of Ukraine. While the former is criticizing the START II Treaty as a whole, Kiev is still delaying approval of START I.

In reply, Iona Andronov, deputy chairman of the international affairs committee, observed that parliament does not object to START II in principle but that "the document still needs to be worked on."

Thus, as a result of the visit of the U.S. secretary of state and senators to Moscow, the sides managed to coordinate certain steps for the near future. As regards long-term cooperation on the problems discussed, there are still more questions than answers.

Status, Future of U.S.-Russian Military Cooperation Eyed

PM0605132193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 May 93 p 3

[Mikhail Pogorelyy article: "Russia and United States Start Coordinating Their Foreign Policy Endeavors"]

[Text] The world mass media are actively discussing the prospects of military operations by the United States and other NATO states in the former Yugoslavia. The leaders of Western states are leaning toward such a solution—in the event that the Bosnian Serbs reject the peace settlement plan based on the Vance-Owen proposals, and renounce the agreement reached in Athens a few days ago. However, the plan for a military operation either by NATO or by multinational forces on a coalition basis was not signed. No final decision has as yet been made, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated.

And the point is not just that by no means all the specific steps proposed by the Americans are being approved by their allies (the day before, Christopher had been sounding out the stance of Britain, France, Greece, and Spain). The U.S. leadership acknowledges that Russia is a historical ally of Serbia, and its participation in a search for a solution to the crisis is very important. It was precisely in order to discuss here the problem of settling the Yugoslav conflict that the U.S. secretary of state came to Moscow—and also to stress the significance of Russia's peacekeeping potential.

Another problem that is worrying both powers is the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Washington is apparently just as worried as Moscow about the unexpected change in the stance of Kazakhstan, which intends to review the decision it adopted earlier on joining the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nor can the United States agree to the Ukrainian authorities' demands that $3 billion be allocated to Kiev for the technical servicing and preventive maintenance of the former USSR's nuclear weapons which are located on Ukrainian territory. The Americans believe—and this is manifestly fair—that this should be a question of honoring the agreements that have already been reached, and fulfilling the commitments that have already been assumed. After all, around $180 million is being allocated to Ukraine in the Nunn-Lugar amendment specifically for nuclear disarmament. Therefore the new demands, which are moreover de facto aimed at establishing control over weapons that do not belong to Ukraine, are generating surprise at the very least.

Particularly since, on the basis of the assessment made by a group of senators headed by Sam Nunn, who visited Russia at President Clinton's request on the eve of the ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Weapons II [START II], complications may emerge in the Russian parliament over the approval of this treaty, given the position of Ukraine and Kazakhstan. It can be assumed that, for its part, Washington is trying to use both a "stick" in the form of restrictions on trade and economic contacts with these republics, and a dollar "carrot" in the shape of extending aid to Belarus, which is sensibly moving toward nuclear-free status, in order to decrease the potential of a nuclear threat to the world.

And finally, the Russian-U.S. dialogue on military policy is developing from individual projects to a systems principle. A delegation from the Russian General Staff is in the United States—for the first time—at the moment, and a visit by the minister of defense is yet to come. During these events, experts believe, discussion will focus not merely on interdepartmental cooperation plans, but also on plans for collaboration in peacekeeping operations.

The emerging trend toward coordination—and a possible future trend toward congruousness between Russian and U.S. foreign policy operations—is advantageous to our states, inasmuch as their interests in these spheres frequently coincide. It is also advantageous to the world community, which stands only to gain from the pooling of efforts by the major powers instead of their confrontation "in all spheres," as was the case in the past.

U.S., Russian War Veterans Present Yeltsin With Sculpture

LD0505165293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1536 GMT 5 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow May 5 TASS—The meeting of the Russian and American troops on the Elbe River at the end of the Second World War 48 years ago is an event which is not in the power of time. Russian President Boris Yeltsin said today receiving a sculpture "The Elbe Spirit" from representatives of the Russian and American Committees of War Veterans. A copy of this sculpture created by Russian artist Vladimir Surovtsev as an order from war veterans of the two countries, was handed over to U.S. ex-president George Bush last month.

"Many events occurred over the past years. Some of them were good as, for instance, solid relations between the United States and the former Soviet Union. There were unfortunately also periods of tempests. But all the same the Elbe spirit has won. The time has come when the peoples of the United States and Russia - the two great powers - have become partners and friends," Boris Yeltsin stressed.

In three days the peoples of Russia and other countries will celebrate the victory day, the president said. On this day we will honour the memory of those who gave their lives in the struggle for this victory. "By joint efforts we wrung the neck to the Fascist hydra, and we are sure there will be no Fascism again," the Russian president emphasised.

Boris Yeltsin suggested that the sculpture "The Elbe Spirit" be kept as a part of a memorial complex on the Poklonnaya Hill devoted to the victory won by the Russian people in the Second World War.

Yeltsin Invitation to Tokyo G-7 Summit Still Valid

LD0605154193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1324 GMT 6 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Bantin]

[Text] Tokyo May 6 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin's decision not to go to Japan in May will not lead to withdrawing the invitation from the Russian president to Tokyo early in July for a meeting with the leaders of the Group of Seven. Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa said this on Thursday [6 May] during his meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Kabun Muto, the KYODO TSUSHIN news agency reports.

Noting that the decision to invite Boris Yeltsin for the summit was adopted as a result of interstate consultations, the prime minister said it will be natural if the invitation to the Russian president from the Japanese Government to visit Tokyo early in July for a meeting with leaders of the Group of Seven remains valid. Neither does Tokyo intend to refrain from aid to Russia's economic reforms because of Yeltsin's decision not to go to Japan in May.

KYODO TSUSHIN reports, with a reference to sources in the government circles that Japan is ready to implement a package of measures of aid to Russia to the sum of 1.8 billion dollars. These measures were announced at a conference of foreign ministers and finance ministers

of the Group of Seven in Tokyo in April. A high official of Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry said, however, that Tokyo may be unable to implement the programme of state insurance of Japanese companies' business operations with Russian partners if the crisis of commercial and economic relations between the two countries is not overcome.

Envoy Notified of Yeltsin Postponement

OW0605144293 Tokyo KYODO in English 1430 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] Moscow, May 6 KYODO—Russia gave formal notice to Japan on Thursday that President Boris Yeltsin is once again postponing a visit to Japan, Japanese official said.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Kunadze informed Japanese Ambassador to Moscow Sumio Edamura the planned May visit will not go ahead, the officials said.

Comments by a Russian presidential spokesman that the decision to postpone the visit was based on an agreement between the two governments were denied in Tokyo by Japanese Foreign Minister Kabun Muto.

Yeltsin abruptly canceled a scheduled visit to Japan last September citing domestic problems but later blamed Japan's tough position over four disputed Russian-held islands off Hokkaido.

He said in April he would reschedule the visit in late May.

Kunadze cited technical and schedule problems as reasons for the latest postponement, Edamura said.

The deputy minister said Yeltsin will propose visiting Tokyo in September or October, Edamura said.

The ambassador said Kunadze entrusted him with a letter from Yeltsin adressed to Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa.

Yeltsin Likely To Visit in Autumn

LD0605192293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1811 GMT 6 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow May 6 TASS—One of the possible dates of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Japan was previously named the end of May 1993, however due to the shortage of time for the preparation of this visit, it will be very difficult to carry it out at the prearranged time, Georgiy Kunadze, Russian deputy foreign minister, told a news conference here today.

The Russian diplomat believes that now one of the possible dates of the Russian president's visit to Japan is the end of September or the beginning of October this year. According to Georgiy Kunadze, Boris Yeltsin's visit to Japan is on the agenda of Russo-Japanese relations, and the systematic and serious preparation for it is under way. By now, the diplomat said, the Russian side has worked out a package of drafts of documents dealing with cooperation between the two countries in political, economic, scientific and technical fields, and on other issues.

In reply to journalists' question about the territorial problem existing between the two states, Georgiy Kunadze said "there is full mutual understanding between Russia and Japan in the main—that is, the territorial problem objectively exists but it should be resolved on the basis of law and justice with due consideration for political factors and normal interests of citizens of the two countries."

There has been a noticeable trend towards reviving a dialogue and deepening mutual understanding in Russo-Japanese relations lately, Georgiy Kunadze stressed. He noted that the Russian side highly estimated Japan's position on economic cooperation with Russia in the course of the preparation for the meeting of the Group of Seven leading industrialized nations (G-7) in Tokyo. "Such orientation of relations corresponds to the spirit of time, civilized dealings and partnership between the two countries," the Russian deputy foreign minister pointed out.

Yeltsin Japan Trip Deferment Viewed

PM0705102393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 May 93 First Edition pp 1, 3

[Report by Sergey Agafonov: "B. Yeltsin Will Not Come To Tokyo in May"; first two paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] B. Yeltsin has altered his previous decision and canceled his visit to Japan scheduled for May. Talks are under way in Moscow on this question with a Japanese representative, an ITAR-TASS correspondent was told by A. Krasikov, leader of the Russian Federation president's press center. Here he noted that the Russian Federation president confirms his intention to take part in the meeting of leaders of the G7 countries in Tokyo.

Citing "sources in the Russian president's apparatus," Japan's KYODO agency reports that the reason for "the new deferment of the visit," as in September last year, is the discrepancies in the position of the sides, since Tokyo is seeking to create some specific basis for resolving the territorial issue while Moscow would like in fact to defer a specific discussion of that problem, considering the unstable domestic situation.

Tokyo—Early this week IZVESTIYA described the diplomatic measures connected with the Russian president's possible visit to Tokyo in May. It was said in particular that by mutual agreement, considering the sensitive nature of the subject, the sides had introduced a secret news blockade. But now the blockade has been

broken—late on Wednesday evening it was not diplomatic channels but representatives of the mass media which announces that Yeltsin will not go to Japan in May.

INTERFAX was the first to report this, citing Krasikov, leader of the president's press service, followed by REUTER and then the Japanese KYODO agency and the NHK television company. Neither the Japanese Embassy in Moscow nor the Russian Embassy in Tokyo had received any official papers on this score—diplomats learned of the diplomatic news via the teletype.

The teletype reproduced Krasikov's statement briefly announcing that (I quote KYODO) Yeltsin's planned visit to Japan in May has been deferred and that the decision on the latest deferment was based on an agreement reached between the two sides. In his interview with INTERFAX Krasikov added that the new schedule for the president's Japan trip is being moved to the fall—Yeltsin will come to Tokyo in September or early October.

In actual fact, however, there was no preliminary agreed decision on the latest deferment—KYODO reports that Edamura, the Japanese ambassador to Moscow, has reported that there had been no official notification from the Russian side and there had been no agreement on rescheduling the visit.

It is worth recalling that the May summit level visit appeared unexpectedly in the context of Russian-Japanese relations and was at Moscow's initiative. This proposal came from the president himself and was later discussed in detail at talks between the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Japanese premier and foreign minister in Tokyo in mid-April and at the level of secret consultations between the foreign ministries in late April. IN accordance with Russian wishes the Japanese side suggested specific states for the visit—25-27 May—and the Japanese foreign minister stated that it was this week that the date for the trip had to be finally agreed and firmed up.

I found out from reliable sources that the Japanese side is making every effort to avoid a new cooling of relations with Russia. Some kind of guideline has already been compiled for official use, emphasizing the following elements: Above all the president episode should not be described as a new deferment or rescheduling of the event since formally the date for the trip had not been confirmed and announced and May was cited only as one possible date. The change of date is consequently a fragment of the working consultations which does not remove the visit itself from the agenda, although it is annoying that Moscow has resorted to the services of the mass media instead of diplomatic channels to give notification of changes in its own position. Parallels and comparisons with the disruption of the visit in September last year considering the present circumstances are wrong and addressing them is undesirable: We must wait for detailed explanations along official channels from the Russian side since the statement by the president's press secretary contains no motives for the review of Moscow's previous intentions.

As a whole these theses are of an undoubtedly constructive nature and that makes it possible to suppose that Japanese irritation over Moscow's constant "surprises" will not reach the official level and will not freeze the delicate bilateral contacts again. In this case it is not only a question of the Japanese side's good will but also of the prospect of the forthcoming G7 meeting in the Japanese capital, to which Yeltsin has been invited and which he has so far not refused to go to.

As for the mass media, the first commentaries on Krasikov's statement were put in rather tough tones: RUssia was accused of contempt not only for diplomatic etiquette but also for Japan as a partner in general; a lot was also said about how Yeltsin's international prestige will inevitably suffer from the new wavering and so on and so forth.

When this item had already been filed to the editorial office the first official opinions on Krasikov's statement were voiced in Tokyo. Kiichi Miyazawa, the head of the Japanese cabinet, refusing to give a specific opinion, noted at a meeting with reporters that the Japanese Government expects the Russian side to give formal notification which would confirm what the press service leader has said and hopes to receive detailed explanations from Moscow in the very near future.

Foreign Minister Kabun Muto, who has just returned to Tokyo after a trip abroad, said as he left the aircraft at the airport that there were no preliminary agreements between Japan and Russia on the new rescheduling of Yeltsin's visit, as Krasikov asserted.

Japanese Response Viewed

PM0705105593 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 May 93 p 2

[Report by correspondent Nikolay Tsvetkov: "Japanese Mien at Russian Game"]

[Text] Tokyo—Japanese radio has reported that having learned that the Russian president will not come in May the leader of a cell of the organization of former inhabitants of the South Kuril islands stated: That's it, we have no more trust in Russia. Of course, that is a personal opinion put, moreover, by a spokesman for what in the not so distant past our country used to term "a small group of extremists." But since that opinion is being broadcast to the entire country perhaps it is not that personal.

Official Tokyo is not voicing any dissatisfaction, nor any satisfaction. Commenting on the news from Moscow, Yohei Kono, chief cabinet secretary, stressed: The present case should not be regarded as identical to September's. At the time the visit was officially agreed but this time only vague talks were under way about its possibility. So that essentially this time there was

nothing to cancel. In addition the Japanese leadership, despite all the bilateral debates, continues to "be a Yeltsin fan" in his struggle on the domestic front and that gives the Japanese formulations additional delicacy.

Nor can one fail to note a certain sense of relief abroad in Tokyo since the proposed visit, if the truth were to be faced, promised nothing pleasant to either side.

Nonetheless, there is much in the Russian game that is hard to explain. Why, one asks, was the subject of the visit to Japan raised in public at all? Simply as a sign of gratitude for the economic aid which had been announced?

And then there is that strange phrase—"the sides' mutual agreement" coming from the spokesman for the Russian president's press service, who reported the cancellation of the May Visit. Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa did not recall that agreement had been reached with him about anything of the kind. Nor did the Japanese Foreign Ministry. In Brief, official amplification and explanation is needed.

Prospects for Visit Analyzed

MK0605121093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 19, 9 May 93 (Signed to Press 4 May) p A 9

[Report by Konstantin Sarkisov, deputy director of the Oriental Studies Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences: "The President's Japanese Theme"]

[Text] On the eve of the referendum, confronted with a fairly tense and explosive situation, the Russian president has, quite unexpectedly, again raised the question of his visit to Japan, although it had appeared that the president put "the Japanese theme" on the back burner until better times.

Boris Yeltsin's decision to postpone, or effectively cancel, his Tokyo visit is still fresh in everyone's mind. It was made with only a few days to go before the visit and being, to put it mildly, undiplomatic in its form, it was probably in its essence the only right solution in those conditions.

Despite all the efforts, especially by the Japanese side, this step has had fairly negative moral consequences. In theory, it should have been a good lesson for both sides to draw—proving that they should not take on a complex foreign policy task until conditions for its solution are ripe.

What has changed since last September? The internal situation has deteriorated to an even greater extent, and the president's confrontation with parliament and the right-wing ultrapatriotic opposition has burst into the open. Still, something has prompted the president to conclude that this time his visit to Japan may prove a success and be less painful than last September.

To all appearances, it was a number of pronouncements by the prime minister and foreign minister of Japan that impelled the president to take this step. The essence of the pronouncements boiled down to the fact that Japan henceforth would not intend to link the question of economic assistance to Russia to any breakthroughs in the settlement of the territorial dispute. As transpired later, however, this stand applies only to the assistance to be granted to Russia by the G-7 and has nothing to do with bilateral relations Hence, there should not be any expectations that the territorial problem will be shelved during the visit.

If this is the case, it may turn out that the inadequate communication links between the two countries or, in other words, an insufficiently clear understanding of each other's stands, may have gotten the better of them. As one of my friends in Tokyo put it, one gets an impression that the two sides speak with each other via incompatible information systems using different codes.

There is no denying that Japan's stance on the territorial issue has indeed changed. Japan backed away from strong pressure tactics and agreed that now is not the right time to raise the issue. The Japanese have realized that they will not benefit from it, either. Russia should attempt to resolve such problems after it achieves internal stability.

Japan's strategic course took clear shape by the beginning of April: The territorial problem should not be dwelt on, and economic assistance should be granted to the extent it has been given by other countries. In pursuing this strategy, Tokyo agreed to grant $1.82 billion of extra assistance to Russia, which was pointedly somewhat in excess of the level of assistance provided by the United States—the most active advocate of the Russian president and Russian democracy.

Backing away from the tough stand on the territorial issue until the situation in Russia is stable again was also a wise choice from the point of view of Japanese interests per se.

Obviously, what Russia is primarily interested in is arranging the presidential visit—if it takes place—so as at least not to shake Boris Yeltsin's authority and not to arm the opposition with additional trump cards. At the same time, it is also obvious that it should not undermine Russian-Japanese relations or send them sliding back.

How can all this be achieved now that a substantial part of the proposed visit will be determined by the limited possibilities the president has at present, despite his victory at the referendum?

It is essential to change the underlying concept of the visit in contrast to the concept which underlay the visit scheduled for September 1992. Expecting to win Japanese support for Russian democracy and reform, Russia should clearly announce its course toward a friendly

partnership with Japan on the basis of recognizing the need for resolving the disputes in order to pave the way for signing a peace treaty.

Of course, a statement like this will not amount to a real breakthrough. Maybe, however, this is precisely what is needed now that conventional yardsticks for measuring efficiency and usefulness do not work and a cause extremely important for the world community—the future of Russian reform—is at stake. If the two sides take this approach, the rest will be a matter of diplomatic skills and professionalism.

Shokhin Urges Effective Use of Foreign Aid

PM0705092393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 May 93 First Edition p 1

[Report by Aleksey Portanskiy: "Russia Will Accept from the West Only Those Billions Which Will Work for Reforms"]

[Text] "The Russian Government intends to attract foreign financial resources to the country's economy only on condition that there is total confidence in their effective use," Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin stated during a 5 May press conference, answering a question from your IZVESTIYA correspondent on the terms for the West's granting of aid to Russia.

To all appearances, that is the fundamental difference between the approach of the reformers' team toward the question of the use of Western aid in contrast to previous union governments, under which our foreign debt reached $80 billion, for which we are now having to pay.

The package of $43.4 billion announced in Tokyo last month is support for Russian reforms with an increase in the foreign debt. Unless we are sure we shall be able to make effective use of these resources we shall enter a spiral of foreign debts such that no Paris club will be able to help us, A. Shokhin stressed.

The government has already, for instance, assessed its potential with regard to the package of Western guarantees and bilateral credits for $11 billion. It turned out that in reality only slightly over half of this can be used for the simple reason that right now we are obliged to reduce credit injections into the economy to prevent an increase in the foreign debt.

So far there are also few chances that the ruble stabilization fund of $6 billion will be used this year. We should ask for it only when the certainty appears that it will not be spent in vain. Taking this sum now, with a state budget deficit markedly in excess of 10 percent and with inflation nearly 20 percent a month is pointless.

As we know, the government program statements emphasize a reduction in inflation to 5.5 percent by the end of the year and a reduction in the budget deficit to 5 percent of GNP. These tasks, incidentally, were set for the end of last year but were not fulfilled.

As before it is difficult to resolve this task today. But quite good prerequisites exist for its fulfillment—above all the results of the referendum, which should now be backed up in the economic sphere. For that it is essential to pursue a balanced but very tough economic policy. Something is already taking place in that sense. Thus, right now all preferential credits previously granted by the Central Bank go through a mechanism of agreement in accordance with the criteria of the Russian Government's structural policy.

In the opinion of Vice Premier Shokhin it is important that under conditions of the unceasing political struggle in society the government should not be tempted to adopt popular decisions. It must pursue a policy which is objectively dictated by present conditions and consider the mandate of trust received from the people.

During the recent talks in Washington the Russian side succeeded in persuading international financial institutions that a rigid way out into world prices for energy carriers is not appropriate to us. That has made it possible to achieve an easing of the credit terms for our oil sector. The rehabilitation credit of $0.5 billion already allocated by the World Bank and the other credits which are expected will enable our oil workers to hope for the import of new equipment to extraction areas by the end of this year. And that means that next year it is possible to count on stabilizing oil extraction. If we succeed in launching the rehabilitation of 30,000 boreholes which are now idle then that will promise a quite rapid return, since the boreholes begin to work within two or three months.

Russia is continuing to seek fairer terms for participation in international trade. To judge by what Aleksandr Shokhin said, we are not the only ones who should be blamed for dumping prices on the world market. In the very near future we intend to supply the Americans with materials confirming that the United States is resorting to dumping in an attempt to remove Russia from a deal with the Malaysian government for the sale of Mig-29 fighters. At the same time the Americans were asked to act more conscientiously with regard to us in the arms market.

Answering a question about possible changes in the Russian Federation government, A. Shokhin noted that changes are not out of the question. As regards Yegor Gaydar joining the government, you must first ask Yegor Timurovich himself to what extent he is now ready to join the government, bearing in mind that the post of first vice premier and at the same time minister of finances is the most natural for him. But that post is held by B. Fedorov, who would obviously agree to move to the post of Central Bank chairman on condition that V. Gerashchenko left it voluntarily. But that is very hard to do without the parliament's support. In any case initiatives for changes in the government should come from the president or prime minister.

Yeltsin, Canada's Mulroney Hold Ceremonial Meeting

LD0605194993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1729 GMT 6 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennnadiy Talalayev]

[Excerpt] Moscow May 6 TASS—A ceremonial meeting between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and visiting Canadian Prime-Minister Brian Mulroney, took place in St. George's Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace. During the ceremony the Russian and Canadian national anthems were played.

After the ceremony Yeltsin and Mulroney left for the Russian president's residence in the countryside, where one-to-one talks were held.

Official Russo-Canadian summit talks are to begin in the Kremlin tomorrow. [passage omitted]

Kozyrev, France's Juppe Discuss Bosnian Serb Decision

LD0605185193 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1700 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev had an in-depth telephone conversation today with French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, the first for the past several days, in which they both expressed their especially negative assessment of the Bosnian Serb assembly's refusal to ratify the Vance-Owen plan, and in which they expressed a firm intention to act jointly in order to work out effective and resolute measures by the world community in order to achieve an end to the war in Bosnia.

Talks With Spain's Solana

LD0605190893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1818 GMT 6 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Georgiy Shmelyev]

[Text] Moscow May 6 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev had a telephone conversation with his Spanish counterpart, Javier Solana, on Thursday.

The two ministers discussed the situation concerning a settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and possible steps towards overcoming the Bosnian crisis.

Talks With Abkhazia End in Maykop

LD0605192693 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1700 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] The Russian-Abkhazian consultations on the question of a settlement to the armed conflict in Abkhazia have just ended. Fulfilling a mediatory function, the Russian Federation delegation told the Abkhazian representatives of the results of the talks between the Russian and Georgian government delegations, which were held in Sochi from 6 to 9 April.

The Russian delegation was headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Pastukhov, and the Abkhazian delegation by Sergey Dzhidzholia, first deputy chairman of the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet. The participants in the consultations were greeted by Aslam Dzharipov, president of Adyge.

Talks Detailed

LD0605220693 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1800 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] [Announcer] Talks between the government delegations of Russia and Abkhazia on a way to achieve a political solution to the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict were held today in Maykop, capital of the Republic of Adygeya. Khristian Dzhaniya reports:

[Dzhaniya] The Russian delegation was led by Boris Pastukhov, Russian Federation deputy foreign minister, the Abkhazian side by Sokrat Dzhidzholia, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Abkhazia. The Russian Federation Government delegation presented its draft plan for a political settlement to the Georgian-Abkhazian war.

The government delegation of the Republic of Abkhazia has drawn up its own plan—approved by the republic's Supreme Soviet—on halting Georgia's aggression against Abkhazia, as the document says. Boris Pastukhov said that the delegation led by him set itself the tasks of finding out the positions taken by the two sides, familiarizing itself with their proposals, and trying to discover possible ways to stop the war. The Russian side stated that the tripartite summit Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze is striving for will not take place until a realistic mecnanism for establishing a cease-fire in Abkhazia is found. Russia is no longer ready, Boris Pastukhov said, to accept the half measures that the sides have resorted to in their search for a way to stop the war between Georgia and Abkhazia. The Sochi talks between Russia and Georgia were of the same nature and they turned out to be unsuccessful.

The official representatives of Russia stated that the Russian Federation is striving for a full-scale settlement to the problem. The Abkhazian side stated that it is also striving for this.

[Announcer] We do not have any further news on the Tbilisi talks.

Further on Consultations

LD0605211793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2016 GMT 6 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Viktor Zhilyakov]

[Text] Maykop May 6 TASS—Russo-Abkhazian consultations ended in the city of Maykop on Thursday [6 May].

A communique adopted upon completion of the consultations says that Abkhazia agreed in principle to proposals made during talks between Russian and Georgian Government delegations, held in Sochi between April 6-9, on an immediate and complete ceasefire without any preliminary conditions and other proposals concerning ways of the settlement of the armed conflict in Abkhazia.

The communique says that a necessary condition for the settlement should be an agreement on the withdrawal of Georgian armed formations from the conflict zone except the necessary minimum needed to guard strategically important facilities and maintain law and order as part of tripartite units on the basis of decisions adopted by a commission for control and inspection in Abkhazia.

The Russian delegation to the consultations, which performed mediatory functions, was led by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Pastukhov, and the Abkhazian delegation was led by first deputy chairman of the Abkhazian parliament, Sergey Djindzhoilia.

Kuwaiti Deputy Foreign Minister Meets Kozyrev

LD0605191693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1823 GMT 6 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow May 6 TASS—The main aim of the visit of the Kuwaiti deputy foreign minister to Russia is to exchange opinions on the development of Russo-Kuwaiti relations and discuss international problems of mutual interest, Kuwaiti Deputy Foreign Minister Sulayman al-Shahin told ITAR-TASS on Thursday [6 May] upon completion of a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev.

The Kuwaiti minister arrived in Moscow on a brief working visit.

Sulayman al-Shahin expressed his gratitude for the support Russia had given to Kuwait during the days of Iraqi aggression and for Russia's position of support to Kuwait displayed by the Russian Federation in the U.N. Security Council. The Kuwaiti minister brought a message from Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, addressed to Andrey Kozyrev.

Sulayman al-Shahin said that during meetings with Russian officials questions of strengthening and developing relations between Russia and Kuwait in different spheres were discussed, from economic to defence issues. "Despite the fact that Kuwait is a small country, it might play a prominent role on the Russian market of capitals and might actively and fruitfully cooperate with the Russian Federation," the Kuwaiti minister said.

He pointed out that a draft agreement on mutual encouragement and protection of investments had been initialed, saying there was a possibility that the treaty would be signed in the near future.

He stressed the importance of stepping up contacts between the two countries in all spheres, adding that planned official visits by Russian and Kuwaiti representatives would promote these contacts.

Holds Talks With Georgiy Khizha

LD0705112393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1111 GMT 7 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—Kuwaiti deputy minister for foreign affairs, Sulayman al-Shahin is in Moscow on a short working visit today.

He met Georgiy Khizha, deputy prime minister of the Russian Government, to discuss questions of strengthening and developing bilateral economic relations and, in particular, military and technical cooperation.

The parties noted a joint interest by Russia and Kuwait to increase cooperation between the two states in trade, economic and financial ties.

Commentary Says Ukraine's Nuclear Weapons Threaten Planet

LD0605215793 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 6 May 93

[Commentary by Aleksandr Gerasimov; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Russia has called on Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other countries of the CIS to rapidly accede to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. This is stated in a working document presented by our state to the UN. Russia considers that one of the priorities of multilateral disarmament should be the consistent fulfillment of accords which have already been achieved. By the way, not everything is going well in this respect. [Video shows mobile nuclear missiles, launch facilities, Ukrainian parliament and officials.]

[Aleksandr Gerasimov] It seems that after a short pause, the strategic nuclear missiles of the former Soviet Union based in Ukraine are once again beginning to be used for their planned purpose—as an instrument of deterrence and a solid argument in political discussions, in this instance, Kiev's discussions with nearby and distant foreign countries.

Statements made two years ago by the newly independent Ukraine about the republic's nuclear-free status are taking on an increasingly eroded appearance. The idea is now going the rounds that if Ukraine gives up the strategic missiles it will no longer be taken into account and it will fall into the rank of third-ranking countries with the corresponding economic and political consequences.

A number of influential parties and movements have already worked out a program for turning Ukraine into a

real nuclear power, from setting up their own nuclear forces command to retargetting the missiles according to the principle of "security in all directions." Moreover, military specialists say that technically this task is quite feasible.

At the present time, all of the 1,250 nuclear warheads stationed in Ukraine are officially considered to be Russian and are operationally subordinated to Russia, although in effect this subordination is purely formal and [Ukrainian] President Kravchuk has even been given the right and possibility of forbidding the launch of missiles. Moscow generals assert that the Ukrainian military administration puts all sorts of obstacles in the way of Russian specialists to prevent them from gaining access to launch installations, thus leaving the missiles without the necessary inspection.

The chief of staff of the strategic missile forces considers that no one can today guarantee the complete safety of the nuclear missiles in Ukraine. So, Kiev's political arguments are being paid for by vast risks, not only to the citizens of that republic but perhaps of the whole planet.

Moscow Urges North-South Dialogue To Solve Nuclear Issue

SK0605141493 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean 1000 GMT 5 May 93

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] The issue of nuclear inspection of the DPRK has emerged as a serious problem. In connection with this, Yevgeny Kristov, commentator of this broadcast network, writes:

The situation is changing concerning [word indistinct]. The contact between representatives of the DPRK and the United States and talks between Pyongyang and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] have resulted in a certain degree of progaress.

The DPRK expressed the intention to accept international inspection of one of the two military facilities [kunsa taesang]. This was made public by IAEA representative David Kyd.

One of the basic reasons that Pyongyang withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] was that the IAEA demanded special inspections [tukpyol sachal] of the two sites in the DPRK. The IAEA suspected that Pyongyang is developing nuclear weapons in these sites. However, the DPRK resolutely rejected this allegation.

Pyongyang stressed that these two facilities are military sites and have nothing to do with nuclear activities. Pyongyang asserted that the demand for inspection of these facilities is intended for inspection of (?military facilities) in the DPRK. Pyongyang also repeatedly pointed out that the United States is pursuing such aims through the IAEA.

The issue of managing nuclear weapons is much more complex than one thinks. Therefore, problems exist not only in the DPRK but also in the IAEA itself. This was pointed out by DPRK Information Committee Chairman Kim Ki-yong during his visit to Malaysia.

He stated that if four conditions are accepted, the DPRK will return to the NPT. He said: First of all, U.S. nuclear weapons must be withdrawn from South Korea; international guarantees should be made that the United States will not (?implement) its nuclear plans [haek kyehoek] against the DPRK; the IAEA should be firm in keeping its neutral position; and the demand for inspection of military facilities in the DPRK should be revoked.

Today's situation reflects [word indistinct]. The North and South of Korea, divided for more than 40 years and militarily confronting each other, expanded their arsenals while distrusting each other. To denuclearize the Korean peninsula and to liquidate the past, dialogue between the North and the South is necessary. At the talks, they should work out a solution to the problems.

Russian-Built Sub Plays 'Main Role' in Iranian Exercise

PM0605154593 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1400 GMT 5 May 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer Osokin over video of submarine with helicopter flying overhead.] Iran is staging large-scale maneuvers in the Persian Gulf under the code name Piroozi (Victory). The main role in these maneuvers is being played by a new submarine acquired in Russia. In the near future Iran will be adding to its arsenal two more submarines which have been ordered in Russia. This was stated by Admiral Mohtaj, chief of the Iranian Navy.

Yeltsin Thanks Bulgarian President for Support

LD0605220293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2014 GMT 6 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Stepanenko]

[Text] Sofia May 6 TASS—Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev received a message from the Russian president, in which Yeltsin expressed his gratitude to the Bulgarian president for the support of democratic transformation in Russia, the BTA news agency reported on Thursday with reference to the press centre of the Bulgarian president's office.

Yeltsin expressed confidence that agreements reached during the Russo-Bulgarian summit in summer 1992, would be more concretely realised, particularly in the sphere of economic cooperation and trade, the massage said.

The Russian president wished Zhelyu Zhelev and the Bulgarian people success in the implementation of democratic reforms.

Vladimir Petrovskiy on UN Role, Reform

MK0605115093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No.19, 9 May 93 (Signed to Press 4 May) p A 14

[Interview with Vladimir Petrovskiy, UN deputy secretary general and director of the UN office in Geneva, by Nelli Biul-Zegdenidze, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent in Geneva; date not given: "United Nations: A New Role"]

[Text] Vladimir Petrovskiy has become the first Russian diplomat to be appointed head of the UN office in Europe. In an interview with MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, he ponders the role the United Nations has to play under new international conditions.

[Biul-Zegdenidze] Mr. Petrovskiy, how do you explain your appointment?

[Petrovskiy] This post, one of the key ones in the United Nations, has traditionally been occupied by representatives of West European countries. Having entrusted it to a Russian diplomat, the UN secretary general and the international community have demonstrated their understanding of the fact that Russia has become an inalienable part of Europe.

[Biul-Zegdenidze] You are a Russian citizen, but at the same time you are a UN bureaucrat. How do you feel in this role?

[Petrovskiy] Any political figure, any diplomat, as he joins the UN service, undertakes to represent its interests. Hence, the main guideline for me is the UN Charter. But at present Russian interests are not at odds with those of the United Nations. As a representative of this organization, I pay heed to the role Russia has to play and the clout it carries on the international scene. I do not belong to those who believe that at present there is only one superpower left in the world—the United States. I continue to believe that there are two of them—the United States and Russia—and that the status of international relations largely depends on their conduct.

[Biul-Zegdenidze] You have been criticized for allegedly pursuing U.S. policies inside the United Nations. How would you answer your opponents in Russia?

[Petrovskiy] What they have written in some Russian newspapers, in particular that my staff in New York is American only, is not criticism but a lie. There was one American on my staff, but aside from him there were representatives from India, Japan, Russia, some Latin American countries... As for my viewpoint, it has always been as follows: There should be a partnership between the United States and Russia—not a partnership where one side readily approves of whatever the other does, but a real one based on respect.

[Biul-Zegdenidze] To how many positions is Russia entitled within the UN system, how much does it pay to the UN budget, and will Russian remain one of the official UN languages?

[Petrovskiy] After the USSR ceased to exist, the quota also diminished. Nonetheless, it has currently been argued that Russia has too many positions to the detriment of the other republics of the former USSR. As far as Russia's contribution to the UN budget is concerned, it has also decreased to some extent, but Russia still faces difficulties in paying it. The United Nations understands this, but at the same time they proceed from the assumption here that Russia should also realize what difficulties the United Nations is facing. The more so because a lot has been done within the UN system to help Russia and the other states of the former USSR.

As for the Russian language, the talk about its abolition is the product of a sick imagination. Ironically, upon the creation of new states in the territory of the former USSR, the need for the Russian language has even increased. For example, we have sent a mission to the Central Asian republics, and they have asked us that we include Russian-speaking people in the delegation.

[Biul-Zegdenidze] You have been called upon to head the second largest UN center after New York at a time when the United Nations is undergoing a fairly painful period of reorganization. What is the essence of this reorganization?

[Petrovskiy] Reforms inside the United Nations have begun with a reform of its chief executive body, the UN secretariat. Last year, the cabinet under Butrus-Ghali, of which I am a member, started the implementation of the first stage of reform. So, we have reorganized the UN headquarters in New York, and now it is handling new problems. This is, first, preventive diplomacy; second, the broadening of the scale of UN peacemaking operations; and third, the creation of conditions that will rule out the possibility of conflicts.

[Biul-Zegdenidze] What is your attitude to Boris Yeltsin's statement that Russia at present could act as mediator in settling interethnic and other conflicts on the territory of the former USSR?

[Petrovskiy] I believe that conflicts should be resolved not unilaterally, but by joint efforts. Take the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh: the settlement effort under way there is undertaken within the framework of the CSCE. The United Nations welcomes the involvement of any country willing to engage in peacemaking operations in this region. If we take the Georgian- Abkhaz conflict, the principled position advocated by the United Nations is a peaceful settlement of the conflict on the basis of a Russian-Georgian agreement.

[Biul-Zegdenidze] The Security Council was set up after World War II, so obviously neither Germany nor Japan could join it, but how would you explain the fact that even now these world powers remain outside it?

[Petrovskiy] I personally believe that today this problem is ripe for solution, and there is no question about whether or not Japan and Germany should become members of the Security Council. I think many people who follow the policies of these countries do not have any doubts in that regard. The question is how to find a solution to this problem without detriment to the efficiency of the Security Council or the representation of other states in the council. Currently, an active discussion is under way to resolve this problem, and I think that in the end it will be resolved favorably for Germany and Japan.

Political Issues

Yeltsin 6 May Address on Referendum Results

LD0605190293 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1630 GMT 6 May 93

[Address to the nation by President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow—live]

[Text] Esteemed fellow countrymen, the official results of the nationwide referendum in Russia on 25 April have been summed up. For many, both in Russia and abroad, they turned out to be unexpected. There has never been an instance in the world in which a similar nationwide plebiscite would be held in the height of a crisis, at a most difficult time for the reforms.

I believe that the main result of the referendum was the support which the citizens of Russia gave to the president and the government, and the policy which they are implementing. The referendum confirmed that Russians really want radical changes in Russia. We genuinely want to cure our country from what ails it. We are aware of our responsibility toward the country, toward us, ourselves and toward our children and grandchildren. The citizens of Russia showed their best qualities at the referendum. They turned out to be wiser than what many deputies thought of them at the Congress, and wiser than opposition leaders thought them to be. People came to understand and feel the main thing: It is only through reforms, no matter how difficult they are, that Russia will be able to embark upon a path of rebirth. There is no other way.

I am proud that our people have made this choice. Freedom, democracy and the dignity of individuals are gaining a firm foothold in Russia. It is genuinely a great choice of a great people. The need to live like human beings is beginning to be part and parcel of our flesh and blood. What brought people to the referendum was the desire to put an end to anarchy, to the constant and harsh opposition to the reforms. None of this is a concoction by the media—it is a reality of our life, of which they are not only aware, but with which they constantly come up against.

The May Day tragedy in Moscow confirmed once again that the irreconcilable opposition, relying on the support of the Supreme Soviet, would stop at nothing. It is capable of resorting to any violations of the law, to crime, to the deaths of people, just in order to obstruct us in the common cause of transformation in Russia. The death of Vladimir Tolokneyev is a serious signal both to the president and to everyone in Russia. We must not weaken for a minute despite the positive results of the referendum.

The neo-Bolsheviks are ready to sacrifice the people once again and to plunge the country into the abyss of violence and arbitrary rule merely to seize power again. This will not happen. We are in favor of civil peace, and the president and government will have the strength to protect stability and tranquillity in Russia. We shall not permit a second civil war. Those who are trying to stir one up will answer for their actions in accordance with the full strictness of the law. No one has the right to violate it.

I regard your confidence at the referendum as your demand that we act more resolutely on this matter. I disagree categorically with the notion that the vote on 25 April has caused a split in society. The referendum clearly showed the stance of the citizens of Russia. The majority of those who took part in the referendum are on the side of the policy of reforms. It is time for deputies to declare themselves. Do they accept the choice of the people, or will they continue to reject the policy of the president and government as supported by Russians? Their political future will depend on it. The will of the people, the will of the majority of voters is higher than the will of the Supreme Soviet, the Congress and any other body or leader. That is why decisions which hinder the pursuit of reforms and destabilize the situation in the country must be rescinded and not adopted in future.

Both the Congress and the Supreme Soviet have already adopted many decisions of this kind. It is all the more important because the Congress of People's Deputies did not have the courage to ask the people directly in the referendum whether or not it has confidence in the Congress.

In 87 Russian constituencies out of 90, the majority of voters said they wanted early elections of deputies. In this regard, the following question is appropriate. Do the Congress and Supreme Soviet have a mandate of trust from the people? Do they have the right to make decisions in its name? The answer is self-evident. This was a major political defeat for Russia's legislative bodies, and one must have the courage openly and honestly to admit it.

Here is another difficult and bitter point for me: The referendum was a defeat for the vice president, Aleksandr Vladimirovich Rutskoy. He recently switched from criticism of some areas of the government's work and its specific actions to wholesale negation of everything the president and the executive authority were doing. During the preparations for the referendum the vice president de facto became one of the leaders of the opponents of reform. A situation where the vice president enters into political struggle with the president and his policy is a unique one. There are not even any legal mechanisms developed for such a case in any country of the world, including Russia, but as president I am obliged to undertake measures. I lost trust in Rutskoy and dismissed him from all responsibilities assigned to him by the president. The reason is simple: Their discharge was being used for personal political purposes, and to the detriment of the business and course of the transformations being conducted by the president and government.

In the run-up to the referendum I was already speaking about what I intended to do when it was over. Now that

the exact results are known, I can tell you in more detail about the steps which are to follow.

First: Both the President and the government, having received support in the referendum, intend to pursue energetically the course of the reforms. The most decisive measures will be adopted in order to create a socially orientated market economy in Russia. We talked about this at the session of the Council of Ministers on 29 April. The specific targets have been identified. The main task in the economy is the fight against inflation. No one now needs to be convinced of the danger it poses. If we do not get it down, we will not succeed in halting or slowing down the rise in prices; nor will we be able to ensure normal working conditions for those who produce, and, what follows, for extricating ourselves from the crisis. Firmness, consistency and a principled approach are important in the fight against inflation. It will not be stopped if no order is brought to the allocation of credits, subsidies, grants, the extension of benefits to regions and enterprises. We are not so rich as to be able to continue to throw money about.

The government and the Central Bank must take a clear-cut stance here. Relevant measures are already being adopted for this.

In the second place, having lent their support to the president at the referendum, the citizens of Russia demanded that the process of building our statehood and of adopting a new Russian Federation Constitution should be accelerated. The heads of the Russian republics, krays and oblasts, and all subjects of the federation have already received the new draft basic law. It was published in the Russian press on 30 April. The constitution will be studied by them before 20 May, and it is then intended to convene a constitutional meeting with the participation of all subjects of the federation. I think that work on the new constitution must not be protracted. It must not be the product of a group of authors or of some single body; the new constitution of Russia must be created by the joint efforts of all subjects of the federation and of federal power with the active participation of sensible political forces and people's deputies who are worried by the protracted constitutional crisis, and, of course, with the participation of our most prominent legal experts.

I have been informed that the chairman of the Supreme Soviet has appointed a session of the Constitutional Commission for 7 May. I state that that decision is unlawful. I remind you that the president of Russia is the chairman of the Constitutional Commission. And I will make the decision to convene the Constitutional Commission when the need for it arises.

I also intend shortly to submit for discussion a draft normative act on elections to the federal parliament. I think that elections to the new parliament should not be later than autumn this year.

Third, I regard the strengthening of our federation as the most important direction in my work. During the referendum the hysterical claims that holding the referendum would lead to the disintegration of Russia were not justified. Leaders of the republics, autonomous administrative entities, krays and oblasts, and the citizens of the country demonstrated true patriotism and a great desire to preserve the integrity of the Russian state. The fact that in some republics and regions a minority of voters supported the president and the government is ground for serious reflections and conclusions. We have the Federal Treaty. Now, together with the subjects of the federation we should work at legal procedures and coordinate federal interests. This is what I intend to get closely involved in.

Four, an intolerant crime situation has evolved in Russia. Taking into consideration the seriousness of the matter, I have decided to head personally the interdepartmental commission for combating crime. A lot is to be done. For many months we have been saying that the existing criminal code is a long way behind the times. It fails to make it possible to stop embezzlements connected with the market economy. So far we have failed to use the experience of the prerevolutionary criminal legislation. Also, the criminal code of the time of the New Economic Policy can help us in this.

Of course, the situation is more complex now, because entrepreneurs are often defenseless against arbitrary actions of state officials. A just indignation in society is being caused by the fact that the most dangerous crimes against individuals, such as gangsterism, robbery and encroachment on citizens' property often remain unpunished. We must ensure at all costs that they inevitably face responsibility. Legal proceedings should be made fast and be streamlined. It is the state's responsibility to ensure the safety of militiamen. Sadly, the issue of combatting crime has lately become an object of political speculations. You know my standpoint: Neither before nor at present have I defended criminals or bribe-takers, nor protected immoral people, swindlers, cads and traitors, whatever post they might happen to hold. But I have always had a rule—never to act on the strength of rumors and never to believe something which is not a confirmed fact. And if a person is guilty, he should answer for it in accordance with the law. I promise that I will study meticulously the documents submitted to the commission for combatting crime, so that the cases can be passed to the Procuracy in the shortest time possible.

Fifth, the referendum has also highlighted another problem—the personnel problem. We were aware and saw clearly that in the provinces—as in fact in the federal bodies—the progress of the policy pursued by the president and the government is being impeded or even blocked. Many decisions are being implemented in a fashion that compromises the reforms themselves. Those who do not agree with our policy must simply go, so as not to interfere with our work. The head of the government and heads of administrations should look upon a drastic reconsideration of their personnel policy as a

direct presidential instruction. In turn, I have been drawing serious conclusions myself, and am already preparing some decisions.

I have talked about just a few of the steps to be taken by executive authority. It will now operate more decisively. I have emphasized that an effective method for fulfilling the mandate of popular confidence does exist, and no one will be able to deflect us from the path we have chosen.

Esteemed people of Russia. From the bottom of my heart I wish to thank you for taking the idea of the referendum to heart, for coming to the polling stations and for casting your votes. I wish to thank millions of ordinary citizens, activists of public committees, headquarters in support of the referendum, political parties and movements, and trade unions, who supported the policy of the president and the government at this difficult time. I wish to thank entrepreneurs, farmers, authors, poets, artistes, journalists, radio and television workers, and all Russian intelligentsia who came to the defense of the policy of transformations in Russia. Thank you for your unselfish activity. I believe that without this truly popular support the referendum would not have taken place.

The day of 25 April will go down in the history of Russia. We will remember it as a victory of democracy and as a triumph of the expression of free will by the people of Russia. The most important thing for all of us now is to consolidate and develop this success. Let's be together as we were at the referendum on 25 April.

Esteemed fellow countrymen. This meeting is taking place on the eve of the day of the great victory and the anniversary of the Russian Armed Forces. I think it is deeply symbolic that these two remarkable holidays almost coincide with each other. The Army supported the president at the referendum—68 percent voted yes. The Russian Armed Forces are carrying on honorably military traditions of all generations of the defenders of the motherland. For all the people of Russia, 9 May is filled with joy and at the same time with deep sorrow and pain for what we have lost. This is our common holiday, celebrated both by veterans who experienced all bitter adversities of the war time, and by young people who know no war hardships. Our soldiers sacrificed their blood and their lives for the freedom of the motherland. Their feat is great, glorious, and immortal.

I express profound gratitude and bow my head to all the veterans. I wish you health and life energy, peace and well-being.

Dear fellow countrymen. Let's make this day peaceful and calm, as Victory Day should be. This is within our powers.

Post-Referendum Options Considered

PM0705092993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 May 93 First Edition p 4

[Article by Yuriy Levada of All-Russian Center for Study of Public Opinion: "After Referendum: Options for Action"]

[Text] The country's political sky is still not cloudless following the storms over the referendum, as was only to be expected. The past few days have shown that the losers are prepared to undertake both minor parliamentary scandals and major street provocations in order to assert themselves and to attempt to cancel out the results of the global vote.

No political success turns of its own accord into a great and irreversible advance; any offensive can peter out unless developed with due efficiency—we have seen enough examples of this over the past 18-24 months. We should, above all, investigate what happened and consider options for the further development of events.

The opposition, supported this time by a number of "disappointed" heralds of perestroyka, intimidated people with a split in society and popular anger. A split really did occur, but it was considerably earlier—after the euphoric times of perestroyka and August 1991 (rather, it was not a split but an inevitable demarcation of forces which had been thrown together by the will of circumstances). What has happened now is an unprecedented—and even unexpected on such a scale—**consolidation** of society around the forces and symbols of democracy. This is a complex process which merits attentive examination.

Elements of "Soviet" tradition clearly affected various aspects of the referendum: In the countryside, for example, the habit of universal participation in voting told most strongly, whereas people in the cities more frequently chose their own mode of behavior. Of course, we should not regret the demise of the unanimous "we approve." The policy represented by the president was supported most actively by Russia's major cities and industrial centers (incidentally, "consumer materialism," which still has a very strong hold on our minds, once again found itself disgraced, for Moscow, St. Petersburg, the industrial Urals, and other centers of massive support for reform are far from being in first place for the population's standard and ease of living). The urban population as a whole, particularly residents of large cities, supported the president's policy to a greater degree than the rural population did. Young people more than the elderly; educated and skilled people more than the less educated, etc. In short, a perfectly normal distribution of sympathies, as we have observed repeatedly in complex situations in recent years. (Two-thirds of the population participating in a vote is also a normal indicator of public activeness, close to "world" standards in this respect). Yes, practically everywhere there is talk of a majority of the politically active population having participated in the vote. However the losing side

might excel in interpreting the methods of counting votes, it is always only the active, functioning majority that is of **political** significance everywhere.

The question now is how to turn this real support by a real majority into a strong and constantly operating factor.

We still remember one method. The leader of the Bolsheviks, who failed utterly in the all-Russian elections to the Constituent Assembly, argued (and proved) that support in the main cities and among the most active social groups at the time was sufficient to keep his party in power. But what was needed for this was something that does not and—it has to be hoped—cannot exist today: a militarized party, an all-powerful secret police, fanaticism, cruelty, and the fear and obedience of the unorganized, exhausted masses.

Today we have neither a party of fanatics—those groups of hysterical fighters who, in order to destabilize the situation, are prepared to side with monarchists and extreme reactionaries cannot be regarded as fighters for the ideals of communism—nor a people prepared to submit to them. Just as there is not, in general, the featureless "mass of people" which both the authorities and the intelligentsia in Russia used for purposes of intimidation for 100 years (and were frightened by it). There are people, groups, and forces, there are intellects and passions, habits and impatience. In a certain sense, everything "conforms with human nature" [vse "kak u lyudey"]. True, there is also quite a real degree of common sense. This has been indicated repeatedly by our poll data and—particularly convincingly today—by the referendum results.

Important problems are being engendered by the regional differentiation of recent political processes; of course, this also affected the 25 April voting results. A significant proportion of yesterday's autonomous entities and a number of oblasts—mainly agrarian ones—refused to support the president and his policy. (Extreme cases which are of a special nature—the distribution of sympathies in Ingushetia or Tatarstan—should be examined separately, outside the all-Russian context). Russia's support for the president, as shown by the referendum, is certainly not the sum of the support from the regions or, as they are now officially called, the subjects of the federation. Hence certain consequences ensue for possible orientations for the future.

There is another consideration with regard to the present consolidation. It incorporates two principles, as it were: rational and emotional. Quite a sober calculation for the success of the reform and of democracy. And a surge of sympathy for the president's policy and person, which is characteristic of Russia's political soul and is occasioned by fears concerning the return to power of "yesterday's men." And this, given a virtually complete lack of a connecting and stabilizing principle—the organizational foundation. There is no longer any need to recall how M. Gorbachev's well-intentioned attempts to organize reforms through a "renewed" party failed. And yet the attempts by B. Yeltsin's "team" to get the reforms moving with the help of a decaying and corrupt state apparatus have proved a little more successful. If today we are judging—apparently not without grounds—the irreversibility of the changes, it is not because the reforms have a good organizational basis but simply because the mainstays of the old system have been thoroughly destroyed (including in the consciousness of the vast majority of people).

This means that, in order not to allow success to slip away and in order to justify yet another mandate from the people—most likely the last one—it is necessary at last to lay the sound foundations of the new statehood. This was not done (maybe it could not have be done) right after August 1991. It is a question not just of the text of the new constitution or the means of adopting it but precisely of statehood, which presupposes democracy's real strength throughout the Russian area. To be still more specific, the task during the next few weeks or months is to find an effective way to resolve this task.

Where are we to seek the point of support with whose help it would be possible to put our tangled state system on its feet? It is hard to imagine that this point can be defined in some single act or decision. We will most likely have to compare and adjust various attempts. But these are only suppositions, and so I can afford to compare some purely imaginary options.

First, the option "from below." In the electrified atmosphere before the referendum, committees or other public organizations in support of the president's policy emerged in many regions. I do not know how significant such forms are in various places, but they could have undoubted prospects—if only as an additional point of political support for the authority. It is possible, however, that this is just too romantic an option for our everyday life.

Second, options of actions "from above."

The specters of "strong-arm" decisions have long been looming—and not just in the opposition's frightened propaganda. Until recently they have not elicited considerable sympathies from public opinion, which fears any coercion. But today, in the sociopsychological situation since 25 April, hardly any significant forces will be found in society which would rush to save the outmoded and discredited semiparliament. Russia's international positions will benefit rather than suffer if this organ's activity is suspended somehow. The way I see it today, the problem is a different one. It is not difficult to disband, cut short, etc. by means of strong-arm methods, but it is impossible to consolidate society and govern the country with their help. In addition, any dependence of authority on the "power structures" (be it the Army, state security, or, let us assume, the re-created Cossack squadrons) is attended by the risk of authority itself becoming the hostage of such structures.

True, this applies not only to structures of the power type. The "federative" option, which has been discussed widely of late (and presupposes the president's direct appeal to subjects of the federation or to the planned Federation Council), has both strong and weak and even, probably, risky aspects. It is tempting, of course, that this option could create some legitimate federative roof in order to seek a way out of the constitutional impasse. But there is no constitutional legitimacy in this formation. In addition—and this is probably the chief thing—the sentiments of federal subjects are too dissimilar (this is also indicated by the referendum results by region) and quite frequently are full of local separatism. Any Russian power will have to reckon with this situation for a long time to come, but it would be a good thing to avoid, as far as possible, the role of a "hostage."

It is possible to imagine one more option—that of accord among reasonable forces which recognize reality and wish to find the way out for the country. Of course, no repeats of the untenable "triple" deals of December 1992 or March 1993 are possible. (Incidentally, was it possible to consider them strictly constitutional?). But among deputies, among public movements, and, let us assume, among local leaders there are many serious and responsible people who together with representatives of the president and the government could constitute some temporary consultative organ (let us assume, a temporary state conference or assembly or something in that spirit). Such a conference could discuss drafts of important edicts, prepare for the adoption of the constitution, and create a representative mainstay (and counterweight) of the governmental power. Temporarily, i.e. until the constitutional crisis is resolved. Of course, without figures who have compromised themselves and without extremists.

To judge from polls in recent weeks, the idea of convening a constituent assembly or constitutional assembly is becoming more popular. Yet the central question here concerns who is to convene such an assembly and how. This is inseparable from the question of how the country is to live until it gets a new working constitution.

Civic Union Analyzes 'Contradictory' Results

PM0605161793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 May 93 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "The Solution to the Crisis Is Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections"]

[Text] The preliminary results of the 25 April referendum have been analyzed by the Civic Union Executive Committee. The committee believes that the referendum confirmed a fact repeatedly pointed to by Civic Union: A broad consensus has developed in Russian society concerning the need for economic and political reforms. The threat of "communist revanche," actively used during the propaganda campaign to intimidate domestic and foreign opinion, proved to be a fabrication.

The president reinforced his positions as a result of the referendum. The ballot results do not provide even a formal basis for early reelection of the body of deputies. This indicates a rejection of political radicalism, of the battle between the branches of power "until final victory."

The results of the referendum are extremely contradictory. The policy of the president and the government received support in 40 regions, including the majority of the national republics. Thirty-five million voters—a majority of those who took part in the ballot—voted for an early presidential election. These results not only provide no grounds for victory celebrations but in fact reveal a severe crisis of power.

The nonparticipation of certain of the Russian Federation republics in the referendum and the mass support given by the populations of a number of republics and oblasts to the additional questions will undoubtedly be used by forces committed to the disintegration of the Russian Federation. Its collapse could also be accelerated by any attempts to shape the policy of the federal center depending on the political orientation of a particular region.

We have yet to discover the cost of the preelection promises, which are destined either to remain unfulfilled or to provoke a new spiral of inflation.

The Civic Union Executive Committee points to the need for a new course of reforms and a new socioeconomic, national, and regional policy on the basis of the centrist forces' proposals. We propose that the work of the "roundtable" of political and social forces be resumed in order to seek ways of reaching civil consensus.

Civic Union has repeatedly noted that the solution of the political crisis is possible only as a result of presidential and parliamentary elections. Today the road to elections lies through a new, democratic Constitution. We call on the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies to accelerate its preparation on the basis of the Constitutional Commission's draft.

The Civic Union Executive Committee notes that in the course of preparing for the referendum the equality required by law in the rights and opportunities of the various political forces to propagate their positions through state television and radio broadcasting was not observed, and it demands changes in the system of leadership of the state mass media to guarantee real pluralism and the objectivity of news.

We support Vice President A. Rutskoy, who is fighting corruption and abuse in the higher echelons of of power, and believe that he should be given the opportunity to continue this work, which is vitally important to the country.

Referendum Shows Yeltsin's 'Unstable' Social Base

PM0605124993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 May 93 p 1

["Analysis" article by Vladimir Kuznechevskiy: "The President Won the Referendum in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Sverdlovsk. And Lost in the Russian Heartlands. In These Conditions a Compromise Is Vitally Necessary for the Good of Russia and Its Peoples"]

[Excerpts] The results of the referendum show that such an unstable social base will not make it possible to carry out radical reforms. Unless force is used, but using violence on the economy and society will only lead, ultimately, to Russia being left with no economy and no society.

A compromise between the president and the opposition is necessary.

I will begin with assessments of the referendum by influential Western newspapers. [passage omitted]

These are a few of the assessments of the results of the referendum and the political situation in the country as a whole after 25 April.

But what about in Russia itself? Debates are going on in our country, with the watershed running between the views that the president gained approval for his policy (the majority of participants in the referendum supported him) or that he actually split society (he did not poll a majority of the total electorate on any single question).

Let us take one oblast which produced typical referendum results, and try to take an unprejudiced look at what happened there (not the capital cities or the president's native oblast, but an average, typical oblast whose population behaved according to average standards during the referendum).

For example, Tver Oblast. The oblast has 1.381 million voters (not 210,000 as in Magadan Oblast, nor 5 million as in Moscow Oblast). There are several dozen oblasts and krays like this in Russia. Participation in the referendum was at the level of 69.7 percent (for Russia as a whole the figure was 68.6 percent). On the first question 53.9 percent of those who took part voted confidence in Yeltsin (for Russia as a whole the figure was 58 percent), while 44.1 percent and 42 percent respectively voted against. On the second question 49.2 percent approved the president's policy (in Russia as a whole—52.9 percent). On the third question 36.8 percent of registered voters favored early presidential elections (32.6 percent in Russia as a whole). And on the fourth question 45 percent supported early elections of deputies (41.4 percent in Russia). All the figures are close to one another.

But let us see how all this looks in absolute terms. Of the 1.381 million voters, 473,186 voted confidence in Yeltsin with 386,817 against—34 and 28 percent of the total number of voters in the oblast respectively.

Voters were divided almost equally also on the second question—431,564 and 426,536 people, being 31 and 30 percent respectively.

Voters in 21 rayons in the oblast voted almost entirely against confidence in Yeltsin and against the policy he is implementing, while 10 rayons, in addition to voting "no" to the first and second questions, said "yes" to the third—on early presidential elections. And this is almost one-half of the oblast; in other words the referendum split down the middle not only people, but also administrative territorial units. And after all, this is what happened across the Russian Federation as a whole. In effect it was only Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg and their respective oblasts with their huge electorates (about 21 million people) that settled the issue of confidence in Yeltsin with their "yes" vote of more than 70-percent, and their 65-percent "yes"-vote on the second question. These three regions accounted for a 20.4 percent share of the total number of those who went to the polls.

But if you deduct from the total figure the almost 20-percent weighting of the results of the ballot in the three aforementioned territories, then on the first two questions Yeltsin did not poll a majority even of those who took part in the vote.

This analysis shows that Boris Yeltsin's social base is extremely unstable. And it is impossible to carry out reforms throughout Russia with [the support of] only Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg. Especially given the almost universal tendency for former autonomies to increase their rights. And this applies not just to the republics, incidentally. After all, Petersburg also held its own referendum on the right to put itself on a level footing with Russia's republics within the Russian Federation. And this gained approval.

And so, with such a narrow social and, indeed, political base, it is hardly possible to carry out reforms using strong-arm methods. Therefore both the president and parliament are left with only one option—to seek compromises and to make them. This must be done for the sake of the good of Russia's peoples.

Rutskoy To Nominate Self in Presidential Elections

LD0705132593 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1300 GMT 7 May 93

[Text] Aleksandr Rutskoy told journalists today that he is not going to resign. Moreover, he intends to nominate himself for the post of president at the forthcoming presidential elections. He decided on this following Yeltsin's statement yesterday in which he expressed no confidence in Rutskoy. Over a short period of time I have seen everything one could possibly see in politics,

and after seeing what the president and those close to him are doing, I will by all means to put forward my nomination, Rutskoy said.

Text of Yeltsin Edict on Anti-Crime Commission

PM0705140993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 May 93 First Edition p 3

[Edict No. 570 of the Russian Federation President "On Organizational Measures To Step Up the Fight Against Crime," dated Moscow, the Kremlin, 28 April 1993 and signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin]

[Text] Taking into account the increased tension in society caused by the growing scale of crime and the spread of corruption which represents a serious threat to the state's interests and economic security, and in accordance with persistent demands by citizens to step up the fight against crime and corruption and increase the responsibility of officials, including those of the supreme organs of authority and management, for the state of law and order in the country, and guided by the Russian Federation Law "On Security," I decree that:

1. It be established that the Russian Federation president shall personally assume overall leadership of the activity of the Russian Federation Security Council Interdepartmental Commission for Combating Crime and Corruption (hereafter referred to as the Interdepartmental Commission).

2. The chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government shall be a permanent member of the Interdepartmental Commission.

3. In accordance with Russian Federation presidential edict No. 747 dated 7 July 1992, the secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council shall be tasked with coordinating the activity of organs of executive power in the process of realizing the decisions adopted by the Interdepartmental Commission.

It be established that sessions of the Interdepartmental Commission shall be directly presided over by the Russian Federation president or one of the permanent members of the Interdepartmental Commission on behalf of the Russian Federation president.

4. The organizational structure of the Interdepartmental Commission and the procedure relating to its activity shall be brought strictly into line with the Russian Federation Law "On Security" and the Statute on the Russian Federation Security Council, and its working apparatus shall be mandatorily included in the Russian Federation Security Council apparatus.

5. The Russian Federation Presidential Administration, the Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property, and the Russian Federation Main Administration for Protection [Glavnoye Upravleniye Okhrany] shall within a week ensure the implementation of decisions adopted at an earlier date by the Russian Federation president on allocating a separate building to house the Interdepartmental Commission and its apparatus, organizing security at the building, and also allocating the necessary transportation, communications, and office equipment.

6. The Russian Federation Ministry of Justice and the Russian Federation president's State-Legal Administration shall within a month and in line with the established procedure prepare and submit:

the necessary normative acts to ensure the effective work of the Interdepartmental Commission in its cooperation with all law-enforcement organs;

amendments to the statute on the Interdepartmental Commission, an organizational structure, and a list of jobs of its working apparatus resulting from the present edict.

7. Points 2, 3, 4, and 7 of Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 1189 "On Measures To Protect Civil Rights, Preserve Law and Order, and Step Up the Fight Against Crime" dated 8 October 1992 shall be deemed to have lapsed, and also Point 2 of Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 103 dated 20 January 1993.

8. Monitoring implementation of the present edict shall be entrusted to the Russian Federation Presidential Administration.

9. The edict comes into force from the moment of signing.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin

[Dated] Moscow, the Kremlin, 28 April 1993

No. 570

Further on 6 May Meeting of Council of Ministers

LD0605162393 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1211 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] A session of the Russian Government was held in Moscow today. Our correspondent Valeriy Kiosse gives the details:

[Kiosse] In the absence of the prime minister, today's sitting was chaired by First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shumeyko. The first question was the examination of the draft law on joint-stock companies.

Petr [as heard] Mostovoy, first deputy chairman of Russia's State Committee for Management of State Property, who made a report, stressed that it is now vital to have such a law, because the number of joint-stock companies is continually increasing and the absence of a universal normative document generates ambiguity and often leads to abuse both by the firms themselves and in respect to them. Knowing that the absence of other laws from the same package, mainly pertaining to the securities market, gives grounds for serious disagreements, the

authors of the draft law have consciously omitted from this document everything that ought to become the subject of other laws.

However, the very short report of the representative of the State Committee for Management of State Property did not give occasion for prolonged discussions. The parliament members made a number of remarks. Among the remarks that were recognized as being important was a proposal to examine once again and modify as much as possible the following requirement: that at least three quarters of the shareholders must vote for the merging of joint-stock companies if there is such a desire. This may be taken into account.

Mostovoy stressed, however, that the rules in world practice for such cases are even more stringent. In some countries 90 percent of the shareholders have to agree. This is done to protect the interests of the shareholders themselves on the appearance, and especially on the assessment, of a newly created company.

As usual, a stir was created by Tabayev, chairman of the Federal Property Fund, who talked for a long time about the need to incorporate a new section into the draft law which, actually, has nothing to do with the subject of the said draft law.

Most of the other proposals were abandoned after Vladimir Shumeyko asked people not to forget that taking full account of all the proposals that have been made would mean that the articles of the present constitution would have to be changed. But it is possible that the new Russian constitution will be adopted even before this draft law is examined in parliament.

As a result, the draft law on joint-stock companies was approved in principle.

After that, with journalists excluded, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers discussed other questions, including stipulations concerning certain Russian ministries and the question of the wage fund for officials of the federal-executive authorities.

President's Draft Constitution Under Discussion

LD0605211693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1859 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] Moscow May 6 TASS—The draft constitution of the Russian Federation proposed by President Boris Yeltsin is now in the center of attention of the subjects of the Russian Federation, representatives of social and political parties and movements.

According to Viktor Savitskiy, co-chairman of the Christian-Democratic Union of Russia, the draft constitution suggested by the president has produced an "impression of a mosaic" on him. Viktor Savitskiy believes the document "does not determine the status of the subjects of the Federation and does not specify the need to decentralize political power." The leader of the Christian-Democratic Union of Russia fears that the vagueness of a budget clause in the draft constitution may become yet another reason for the disintegration of Russia, if the fundamental law does not stipulate the rights and obligations of the Federation's subjects in accumulating and spending financial funds. Viktor Savitskiy also believes that the constitution should motivate the structure of legislative and executive powers, and determine clearly in what way elections ought to be held.

As distinct from the leader of the Christian-Democratic Union of Russia, parliamentary speaker of Chuvashia, Eduard Kubarev considers the president's draft constitution the most acceptable to Russia. He is particularly impressed by the fact that the document includes as components all the major principles of the federal treaty. As for the version of the draft constitution worked out by the constitutional commission, it reflects these principles in an evasive form. The speaker of the Chuvashian parliament is against arranging a "parade of constitutions". "It is necessary to present to the people a single draft constitution taking the president's draft as a basis," Eduard Kubarev told ITAR-TASS. He believes that the region should be headed by a leader elected by the whole people but not appointed by the central government, otherwise the scope of independence of the regions under the federal treaty will be reduced.

Touching on the status of territories, regions and autonomies within the Russian Federation, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Chuvashia says that he firmly sticks to the viewpoint that economic independence is far from being the way to political independence and secession from Russia.

When reading the president's draft constitution, one gets a feeling that the document has no whole concept, Fridrikh Borodkin, first vice-president of the Association of Siberian and Far Eastern Cities, doctor of economic sciences, noted. It is good that the document begins with the rights of the individual, then determines the rights and obligations of the citizen, and only after that includes all the rest concerning the state. The first vice-president of the association called this approach in setting forth the fundamental law new in principle for Russia.

At the same time, the prominent researcher and sociologist criticized some provisions of the draft constitution. He considers the inclusion of the federal treaty in fundamental law to be unprecedented in world constitutional practice as it makes state power dependent on leaders of regions, territories and republics. According to Fridrikh Borodkin, the inclusion of the federal treaty into the draft looks like a tactical move by its authors, however this freezes the possibility of any serious reform of the administrative and territorial division and the development of genuine territorial self-government. The researcher expressed his concern that some regions are advancing the idea of starting the preparation of the

Russian constitution on the basis of charters and constitutions of regions, territories and republics. He doubts whether it is possible to combine all these charters in one non- contradictory code, and called this approach a direct way to a breakdown.

Certain irritation is caused by superfluous detail in describing the rights and duties of various bodies and institutions as such detailed elaboration may become a hindrance to social progress in future, Fridrikh Borodkin said. The researcher believes that the constitution must fix a balance between some political and economic forces, the rules of interaction among them and the limitation of actions of these forces for a long time.

In its statement released in Moscow today, the Russian Movement of Democratic Reforms urged the president of the Russian Federation to "take the initiative in organizing the constitutional process, to convene a constitutional meeting (assembly) with the participation of heads of the republics and heads of administration of the Federation's subjects, representatives of federal executive and legislative power, as well as nationwide political and social forces." The leaders of the Russian Movement of Democratic Reforms believe that the constitutional assembly could adopt the draft constitution and the law (statute) of elections which "should be held no later than autumn of 1993."

White House Said Headquarters of 'Violence,' 'Tyranny'

PM0605154793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 May 93 p 1

[Sergey Ovsiyenko report: "The Supreme Soviet Does Not Express the Will of the People"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet does not express the will of the people. That was stated at a press conference yesterday by Russian People's Deputies L. Ponomarev, S. Yushenkov, B. Zolotukhin, G. Yakunin, and others.

The reason is that a conservative majority has formed at the Congress and the Supreme Soviet recently and has acted as a brake on the reforms that are being implemented. Even the referendum results failed to dampen the ardor of those who favor a return to the past. The May Day provocation, organized by neocommunists who enjoy support in the parliament, has exposed the link between the Supreme Soviet, the National Salvation Front, and the State Committee for the State of Emergency. The White House has become the headquarters of the forces of violence and tyranny.

In these conditions everything must be done to secure parliamentary elections as soon as possible and the present Congress should dissolve itself.

This aim is achievable. In the opinion of S. Yushenkov, around 200 people's deputies are prepared to resign their powers while the remaining 150 (it is essential to garner the votes of 350 persons) could be won over to their side. The extraordinary Congress, to be provisionally slated to be convened in May, will help in this respect.

Since the referendum the president has had a tremendous strategic advantage which the Supreme Soviet and its speaker are trying to challenge by, among other things, the organization of a provocations. We already know about one provocation: The next is the convening by Khasbulatov of a session of the Constitutional Commission even though it is the president, as its chairman, who has the right do that. The point of these actions is obvious—it is to fight the president's draft Constitution. But that is not all, S. Yushenkov stressed, the opposition is striving to oust the president and thus turn the referendum results in their own favor.

As deputies have stated, B. Yeltsin has prepared a set of edicts on guaranteed material support for the press and on personnel changes in the government, which will presumably appear in the next few days.

Skokov Said Relieved of Security Council Duties

LD0605153793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1500 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] The Russian Information Agency has learned from well informed sources that Boris Yeltsin today adopted a decision in principal on the release of Yuriy Skokov from his duties as Secretary of the Security Council. According to the source, the president's action is linked with Skokov's disagreement with Boris Yeltsin's appeal to the citizens of Russia on 20 March, especially in the section referring to the introduction of a special order on the administration of the country. Anatoliy Krasikov, the head of the Russian President's Press Service, was not able to confirm this information, and proposed that it should be treated with caution.

Yeltsin Signs Decree on Staff's Social Protection

LD0605210193 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 2000 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin has signed a decree on measures to step up the social protection of staff in the central bodies of federal executive power and to raise their professional standards. The document refers to the procedure for acceptance for work in central bodies of federal executive power. It will now be implemented by way of competition.

The decree also provides for a monthly increment for civil servants based on length of service, dependent on their work record.

Coup Trial Defendents Remain Free

LD0605194393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1749 GMT 6 May 93

[By CRIMEPRESS correspondent Nikolay Semenenko]

[Text] Moscow May 6 TASS—The military collegium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation has no sufficient information yet to satisfy the request of the Procurator-General's Office to take into custody again Vladimir Kyuchkov, Anatoliy Lukyanov and Gennadiy Yanayev, who are awaiting trial for the August 1991 putsch.

CRIMEPRESS was told by a representative of the military collegium's press service that this could be done, in accordance with the Russian procedural code, only if there were reasons to believe that the defendants were planning to escape trial, hide the truth, or resume their criminal activities. This could also be done to enforce the implementation of a court sentence. At the present time, the military collegium has no documents proving that the defendants, set free on condition that they will not leave their place of residence, have committed or intended to commit such actions.

As to the participation of Kryuchkov, Lukyanov and Yanayev in the May Day demonstration, mentioned in the request of the Procurator's Office, the investigation of the events has only begun and the collegium was not informed about its progress. Mass media reports on the clash of demonstrators with the militia on may 1st do not clearly disclose its reasons and the involvement of the defendants in the riots. Hence, they do not provide grounds for any procedural decisions on the part of the court.

Current Political Situation Analyzed

MK0705140093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 May 93 p 1

[Yevgeniy Krasnikov report under general heading: "Boris Yeltsin Publicly Expresses No-Confidence in Vice President, Suggests That Parliament Stand for Election in Autumn. Russian President Also Demands Personnel Changes in Government To Radicalize Economic Reform"]

[Text] It can be predicted with complete certainty that the impending events of the next few days may influence the country's internal political situation in a very serious way. The radicals from the president's inner circle (those belonging to the Reform coalition) were so confident that this time they finally managed to push Boris Yeltsin forward to the last, decisive battle, that they made public edicts and directives prepared by the president even before they were officially published.

This haste is entirely understandable. The reason for this is not only the fizzling out of the post-referendum euphoria. The radicals are in a hurry also because Boris Yeltsin may again soften his tactics and lend an ear to the advice of his more moderate allies.

Yeltsin's inner circle may be divided roughly into the radically minded chiefs of the presidential administration who argue for declaring the state of emergency and clamping down on the opposition, and the moderate Presidential Council, many of whose members are trying to persuade the president to expose himself to an early election. Apparently, this difference of views can also be explained by different degrees of independence of the above structures. It is well known that members of the Presidential Council work, in effect, without receiving compensation. The only official perks they have are the right to commandeer a car and to enter the Kremlin without hindrance. According to reports from the Kremlin, at present there are several draft documents on the president's table. The draft Law on Lustrations [zakon o lyustratsiyakh] (drawn up by Galina Starovoytova as long ago as the beginning of 1992) that bans former party nomenklatura officials from working in the civil service and teaching in schools for five years, the edict transferring legislative functions to the Council of the Federation until a new Constitution is adopted, and, finally, the edict on measures to ensure the constitutional process.

The last document (it will probably be published by the time this issue hits the newsstands) is designed to pave the way to the new constitution proposed by Yeltsin and Shakhray that introduces a presidential republic in Russia. The presidential administration has worked out a clear plan of action: Since "the referendum ushered in the new constitutional process and helped to get rid of the legal consequences of the previous period," a commission to consider the Shakhray draft was set up along parallel lines with the official Constitutional Commission. By approximately 20 May the components of the Russian Federation are to submit their comments and conclusions regarding this document. On 12 June, the fundamental law of Russia will be adopted by the Constitutional Assembly. It is also understandable what will happen next: the soviets will be disbanded, the post of vice president abolished, and so forth. Boris Yeltsin's televised address yesterday confirmed this scenario.

This is the scheme as it has been devised, but there are serious doubts that the president's loyalists will actually be able to carry it through. First, one should not underestimate the degree of resistance of the deputy corps. For if the president openly calls for the constitution to be adopted by a Constitutional Assembly and not by the incumbent Russian legislature, this will amount to a violation of previous decisions by the Congress of People's Deputies, which is bound to prompt a corresponding ruling by the Constitutional Court. Second, the stands taken by heads of administrations, on whose support the president counts so much, are by no means unambiguous. Even those who have approved of the presidential draft constitution express serious doubts as to the legitimacy of the proposed mechanism for its adoption.

It can be assumed that the presidential version of the Constitution will not so much aggravate Boris Yeltsin's relations with the deputies (these relations do not appear to have any more room for aggravation), but rather prompt the deputies to energetic anti-presidential actions, if only out of the instinct for self-preservation.

The declarations by Democratic Russia spokesmen—that they will be able to convince the Supreme Soviet and the Congress to dissolve themselves—appear naive, to put it mildly, and do not sound sincere. What is much more likely is that in the next few days the parliament may vote for convening an extraordinary congress of people's deputies. And the problems to be discussed by the congress (the presidential edicts will be very helpful in that regard) may be resolved by drastic reshuffles: changing the four "power ministers" and giving an unsatisfactory mark to the Chernomyrdin government.

The likelihood of tough actions on the part of the president is very high, especially in the next few days. For 9 May will be marked by yet another opposition demonstration. Its organizers intend to march along Tverskaya Street from the Belorusskiy railway station to Red Square, where a rally is scheduled to take place. Tverskaya is much narrower that Leninskiy Prospekt, and should new clashes break out, casualties may be much higher.

The first step toward a new tragedy, however, has already been taken. Moscow City Hall has shortened the route of the demonstrators, directing them to hold a rally on Sovetskaya Square, which probably would be very crowded even if only 1,000 people show up. According to reports from the National Salvation Front Political Council, the communists and nationalists, in turn, intend "to carry out the planned demonstration in accordance with the duly submitted application."

Yeltsin's Supporters Discuss Next Moves

MK0405114493 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 5 May 93 p 3

[Valeriy Pogorelyy report: "Democrats Advise President. Boris Yeltsin's Supporters Hold Conference in Kremlin"]

[Text] The president's supporters in parliament, taking advantage of Boris Yeltsin's proposal, held a closed session in the Kremlin yesterday. The democrats met to discuss their post-referendum tactics and to draw up their proposals for the president in the wake of the clashes at Kaluzhskaya Zastava. In the opinion of radical deputies, in the light of recent events it is time for the president to switch to tough steps against those who are preventing the implementation of crucial economic reforms.

It is believed within the parliamentary "Coalition for Reforms," which mainly includes deputies of a democratic persuasion, that the president won an impressive victory in the referendum. The clashes in Moscow, however, showed that his opponents are even prepared to let blood be shed in order to prevent the development of this presidential success. Even before 1 May, judging from their statements, the deputies were prepared to urge the president to act "toughly, clearly, and with such speed so as not to repeat the inactivity of August 1991." As far as KOMMERSANT-DAILY is aware, however, specific steps were discussed at the Kremlin meeting.

[KOMMERSANT-DAILY note] The president's supporters in the deputy corps—there are around 200 of them—are united in the so-called "Coalition for Reforms." According to official data from the Supreme Soviet press service, this faction has not confirmed its status and has formally ceased to exist. These deputies' votes are insufficient to prevent the adoption of decisions that do not suit the president. [note ends]

Viktor Sheynis, one of the coalition's popular figures, stated at a recent news conference that the president "has the right to implement any decisions, regardless of the Supreme Soviet's interference." But now, according to KOMMERSANT-DAILY information, the democrats will urge the president not to confine himself to steps against only the Supreme Soviet and Congress and will most likely urge him to dissolve all soviets and introduce direct presidential rule in the country. Yeltsin, however, does not have the authority to dissolve soviets and, in particular, the Congress. Therefore the coalition, by all accounts, will suggest that he begin a campaign for self-disbandment by the parliamentarians. It is also possible that the deputies will be prepared to discuss with the president the question of holding another referendum on a new constitution, for which Gleb Yakunin is proposing to organize a collection of signatures.

The democrats have scheduled a news conference for today, at which they propose to give a more detailed account of the results of yesterday's closed conference. KOMMERSANT-DAILY will report this in tomorrow's issue.

Pamyat's Vasiliyev Expresses Support for Yeltsin

LD0605213293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1753 GMT 6 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow May 6 TASS—Dmitry Vasiliyev, leader of the National Patriotic Front "Pamyat" (Memory), sharply criticized the demonstrators' actions on May Day calling them a "Communist provocation against Boris Yeltsin". Their actions "On May 1 is an impudent provocation in the spirit of bolshevist and socialist-revolutionary terror. It is directed against the president," he said.

According to Dmitriy Vasiliyev, all members of the "Memory" Front not only voted for confidence in the president during the recent referendum but also carried out active propaganda work in his support.

Dmitriy Vasiliyev, in a peaceful mood, received on his own initiative a group of journalists, dressed in house clothes but not in a notorious black military uniform. There were icons and portraits of Russian tsars on the walls of his flat.

"I am an orthodox believer and monarchist, therefore I am for strong sovereign power, in the given case, for the president's strong power," the leader of the "Memory" Front stressed. He believes that the parliament and the congress have been seized by communists, and the existing dual power is the "Result of the struggle between the two systems - the capitalist one, represented by Boris Yeltsin, and the communist system, represented by the soviets and Ruslan Khasbulatov."

Dmitriy Vasiliyev spoke with approval on the draft constitution proposed by President Boris Yeltsin. The present Constitution, he believes, is purely communist. "I am being told that I have sold myself to Boris Yeltsin and democracy. But I have weighed carefully the provisions of his draft constitution and see many positive elements in it," the leader of the "Memory" Front noted.

Dmitriy Vasiliyev regards the settlement of the land issue as Boris Yeltsin's main merit. "All have been up in arms against the president, first of all because he wants to give land to the people," he says.

Dmitriy Vasiliyev himself, like other members of the "Memory" Front, works in an agricultural cooperative. For instance, his own cooperative, where five people work, has 25 cows. "We sell milk to the state, but not spend time in fruitless meetings as communists do," the leader of the front notes.

The leader of the National Patriotic Front considers the granting of freedom of the speech to all citizens of Russia also Boris Yeltsin's merit. "The president's political course gives all citizens wide possibilities for showing an initiative," he says. However, according to Dmitriy Vasiliyev, "Russians have been piled up with too many reforms which would rather be implemented gradually. The people have been literally crushed by them."

At present the "Memory" Front is not associated with any party "As all of them are coloured rosy and red tones, including the Front of National Salvation," Dmitriy Vasiliyev told ITAR-TASS. According to him, the "Memory" Front has now moved away from the intensive political activities so as to be "fully engaged in the sowing campaign."

Trade Unions Advocate 'Dismantling Communist Symbols'

PM0605153193 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 May 93 p 2

[A. Frolov report: "Who Is Preparing Provocations"]

[Text] The president and the premier have warned citizens that "any attempts to embroil the population in provocations and violent acts will be met with a very resolute rebuff." Needless to say, they intend to seek the provocateurs among patriots and communists, but while these fruitless quests are under way, yesterday the following document was circulated by fax under the noses of the authorities, quite openly, to addressees including our editorial office.

"We ask all organizations in the Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Russia [FITUR] to hold consultations with various organizations as to the matter of dismantling communist symbols (the butcher and murderer Lenin, hammers and sickles, red banners, etc) in connection with the increase in provocative demonstrations entailing bloodshed among ordinary Russian citizens. To this end it is necessary to start organizing workers' self-defense detachments, workers' voluntary militias, and self-organization committees. [Signed] A.S. Alekseyev, chairman of the Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Russia."

It is not very literate, but it is very definite. However, the symbols mentioned in the scrawl adorn the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Kremlin Wall, not to mention millions of other tombs of those who died for the Fatherland. That is, Yeltsin's "trade union" is directly urging its members to commit violence and to desecrate gravestones. Knowing their habits, it can be assumed that the acts of vandalism will be timed to coincide with 9 May. It would be interesting to know what Messrs. Stepankov and Lisin think about this and whether the trade union bosses will meet with the promised "resolute rebuff."

Victory Day Activities

Moscow Braces for Marches, Possible Violence

MK0605130693 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 6 May 93 p 9

[Sergey Veselov report: "Aftermath of May Day March in Moscow. Viktor Anpilov May be Stripped of Deputy's Immunity]

[Text] **The Moscow Prosecutor's Office is today going to ask the Moscow City Soviet to strip Viktor Anpilov of his deputy's immunity, as he was an organizer of the May Day demonstration that ended in a bloody clash with OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] at Kaluzhskaya Zastava in Moscow. Moreover, it became known yesterday that the Russian Prosecutor's Office asked the Supreme Court to alter the restriction of freedom ruling in regard to the two defendants in the State Committee for the State of Emergency case—Anatoliy Lukyanov and Vladimir Kryuchkov, who took part in the march.**

Also yesterday, OMON officer Vladimir Tolokneyev, 25, an Afghan war veteran and father of two who was wounded on 1 May, died in the hospital without regaining consciousness.

Meanwhile, a commission to investigate the May Day events formed by parliament from among Russian and Moscow deputies and the deputies from two city rayons

is continuing its work. Its chairman, Gennadiy Benov, known for his anti-presidential views, stated that the main task before the commission is "to give a moral and legal appraisal of what took place on 1 May, otherwise it would be impossible to appraise it politically."

Some of the witnesses who took part in the demonstration, and medics, have already appeared before the parliamentary commission. According to KOMMERSANT-DAILY, Vitaliy Kiselev, head of the Moscow Administration of Internal Affairs, admitted to the commission that he made the decision to block Leninskiy Prospekt. Vitaliy Kiselev confirmed that militia became confused after the marchers tried to break through the cordon. "Nobody expected that this could happen," he said at the commission session.

Also yesterday, Moscow City Hall cleared the Officers Union alone for a 9 May [Victory Day] march along Tverskaya Street from Belorusskiy rail terminal to Sovetskaya Square. Zhirinovskiy's party was cleared for a meeting outside Gorkiy Park. The Liberal Democrats expect it to be attended by some 300,000 people. Also yesterday, the Inner Soviet decided to permit entry to Red Square to everybody who had applied for demonstrations. This decision will be discussed by the Moscow Soviet today.

Representatives of Working Moscow, and Working Russia, the United Front of Working People, the National Salvation Front, and Russian Communists have by now announced that they are going to join in with the Union of Officers and break down all obstacles set up on the path to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and Red Square.

It looks like fresh clashes cannot be avoided in Moscow. Political passions are running so high that even bans on demonstrations and meetings for organizations that held the tragic May Day march can no longer stop people. On the other hand, the law enforcement organizations declare that they have prepared for 9 May better than they did for May Day. Obviously, what is implied is the possibility of making use of water cannons, tear gas, and rubber bullets. As for Vladimir Tolokneyev's death, it will undoubtedly embitter OMON personnel.

Yeltsin To Lay Wreaths

LD0605172593 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1230 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] President Boris Yeltsin intends to participate in events connected with the celebration of Victory Day, the POSTFACTUM agency was informed by Artyum Solovyev, who is in charge of public relations at the CIS War and Labor Veterans Committee. At 1000 on 9 May, the president and members of the government will lay wreaths at the grave of the unknown soldier.

Rallies Banned in Designated Area

LD0605154493 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1430 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] An instruction from Boris Yeltsin charges the government with submitting a proposal on the status of the Russian Federation's capital to the Supreme Soviet within two days. The government must define a list and the boundaries of territory immediately adjoining buildings of the the supreme bodies of executive authority. Holding rallies, meetings, processions, demonstrations and the picketing (?of property) is not allowed on this territory.

Officers Union Warns Against Ban

LD0605211093 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1600 GMT 6 May 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] "If the Moscow government does not allow us to march on 9 May from Belorusskiy station at least as far as Manezhnaya—to say nothing of Red Square—the Union of Officers will not answer for the consequences," Stanislav Terekhov, chairman of the union, said at a news conference today. Bans notwithstanding, on that day which is sacred to us all, we will not halt at Sovetskaya Square, he said.

Terekhov also commented that the Union of Officers, as initiator of the event, is ready to accept into its ranks on 9 May everyone who wishes to mark the day by demonstrating.

Regarding the statement due to be made today by Boris Yeltsin, Terekhov said that if Boris Nikolayevich tries to impose a state of emergency, or even to infringe the rights of the communists, then all the pro-communist forces will assemble tonight outside the White House and mount something like the August putsch. "And then," Terekhov said, "Boris Yeltsin will not be able to remain in office even for four days." The communists, he said, are now ready for anything, since they have nothing to lose but their chains.

Union Insists on Marching

LD0605192193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1817 GMT 6 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Vdoyvin]

[Text] Moscow May 6 TASS—On May 9, during celebrations of the Victory Day, the Union of Officers intends to march from Belorusskaya railway station all the way to the Red Square despite a ban imposed by the city administration, Stanislav Terekhov, chairman of the Officers' Union, said at a news conference here today. "We shall not stop on Sovetskaya Square on this sacred day. Our duty is to place flowers on the grave of those who died fighting against fascism between 1941-1945."

Terekhov noted that the Union of Officers, which had initiated the march, "is prepared to let all those wishing to celebrate the day by a peaceful, not a political demonstration, join it. According to Terekhov, the march will be led by veterans who will be protected against extremist forces, if necessary."

Terekhov believes that on May 1, "an attempt was made to liquidate the opposition by force, however, we are resolutely determined to cut short similar attempts to disperse peaceful demonstrations." In conclusion, Terekhov said that "there would be no provocations on May 9, and if any attempts are made, they would resolutely be cut short."

Mayor Told Not To Use OMON

LD0705085593 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0700 GMT 7 May 93

[Text] Moscow's Inner Council has instructed the mayor's office of the capital and the services subordinate to it to ensure the unimpeded staging of the notified Victory Day mass events in the city. It has, moreover, been agreed, ITAR-TASS reports, that along the roads to be followed by the processions according to the declared routes there should be no use of OMON subunits or street-blocking equipment.

Moscow's Inner Council urged the internal affairs main administration to release General Kiselev, who commanded the Moscow militia forces on 1 May, from directing the subunits of the law and order forces during the forthcoming festive days.

Official Warns Communists Seek 'Blood'

LD0705102093 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 7 May 93

[Text] The Moscow authorities have precise information about the readiness of communist extremists for provocations on 9 May. This was announced in an interview with the Vesti TV program by Vasiliy Shakhnovskiy, the Moscow mayor's office chief of staff. According to him, fighters from Working Russia, the Communists and neo-Communists have already prepared petrol bombs and are ready to use them. They need blood, and they need a corpse so that they can carry it through Moscow, Vasily Shakhnovskiy thinks.

Procuracy General Warns Against 'Provocations'

LD0705145293 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1400 GMT 7 May 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] We have just received a statement issued by the Procuracy General of the Russian Federation. Here is just one quote from it: The Procuracy General of the Russian Federation appeals to all citizens of Russia not to give in to provocations that might spoil the great Victory Day's celebrations. At the same time, the Procuracy warns that it will take resolute and comprehensive measures against those who violate the law and ignore the voice of reason.

Constitutional Court Urges Calm

LD0705143293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1402 GMT 7 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—The Russian Constitutional Court called today on all representative and executive power bodies, political parties and public organizations "to abstain from large-scale arrangements aimed to stir up political confrontation, fraud and hatred on the Victory Day of May 9".

The appeal called on Russian citizens "to observe constitutional lawfulness and legal order, show national concord and responsibility for the sake of provision of human rights and freedoms, civic peace and well-being of Russian peoples".

At the same time, the Constitutional Court expressed sincere sympathy with all victims of clashes on May 1 in Moscow.

Protests Near Official Buildings Banned

PM0705083593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 May 93 First Edition p 4

["Directive by the Russian Federation President"]

[Text] Pending the enactment of the Russian Federation Law "On the Status of the Russian Federation Capital" and the clear definition of the borders of territories in the city of Moscow, capital of the Russian Federation, directly adjacent to buildings and edifices occupied by the Russian Federation's higher organs of legislative, executive, and judicial power where it is forbidden to hold rallies, assemblies, street parades, demonstrations, pickets, and protests, the holding of these sociopolitical events in Red Square, Novaya Ploshchad, Ilinok Street, and Bezymyannyy Lane is to be prohibited.

This directive is to come into force from the moment it is signed.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin

[Dated] 28 April 1993, No. 300-rp

May Day Demonstration Leaders To Be Prosecuted

PM0705150193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 May 93 First Edition p 2

[Valeriy Yakov report: "Prosecutor's Office Lists Names of May Day 'Heroes'"]

[Text] On the fourth day of the inquiry, the Russian Prosecutor's Office has at last decided to reveal albeit a minimum of information about what the investigation team is doing.

In its official statement issued through the public relations center, the Prosecutor's Office admitted that "indications of administratively punishable offenses have been identified" in the actions of the [1 May Moscow] rally organizers. This, for instance, was reflected in the fact that the demonstrators tried to deviate from the route prescribed by Moscow City Hall. Likewise, other gross violations of established regulations were committed. The following representatives of a number of movements and parties are being called to account administratively for this: Comrade Lakeyev (Working Moscow), Comrade Guseyev and Comrade Khudyakov (Working Russia), Comrade Kokhanyuk (Alliance of Communists), Comrade Skurlatov (Revival Party), and others.

Nor have the esteemed deputies been overlooked. The Prosecutor's Office sent Moscow City Soviet a petition seeking permission to call People's Deputy Anpilov (Working Moscow) to account and made a similar request to the Supreme Soviet in respect of People's Deputy Sayenko (National Salvation Front).

It is possible that the aforementioned May Day heroes and their brothers-in-arms, who continue to gather near the White House vigorously creating an impression of their own fearlessness and threatening to demonstrate even greater resolve 9 May, will be charged under the criminal law as a result of the inquiry held. Especially as their "heroism" ultimately led to a human fatality. But for the time being Article 166 of the Administrative Code merely threatens them with a fine of up to R300, and administrative arrest for a period of up to 15 days "in exceptional cases, if, given the circumstances of the case and with due account of the offender's personality, the application of these measures should be deemed insufficient."

However, the investigation team, which was increased to 70 people owing to the enormous amount of work, is running checks on the involvement of these comrades and others of their brothers-in-arms in organizing mass disturbances—arson, and resisting militia personnel. In excess of 20 active participants in such events have already been identified, one of whom has been charged with violently obstructing the work of the militia—he was arrested.

By contrast with the Prosecutor's Office, the Russian Federation Supreme Court Military Collegium has not found sufficient grounds to alter the restrictions on defendants Lukyanov, Kryuchkov, and Yanayev. In its statement, the collegium claims not to dispose of "information confirmed in documentation that any one of the defendants in the case of the State Committee for the State of Emergency, being under recognizance not to abscond, committed or intended to commit actions obstructing the establishment of the truth in the case, or containing indications of criminality."

Parties Urge Action Against Riot Organizers

LD0605140693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1320 GMT 6 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow May 6 TASS—The Economic Freedom Party and the Russian Democratic Reforms Movement have issued a joint political statement demanding the punishment of persons responsible for the Mayday riots in Moscow. The document, forwarded to ITAR-TASS, stresses that "extremist forces have provoked an outright confrontation and blood-letting". Thereby, "the reactionary forces have made a new step towards drawing the country into a political chaos and civil war".

"The responsibility for this rests wholly with the organisers, inspirers and participants of the provocation", says a press statement released by Moscow's chief controller Viktor Mironov. "A preliminary analysis of the Mayday events, eye-witness accounts, video and photo materials show that the law enforcement bodies were acting in accordance with the legislation in force and their prerogatives," the statement says. Numerous facts confirm that "specially trained attack teams of militants were among the demonstrators," the document says.

Mironov says that "the top leadership and press service of the Supreme Soviet, a group of Moscow Council members and leaders of some district councils, the self-styled "centre of candidates to the post of Moscow's administrative head", as well as several other organisations and officials, who are rendering outright support to political extremists for quite a time now, are groundlessly trying to save those guilty for the riots from deserved punishment. The chief city controller says that any attempts to repeat such a provocation on May 9 will be cut short by the federal and Moscow executive authorities. The Municipal Council and the government of Moscow has everything necessary to do it and they will prevent Russia from sliding down to the brink of a civil war, will not allow any retreat from the reform and the restoration of a totalitarian system.

The "New Russia" socio-political bloc, uniting six parties and movements, has urged the president to sign a decree on the suspension of the activities of all the political parties and organisations that took part in the Mayday riots. The bloc's statement, released for the press today, says that the Constitutional Court should assess from the legal point of view the actions of those responsible for the riots, and the Russian Procurator's Office should conduct a careful and fair investigation. The document says that it is necessary to make the military collegium of the Russian Supreme Court put under guard again all the people awaiting trial for the August 1991 putsch, because they were among the inspirers of the blood-letting. The "New Russia" bloc

demands measures from the Moscow chief militia department to prevent a repetition of riots on May 9.

Several documents, addressed to the personnel of the Moscow militia, the Procurator-General's Office and the Justice Ministry of the Russian Federation were adopted by a meeting of Moscow's democratic representatives. They insist that the blame for the Mayday riots rests with "those who had unlawfully led the people to Gagarin Square". The documents express confidence in the militia and call for the banning of all the organisations responsible for the disorders.

The public committee of Russia's democratic organisations has urged the Russian MPs to strip of parliamentary immunity their colleagues, if the investigation proved that they were among the organisers of the bloody riots. Addressing war and labour veterans, the committee urged them "not to be deceived by a handful of adventurists, hiding behind high-flown phraseology".

Military & Media Issues

Grachev Greets Army Personnel on First Anniversary

PM0705143793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 May 93 p 1

[Order No. 234 of the Russian Federation Minister of Defense dated 6 May 1993, Moscow]

[Text] On 7 May 1992, the Russian Federation president announced the creation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

The Russian Federation Armed Forces have now been formed, an adequate level of combat readiness has been ensured, and the legal foundations have been laid for the social protection of the servicemen and their families.

The Russian Federation Armed Forces are one of the most important pillars of statehood, preserving as they do the traditions of patriotism, friendship, fraternity, and devotion to the fatherland.

Today Russian servicemen's morale enables them to carry out the set tasks in reliably protecting and ensuring Russia's national security.

I greet and congratulate soldiers and seamen, sergeants and petty officers, warrant officers and ensigns, officers, and civilian personnel on the first anniversary of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

I wish you good health, prosperity, and success in improving your military skills in the interests of raising the state's defense capability.

I express confidence that henceforth you will continue the glorious combat traditions of older generations of the fatherland's defenders, display endurance and organization, and do everything you can to maintain civil peace and accord in society.

[Signed] Army General P. Grachev, Russian Federation Minister of Defense

Comments on Formation of Armed Forces

LD0705095793 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0800 GMT 7 May 93

[Commentary by television correspondent Aleksandr Ostrovskiy, including recorded remarks by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Ostrovskiy] Russia's Army is one year old, but 12 months ago it would not have been quite true to speak about its birth. Russia's Army, which remains international in spirit and composition, and which has not discarded all the good things from the old Soviet Army, is trying to revive itself and to restore people's respect for the man in uniform.

[Grachev] We have succeeded in creating the basis for Russia's future highly mobile, modern armed forces. We have done this despite all the difficulties of the domestic political and economic situation during the course of this year, and also the difficulties which have been linked with the sharp criticism this year from various parties and currents, from the press, from the right, left, red, blue, and green, and so on. The main outcome is that we have been able to withstand all this. The Army has acquired a new face.

[Ostrovskiy] Together with its new geo-strategic structure, success has been achieved in restoring the administration of the armed forces, and that means combat readiness, too. Two military districts—the Volga and the Urals—have been set up, and the North Caucasian District will be the main one by 1995. There are now over 50,000 troops in the Army who are serving on contract. Arguably, however, the main thing is that the discharge of young officers who believed in the future of the new Army has been cut down. Many problems remain—the influx of troops from abroad and accommodating them, and replenishing units with men. The Army continues to be used in inter-ethnic conflicts. A state housing program is also vitally needed for the military.

Reduction Planned for 1995

LD0705125393 Moscow Programma Radio Odin Network in Russian 1100 GMT 7 May 93

[Text] Today the Russian Armed Forces are celebrating their first anniversary. According to Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, despite economic and political instability, we managed to set up the basis for future highly-mobile Armed Forces in a short period of time. In accordance with decisions made, it is being planned to reduce the total strength of the Russian Army to 1.5 million men in 1995. At the same time, Russian troops will have to be withdrawn from Germany and the Baltic republics.

Khasbulatov, Rutskoy Receive WWII War Veterans

LD0705142293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1404 GMT 7 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Yuriy Filippov]

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—Speaker of the Russian parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov today received a large group of veterans of the Great Patriotic War at the House of Soviets here today. Describing the current difficult situation in Russia, he noted that "grave violations of human rights" were now being committed in the country and that many processes were leading the society towards autocracy.

Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoy, who was present at the reception, assured the veterans that "people have still not lost faith, despite the attempts of pseudo-democrats to slander our history, to distort the results of the referendum". The vice-president wished the veterans profound confidence in Russia's ability to cope with the current difficult situation.

Press Ministry Calls Ban on Media 'Crude Violation'

LD0605190393 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1700 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] On 5 May this year, ITAR-TASS issued a report that correspondents of three major news agencies—ITAR-TASS, RIA, and INTERFAX—who are accredited to parliament will henceforth be prevented from attending sessions of the presidium of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet.

The Russian Ministry of Press and Public Information states that this decision is a crude violation of the law of the Russian Federation on the media. For example, Article 48 of the law says that bodies, organizations, and establishments to which journalists are accredited are obliged to inform them about sessions, conferences, and other events, to provide stenographic reports and other documents, and to create favorable conditions for producing recordings. By law, an accredited journalist has the right to attend all sessions, with the exception of those where it has been decided to hold a closed session. Article 61 of the law on the media stipulates an easily accessible and perfectly democratic means for protecting the rights of accredited journalists: an appeal to a people's court.

The Russian Ministry of Press and Public Information expresses the hope that this conflict will not become the subject of legal proceedings and will be cleared up in a spirit of mutual respect between the representative bodies of power and the press.

Yeltsin Prepares Decree on Press, Media

LD0705121293 Moscow Programma Radio Odin Network in Russian 1100 GMT 7 May 93

[Text] Today Russia is traditionally celebrating the Day of Radio. It has become known that a presidential decree is now being prepared on material support for the press and on the protection of media.

Editor Refutes Press Minister's Claims

PM0605130193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 5 May 93 p 1

[Open Letter to Minister of Press and Information Mikhail Fedotov from Valeriy Kucher, chief editor of ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI, member of the Press and Information Ministry Collegium, and secretary of the Union of Russian Journalists: "Our Minister Has Put Our Newspaper in an Unenviable 'Cage'"]

[Text] Esteemed Mr Minister!

I wrote you this letter on 3 May—International Freedom of the Press Day. I was prompted to write it by the monologue delivered by you at a meeting of the chief editors' club, attended by representatives of international news centers as well as journalists from a number of the Western mass media accredited in Moscow. Your impromptu speech, which contained an account of the present state of the Russian press, somewhat surprised me, I must admit. In the country's information area you distinguish between the free press, the partly free press, and the dependent press. These tendencies, trends, in your view, are most fully illustrated by the newspapers MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS and KURANTY respectively. And you call ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI the "leader" of the "dependent" press. I thank you for assigning our newspaper a place of honor and for supporting your thesis most concisely. ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI's harmful dependence, in your view, is expressed in the fact that the publication of the newspaper is funded by the government, which you claim issues orders to it as though it were its owner, and that the newspaper reports back on its work to the government.

Forgive me for being so blunt but I did not expect such vulgar, primitive logic from you.

Admittedly, knowing your penchant for refined language, I could have attributed your classification of the Russian press to a mundane display of ministerial arrogance or simply to a casual flirtation with a cutting phrase were it not for the fact that this conclusion is dangerously flawed. The flaw, it seems to me, is that this account of the highly varied and complicated world of the Russian press was given not by an ordinary participant in a debate or a lover of winged words but by a member of the government, a minister furthermore, and a doctor of juridical sciences, and thus a learned man. I am afraid that the audience, and especially the foreigners among them, may have been dazzled by your titles:

Supposing this conclusion really is founded on a profound scientific and theoretical basis, what then? How can people not believe that ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI is a submissive newspaper, blindly obeying a social order. But let us look at what this question is really about.

I agree that the Russian press' acquisition of freedom is the most topical issue today. I, for instance, am profoundly convinced that an independent newspaper is one which earns the means of its own existence by advertising, does not have sources of information in the nomenklatura, and has journalists who do not preach down to people. ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI's source of finance is not hidden from outside eyes nor is it a carefully guarded editorial secret. Our newspaper receives a subsidy from the state budget. Is that the right thing to do? I think not. It is not right when not only newspapers loyal to the president and the government receive financial injections but even opposition newspapers such as SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA are sustained by taxpayers' money. There must be a carefully conceived state policy here. It may be expressed in support for various forms of newspapers' commercial activity, which is what creative collectives want so much, or in the creation of a single commercial advertising basis for all central newspapers, as is customary in the European mass media today. In any event, the Ministry of the Press should initiate the creation of the economic foundations for the independence of newspapers. But what do we see in fact? Since March 1992, that is, since the weekly ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI was transformed by a government decree signed by Boris Yeltsin into a large-format publication appearing five times a week, our charter has not been ratified. For a year now the draft document has been wandering through the corridors of the ministry and the government apparatus where ministry and government functionaries cut it to pieces and painstakingly excise the "suspect" items of the normative document. Goodness knows where it is now, and we are continuing to work without legal rights to independent commercial activity. Are we really the only ones in the position of having no rights?

Now for the matter of who is directing ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI and how. Shadow leaders have never stood, nor are they likely to stand, behind ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI simply because relations between the creative collective and the founder of the newspaper—the Government—have been clearly and openly defined. These relations determine the niche that ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI occupied in the system of the country's mass media. That means primarily the broad coverage of all aspects of the government's activity and the analysis of its results. Certainly not on the basis of concentrated support and approval for the cabinet's steps but of taking a purely critical stand.

In addition it is prescribed that ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI publishes the Russian president's edicts and directives, government decrees, and the normative acts of ministries and departments relating to citizens' rights and freedoms. Our newspaper does that by publishing the weekly supplements KURYER and DOKUMENTY. This is the extent of the space allocated to the government in the newspaper.

Or perhaps the minister knows of even one instance when the newspaper was taken to task at a government session? Or does he know of a case when members of the government told the editorial office how to report on this or that event? What indeed does Mikhail Fedotov know, given his personal indifference toward ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI (but that is his personal affair, by the way).

Having declared that ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI reports back to the government, the minister probably wanted thereby to stress that the newspaper is not to be fully trusted. But Mr. Minister, should this czarist matter cause suspicion among the populace? ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI has already found its readership even though it has been appearing as a fully-fledged publication only since December 1992. The newspaper is going through a complex formative process. I do not hide the fact that the state's interests sometimes prevail over the individual's interests in the newspaper. But I also know that ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI will be bought and read by those who hope to find in it an accessible means of contact with the supreme organs of power and who link their own freedom and prosperity to the freedom and prosperity of the state. Is this not why ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI is read in 114 countries of the world and why subscriptions to the paper are increasing by the month? And we are confident that our newspaper will become one of the most useful and influential in the country. It is just a matter of time.

If the minister were an attentive reader of ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI he would have discovered in it views sometimes directly opposed to the official viewpoint. Is not the Saturday supplement VEKHI, which the editorial office publishes in conjunction with the Russian intelligentsia, not a sign of a free publication? Is the weekly supplement RETSEPT, which deals with acute questions of the nation's ecological safety, not an example of the ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI journalistic collective's free and independent views on this topic? Are the letters that we publish under the rubric "Addressed to the Government" not a means whereby the masses can exert influence on the authorities? It is another matter that a young newspaper is not yet receiving a large and varied range of mail. It is another matter that the editorial office's fledgling creative collective is literally fighting for its existence. Efforts are being expended on trying to overcome the resistance of a great many civil servants. Through their whim the editorial office is carrying out a large part of the newspaper publication production process independently, using old-fashioned computer technology. The editorial office has 50 percent less staff than such newspapers as IZVESTIYA, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA simply because it is short of premises. We are forced to use our own resources to create photographic studios, a library, and other technological facilities,

headaches which our colleagues at other newspapers do not have. And all this is happening because the newspaper is housed in a building not suited to publishing and owned by the "Montazhspetsstroy" Corporation, an organization with experience of building special-purpose premises and which has established a punitive entry system for us. As for publishing the newspaper on a day when the corporation is not at work, for example, we have to apply in writing to the head of security to let journalists into the building. It is another matter that a ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent cannot go on foreign assignment because of the lack of hard currency. It is another matter that we cannot obtain various types of information because the newspaper cannot open its own correspondents' offices abroad or secure for itself the types of communications necessary for receiving information from the leading news agencies at home and abroad.

And when Minister Mikhail Fedotov declared in his first public speech that he will make every effort to ensure that his ministry was not a Ministry of the Press but a ministry for the protection of the press, this caused, in our collective at least, a sense of profound optimism and hope. But time has passed and we are again dealing with ready phrases designed for popular consumption. The protection of the press has always been something specific and material. However, the Ministry of the Press and Information is still dependent on other people. Subsidies for newspapers? How that one was thrashed out just six months ago. Time has passed but the ministry has not changed anything in the mechanism for distributing them. Premises for the newly opened Russian newspapers? State support for indigent book publishers? All these things were decided earlier. The Press Ministry headed by Mikhail Fedotov should be working to develop and improve the mechanisms of practical help for the country's ailing newspapers. But for some reason we do not feel that the Ministry of the Press is making an effort to ease the tax burden. The newspaper delivery system has collapsed disastrously but the ministry is doing nothing to ease the crushing pressure of the Ministry of Communications. The economic stranglehold on the press is intensifying but we have seen no resolute steps from the Ministry of the Press.

Believe me, esteemed Mikhail Aleksandrovich, I am saying these things not because I am aggrieved at your scathing words about ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI. We ourselves are convinced that the time has come finally to end the situation in which newspapers can be founded by influential federal organs of power such as the Supreme Soviet or the government. This is where the Ministry of the Press could help ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI to become a truly free newspaper owning its own building, property, equipment, and printing facilities. Apparently the idea that it is necessary to change the newspaper's status has already gained currency in the government. Vladimir Kvasov, leader of the government apparatus, bluntly stated in a telephone conversation with me that he does not consider the newspaper to be his. Perhaps he said that in the heat of the moment but you will agree that there is some substance to it. Even people within the government are already beginning to understand that ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI cannot be an apparatus newspaper. But we receive letters from the apparatus of the ministry headed by you, instructing us to cover this or that particular problem. This means that direct instructions are coming from you, esteemed Mr. Minister. Does it not seem to you that the process of establishing an independent Russian press should begin by changing the role of the ministry that you head? After all, a role can either be performed well, quickly changed, or abolished once and for all. There is no other way.

But perhaps my entire conversation with you has been in vain? Perhaps when asserting that ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI is being controlled by the government and held accountable to it you wanted to stress how things ought to be?

Economic Issues

Fuller Version of Chernomyrdin 29 Apr Speech

PM0605104193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 May 93 p 3

[Unattributed account of report delivered by Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin at the 29 April 1993 session of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government in Moscow: "National Consensus Needed To Implement Reform"]

[Text] The government session examined the questions of Russia's socioeconomic development in the first quarter, current tasks, and the progress in fulfilling the government's action plan for the implementation of economic reform in 1993.

Viktor Chernomyrdin noted that the country has entered a very crucial period, when we need to assimilate all the trends in political and economic life and to determine what will still need to be done in the next few weeks and months and how to carry out in-depth economic reform. The referendum, as the premier defined it, has convincingly demonstrated that Russian citizens adhere to the course pursued by the president and the government. This is particularly important for the government and for the entire executive, which is the source of this most crucial work, of the highly complex transformations in production relations, and, essentially, of the changes in the lives of all our people.

In its practical work the government today proceeds from the actual situation and from the actual potential which it possesses. If we approach the determination of economic policy from this viewpoint, we must note at least two aspects.

First, an important stretch of the road has been traversed, and the processes of reforming our economy have largely become irreversible.

Second, we should advance vigorously along the road of reforms, only now without jerks or revolutions. We must consistently adjust the work of the new market mechanisms and reduce to a minimum the problems of the transitional period.

I. The Government's Activity and Economic Results for the First Quarter of 1993

Among the most important measures implemented so far I should name the decisions adopted on the agro-industrial complex, on the population's social protection, on the conversion program, and on trade and economic relations with CIS countries. Special attention was devoted to the development of small business and to state support for it. The federal "Housing" program was examined and approved. Decisions on improving foreign economic activity were adopted.

But, Viktor Chernomyrdin noted, the plan is being "fulfilled unsatisfactorily." The biggest misgivings result from the implementation of measures in the sphere of financial and monetary-credit policy. The Ministry of Finance is coping worst of all with its commissions. We realize that these are extremely complex questions which require the adoption of concerted decisions with the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet.

While justly criticizing the Ministry of Finance, at the same time we cannot fail to see that the Central Bank bears a large share of the responsibility. It is the Central Bank that is holding up the preparation and coordination of documents on improving the system of transactions and regulating enterprises' mutual obligations, on increasing sanctions against banks for holding up bill payment operations, on using enterprises' funds to clear payment arrears, and a number of others. The result is the diminishing effectiveness of the efforts being made to curb inflation.

The policy of providing loans for industry has played a special role. Yes, the massive allocation of loans has slowed the production slump. But, at the same time, it has spurred inflation and led to the unsophisticated production structure which we have all criticized so concertedly being frozen in place. We have thereby essentially played into the hands of those who are cranking up prices and closed our eyes to the very high and entirely unjustified levels of profitability in most sectors.

It is worth noting that profitability in power generation and the fuel industry, where the state regulates rices, has fallen by up to 30 percent during the year. It has risen by approximately the same amount in the light and food industries, where prices are limited by the population's effective demand. But profitability levels in the chemical and petrochemical industries are approximately 100-150 percent higher.

The situation as regards improving the health of the budget remains tense. Thanks to parliament, we have gone through the first quarter of this year without a ratified budget. This has complicated the financing of priority state spending. The federal budget deficit is not only not falling, it has actually risen. According to provisional figures, it reached more than 10 percent of GDP during the quarter.

An analysis of the current economic situation shows that the main trends prevailing in the social production sphere last year have continued during the first four months of this year. Stabilization of the average monthly volumes of industrial production has been observed for eight months, and in the first quarter of 1993 this indicator was approximately 2 percent higher than in the fourth quarter of last year.

But does this mean that we are already emerging from the crisis? Not in our opinion. For the level of industrial production that has taken shape during these months remains extremely low: It is 19 percent below the first quarter of 1992.

There is particular concern about the situation in the fuel industry. On the whole, it has been possible to keep the fuel and energy complex working effectively and to avoid any particular excesses during the winter period of maximum demand for power. Nonetheless, in the first quarter of this year the overall decline in the production of fuel and energy resources was 7.1 percent compared with the first quarter of 1992, with oil extraction falling by 15 percent, and the amount of coal mined declining by 10 percent. Gas extraction volumes have been maintained at a stable level.

Many of the fuel workers' problems are linked to the fact that their financial and economic relations both with other economic sectors and with the state are disorganized. Sectors which we have placed in a tough economic framework were owed more than 2.5 trillion rubles [R] by their customers for output delivered to them. This is virtually one-half of all the outstanding payments in Russia.

Production continues to decline in the metallurgical industry, machine building, and the chemical and timber industries. At the same time, the automobile industry has adapted successfully to the new conditions.

Light industry is in a difficult situation. One of the main reasons for the decline in this area is the sharp reduction in the population's effective demand. To a certain extent this is an objective process. But the situation is exacerbated by the breakdown of traditional links with suppliers of raw materials from the CIS countries—primarily Central Asia. Matters have now been successfully resolved with Uzbekistan on this problem. Shipments of cotton to our textile enterprises have been resumed as of March. But, even in today's complex conditions, many light industry enterprises are showing that it is possible to work better.

Conversion is starting to bear fruit. Defense complex enterprises, which are experiencing the same difficulties

as industry as a whole, have cut back production. At the same time, the decline in this complex is becoming structural.

The situation in the countryside is complex. In the six months of the winter period sales of livestock and poultry fell by 10 percent compared with the previous winter, and milk and egg production declined by 15 percent and 13 percent respectively. Livestock numbers have fallen. In these conditions the government has changed its policy: We have set the task of stabilizing agricultural production. To this end, budget spending on agro-industrial complex sectors has been increased, and subsidies and concessions have been arranged for those in the most difficult position. Credit resources have been allocated, part payment in advance has been introduced for grain and oilseeds, and controls have been organized over shipments of material and technical resources.

The economic crisis has also been visible in the social sphere. Rising prices force people to spend money primarily on the purchase of vital necessities and food. These purchases now account for 50 percent of consumer spending.

The process of the stratification of the bulk of the population in terms of per capita income levels slowed somewhat in the first few months of this year. The increase in all kinds of social payments, higher pay in budget-funded organizations, and subsidies to unprofitable enterprises have had an effect. It needs to be honestly said that people's position remains difficult.

Assessing the overall economic results of the first quarter, it has to be stated that the present economic situation can be described as an extremely shaky temporary equilibrium, which could more appropriately be called a "stagnation of crisis."

II. Most Important Avenues of Deepening the Reform and Changes in the Tactic of Implementing It

In which avenues do we see the need to define more precisely the policy that is being implemented?

First, the social thrust of economic policy is being strengthened. It should be acknowledged that very, very little was done last year for the social orientation of the reforms.

Hard though it may be to recognize this, we simply do not have the right to take on obligations that cannot be fulfilled. We do not have the potential to support everyone or to restore everyone's former living standard and actual income and savings within a short time, but we must act.

Second, a very important priority of our policy is the consistent struggle against inflation and the instilling of order in the financial and monetary-credit sphere.

Third, we will continue the work on implementing the privatization program, and at the same time we will take effective measures to enhance manageability in the state sector of the economy.

Fourth, the government is introducing new elements into its structural policy. The essence of the new approach is to ensure selective support for production, for progressive structural changes, and for points of future economic growth while keeping within the confines of the existing limited resources.

Fifth, substantial changes are being made to regional policy. Here our key task is to preserve and strengthen the integrity of the Russian Federation, underpinned by full-blooded realization of the Federation Treaty.

Strengthening the Social Thrust of the Government's Activity

It will be impossible for the economic reform to succeed unless paramount attention is given to the way certain measures and actions affect the population's material position and living standards. The scale of social support at all levels is not all that small today: A number of decisions in the sphere of raising living standards and stepping up social protection for the population have been adopted since the beginning of 1993 at a total cost of R9.7 trillion rubles (including R6.3 trillion from the budget).

It should be stated frankly that not all measures to maintain and raise the population's living standards were coordinated between the president, the Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers. Sometimes we were simply faced with an accomplished fact. No one is opposed to increasing wages, pensions, grants, and allowances. But such decisions must be worked out in advance in the government. In the context of a growing budget deficit I do not rule out the possibility that the timeframe for the implementation of a number of already adopted measures may be adjusted.

The main task is to better target social support. The least well-off sections of the population must undoubtedly take priority.

One of the most acute and painful issues in the social sphere is the protection of the population's money savings. Here the general line is to bring interest rates on savings bank deposits closer to a positive level. We will try to restore, at least partially, the population's savings which have been "eroded" by inflation.

Questions of labor remuneration also demand attention. It is necessary to even out the unfounded discrepancies in the level of earnings in the extracting and processing sectors, as well as between individual regions. The corresponding commissions have already been given to the Russian Ministry of Labor.

The government will also implement measures aimed at maintaining the levels of labor remuneration in budget-funded sectors with due regard for the change in the cost of living index.

This year we may have to face the problem of real unemployment head-on. We therefore need to immediately step up work to retrain and find work for redundant workers; to use all possible means to help develop enterprise, small business, and private farming; and to move in practice to the organization of social work.

Anti-Inflationary Policy and Financial Stabilization

Experience has shown that the main condition for an effective anti-inflationary policy in Russia can only be comprehensive influence on both component processes of the formation of market prices—supply and demand. This influence should be exercised at the initiative of the state in the following main directions.

The paramount task is to **slow down the growth of the money supply.** In its practical work on monetary and credit regulation the Central Bank and the Government rely on the measures stipulated in the government's Action Program for 1993. With a view to their practical implementation a draft presidential edict has been drawn up on the basic guidelines for monetary and credit policy, envisaging tough quarterly limits on the growth of centralized credit and the money supply.

Interest-rate policy is becoming an increasingly important instrument of money and credit regulation.

Another very important element in influencing demand within the framework of anti-inflationary policy is the reforming of the budget system, the consistent reduction of the federal budget deficit through the consolidation of the revenue base and the reduction of expenditure. For this it is planned to introduce amplifications to the 1993 budget on the basis of a **program of tough economic stringency in federal budget expenditure** to be drawn up by the Finance Ministry. But this is not only and not so much a matter for this ministry—above all, the "spending ministries" must get actively involved in this work.

The main reserve for improving the health of state finances is to change the **procedure for providing subsidies and subventions,** and steering such payments away from producers and toward consumers. We need to ensure that all kinds of subsidy are consistently transferred into the budget.

A most important avenue in improving the budget system is to **establish sensible relationships between the federal budget and budgets in the republics and the regions in accordance with** the demands of the Federation Treaty.

In implementing **taxation policy** in 1993 the government sees its main task in improving the procedure for levying existing taxes and primarily value-added tax. So far taxation discipline is at an extremely low level.

A special role in achieving financial stability in the economy belongs **to the consolidation of enterprises' financial position.** The government has decided to go halfway to meet enterprises, relieving them of taxation on their own profit if it goes to swell working capital. The work of the interdepartmental commission for enterprises' financial recovery is being resumed.

We shall also use **anti-inflationary measures of influencing supply.**

One of the most important is **the development of markets which are new for modern Russian conditions—markets for housing, real estate, land, and the funds of privatized and joint-stock enterprises.** Already these markets have a large potential and could divert substantial volumes of cash and noncash money, substantially reducing the tension on the market for traditional goods and services.

Life demands that we also actively influence the actual process of price formation.

Of course, it is not a question of direct price-setting by the state—by ordering freezes at federal or regional level. Such methods—as experience has shown—are virtually useless.

We intend to make more extensive use of methods of controlling the price formation process that are equal to market relations and particularly topical given the actual state of affairs in our economy. These include control by executive organs centrally and at local level over the price of products from enterprises in a monopoly position, and the conclusion with government assistance of price agreements between enterprises and sectors.

Implementation of Privatization Program

By the end of the first quarter 52 percent of trading enterprises had gone private in the sphere of small-scale privatization, along with 47 percent of public catering enterprises, and 53 percent of consumer service enterprises. Some 90 percent of the 5,000 major enterprises included in the first "wave" have been floated off and registered as joint-stock companies. The mechanism of check auctions is being implemented: From the first 20 auctions in December the figure has moved on to 400 in April—and covering all of Russia.

The most important tasks in 1993 will be: the completion of the process of small-scale privatization; the acceleration of the transformation of large and medium enterprises into joint-stock companies; the extensive implementation of voucher auctions including regional and interregional auctions; the reduction of various bans and restrictions on privatization.

With a consideration for the experience of 1992 the government considers it necessary to embark on a substantial expansion of the rights and potential of regions in implementing privatization and to consider more carefully the features of their entry into the market.

The task today is to urgently sort out the criteria by which the different procedures laid down by the State Privatization Program will apply to certain enterprises. This issue must be urgently resolved by the State Committee for the Management of State Property. It is a question first and foremost of the conditions for retaining state ownership of blocks of shares and of issuing "golden shares."

Financial and industrial groups will be set up with a view to preserving existing technological complexes and concentrating their financial resources. These groups should ensure the development of Russian [otechestvennyy] enterprises, enhance their ability to compete in the world market, attract investment, and expand the country's export potential.

Having issued privatization vouchers we must now ensure Russian citizens the necessary conditions for selling them, giving everyone the opportunity to exchange his vouchers for shares by the end of the year.

In this connection it is necessary to resolve a number of questions for the intensification of social guarantees in the course of privatization.

Improving the Running of the State Sector

The overwhelming proportion of the country's economic potential is still concentrated in the state sector. It will take a certain amount of time before this proportion is reduced to a level that is normal for a market economy. And the state, for as long as it remains an owner, is obliged to exercise its managerial functions.

But it turns out that, as of 1987, the state has started avoiding these functions—and doing so at a time when a market mechanism has not yet started working.

Of course, there can be no question of any return to the old methods of over-administration.

The government is making the reform of state enterprises one of its urgent tasks.

First. All state enterprises are divided into two categories—those under direct state administration and enterprises on a full commercial footing [na polnom kommercheskom raschete]. Each of these categories has its own procedure of state control and administration laid down in accordance with general legislation.

Second. Enterprises under direct state management are controlled quite stringently by state organs on questions of production, pricing and pay policy, and finances. But, at the same time, the state gives them limited financial support. The government appoints enterprise leaders. All enterprise workers have the status of state employees.

At the moment, such installations should clearly include the main enterprises in rail transport, communications, power generation, and the defense, coal, and gas industries.

Third. State enterprises on a fully commercial footing enjoy broad independence and virtually the same rights as private enterprises (with the exception of the right to appoint their leader and to engage in operations involving state property).

Fourth. Privatized enterprises where the state has a controlling block or a "golden share" work on the basis of legislation on joint-stock companies, and state control over them is exercised solely through the state's representatives at the enterprises' administrative organs.

Structural Policy, Support for Production and Entrepreneurship

The government proceeds on the basis that the profound restructuring of the Russian economy which is taking place under the influence of market demand, the strengthening of financial discipline, and international competition is inevitable.

At the same time, this process cannot be allowed to be random.

Considering the extremely limited nature of financial resources and the need to combat inflation, the government's structural policy will be strictly selective. We shall issue funds only for economically well substantiated, highly effective projects.

Here I would also like to say a few words about the work done by our ministries and committees—above all, of the sectoral variety. There is no denying that they will have to work in difficult conditions. They will not have their former ability to issue orders, and there are no resources which could be distributed.

But this does not mean that the esteemed ministers will turn exclusively into supplicants for the affairs of their sectors' enterprises.

Take the situation in agriculture: Approximately 3-5 million tonnes of commercial grain is left from the last harvest on kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and by 1 April only 600,000 tonnes of it had been bought. The same is true of wool: Some 22,000 tonnes (in washed fiber) is stored in unsuitable premises, spoiling, and being pilfered. Meanwhile we are importing grain and wool. We need to propose new mutually advantageous forms of trade.

The priorities of our structural policy should also be reflected in our foreign economic activity. Of course, we will use sensible protectionism to protect domestic producers, and promote the appearance on the world market of output involving a high degree of processing, while at the same time controlling exports of raw materials. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Finance Ministry, and other ministries and committees must step up their work in this area.

As early as this year we must expand the front of the agrarian reform, giving the peasant an outlet onto the

market and curbing industry's monopolism. The countryside needs a special banking network. After all, even today loans allocated by the government are not reaching rural producers.

We shall support all spheres of the peasant cooperative movement in production, credit, and insurance. We will switch from supporting the countryside "in general" to providing incentives for the most efficient producers.

I would like to say a few words about support for enterprise. The process of creating and developing a network of small businesses is proceeding slowly and with difficulty. As of the start of this year 624,000 small enterprises had been registered, predominantly in the trading and brokerage spheres. I am convinced that one of the government's main tasks is to change matters for the better in this area in very short order. I hope that we have nonetheless gotten moving. A fund to support enterprise and develop competition is being set up. Different tax policy options are being actively elaborated. The decision has been made to simplify as much as possible the process of registering small businesses.

Strengthening the Legislative Base of Economic Transformations

The government's activity is not yet based on a proper legislative footing.

The old economic legislation cannot function in market conditions. But a new comprehensive system has not yet been created in this country. The RSFSR Civil Code currently in force contains a number of overtly antimarket norms, and the Foundations of USSR Civil Legislation temporarily in force [vremenno vvedennyye] cannot resolve the key problems of legal regulation. Work on the new civil code is being held up.

The government has now been given the right of legislative initiative. Full use must be made of it.

III. Policy With Regard to the Former Union Republics

At the Council of Heads of Government session in Minsk we made specific proposals whose implementation would, in our opinion, make it possible to place cooperation on a firm economic and legal footing. First and foremost, this relates to the strengthening of the organizational structures of the Commonwealth as a whole. A whole string of these coordinating organs have already been set up. We pin high hopes on the Intergovernmental Oil and Gas Council recently set up in Surgut. The practice of creating such organs in key sectors should be considerably expanded. We propose starting preparations on a draft agreement for the creation of a Eurasian coal and steel association.

But, on the whole, in 1993 we need to intensify the negotiating process within the CIS—and possibly with the involvement of other states—so as to take real steps along the road of creating a "common market" for the Commonwealth.

Thus, in the economic sphere the prime condition for such an alliance should be not only the guaranteed provision of reciprocal deliveries, but also the in-depth coordination of economic policy, the strict observance of the principles of a unified monetary system, and the implementation of a unified foreign economic policy with respect to third countries.

In the political sphere the prime condition is to take a coordinated stance before the world community on fundamental questions of international relations, as well as on the questions of acute conflicts on the territory of the former Union.

In the military sphere the main condition is to ensure the coordinated resolution of the questions of the former Union's nuclear potential and the use of major strategic installations.

In the sphere of the protection of human rights the prime condition is to present a united front on questions of the guaranteed protection of the rights and freedoms of the nonindigenous population on the territory of our nearest neighbors.

IV. Current Tasks

We must clearly outline our immediate tasks, which must be resolved in May-June.

The most urgent task is the suppression of inflation. Inflation must be suppressed come what may, at any price.

In the struggle against inflation it is necessary to continue the practice of establishing tough guidelines for monetary and credit policy. We have already agreed with the Central Bank on the limit of up to 30 percent for the growth of credits in the second quarter. I consider it necessary to approve limits for credits expansion for the third quarter of 1993 of 20 percent and in the fourth quarter of no more than 15 percent. It is necessary to continue raising the Central Bank's refinancing rate.

By the end of June we must decide what to do with prices for energy carriers. This subject has become almost a forbidden one. But it does exist, yet we are afraid to touch it—as if we are worried about what might come of it. Again politics is beginning to prevail over economics. We must prepare proposals for prices for coal, elaborate a regime of liberalization suited to the present situation in the national economy, calculate all possible consequences, and make a decision.

On the problem of nonpayments. We must immediately adopt a package of documents on the normalization of settlements. But it should be clear to everyone that there will be no indexing of working capital.

There is also another side to the problem of nonpayments—namely, nonpayments within the CIS framework. On the one hand, we are simply not being paid. On

the other hand, our enterprises are delaying their payments too. This means that the problem of organizing settlements within the ruble zone is not only urgent but has come to a head.

We need to work on the creation of a favorable and predictable economic environment. This is state regulation, which we want to organize. The priority steps in this sphere will be to organize financial discipline for enterprises of all forms of ownership and to establish clear-cut and strict budget restrictions.

I shall make a separate mention of bankruptcies. We talk a lot about it but there is so far no working mechanism. Neither the State Committee for the Administration of State Property nor the Ministry of the Economy nor the Ministry of Finance has yet suggested an effective method of defining bankrupts nor specific targets nor specific deadlines.

With regard to foreign economic activity, our immediate task is to make use of the ruble exchange rate situation. This rate should encourage our exports. In principle we have already reached the point where the balance of trade is beginning to move into the black. But exports are hardly growing at all. Consequently, a most important issue today is how to stimulate industrial exports of machinery and equipment. Unfortunately, we are giving our exporters mixed signals—sometimes slapping on bans, sometimes issuing authorizations.

The reform will not work if we fail to sort out the functions of central economic organs and sectoral structures. The holdups and disruption to the fulfillment of measures under the government's action plan are a sign that by no means everything in this area is favorable. Many leaders, when they talk about reform, have failed to grasp just what they and their ministries need to do or how they should work with enterprises and regions. And they often fail to listen to each other.

We must investigate attentively the entire institutional backup for reform. Primarily the ministries. We must ascertain which of them are unnecessary and may consequently be abolished. In general, a normal market economy has just a few actual economic ministries: ministries of finance, of the economy as a whole (frequently including foreign trade issues), labor and social questions, and science. But how many of them are there in our country? I do not want to scare anyone, but we must seek out at every stage of the reforms suitable managerial decisions and make new institutions directly connected with the main link of the economy and working with enterprises on a commercial basis the government's representatives.

The government is making the attainment of national consensus on the main economic policy issues one of its main goals. You will recall that at both the Eighth and Ninth Congresses of People's Deputies I advocated the elaboration and signing by leading social forces of agreements which would define a platform of constructive work in the economy. I believe that the government has not devoted enough attention to this work—although, admittedly, the circumstances have not been helpful, to put it mildly. The "round table" which began work at the initiative of the government and the Supreme Soviet has not yet become an authoritative forum capable of solving the tasks facing it.

I believe that the "round table" should set itself the one task of elaborating an economic solidarity pact and a package of additional agreements on specific problems, which would, in particular, make it possible to strengthen state power and preserve Russia's integrity; to be more successful in the fight against inflation; to promote the acceleration of economic transformations, the ending of the production slump, and the restructuring of production; to strengthen support for socially vulnerable sections of the population; to improve the effectiveness of the fight against crime and corruption; and to strengthen legality and law and order.

Only thus will we achieve success, overcome the crisis, and ensure the prosperity of Russia and the well-being of its citizens.

Supreme Soviet

Further on 6 May Parliament Proceedings

Moscow Mayor Questioned

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[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1031 GMT on 6 May, in a live relay of a Russian Supreme Soviet session in Moscow, carries a question and answer session with Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov.

The question and answer session begins with a reprimand from Russian Supreme Soviet Speaker Khasbulatov's who says "we are not in the habit here of using words such as scoundrel."

A deputy reminds Luzhkov that during his speech he used the figure of more than 30 when referring to the number of unsanctioned rallies and demonstrations in 1992. He asks how many times the mayor's office prosecuted the organizers of these unsanctioned rallies. The deputy goes on to ask whether the fact that the mayor's office never prosecuted anyone is not tantamount to supporting these events. Luzhkov says that "materials were repeatedly sent to the procuracy and the courts." He adds that it is up to the militia and the procuracy to take matters further.

Replying to a question, Luzhkov denies that law and order bodies are subordinate to the Moscow mayor's office. Khasbulatov interjects saying that "law and order protection bodies are subordinate to the law." Replying to a question about the identity of the driver of the truck that killed the militia member and a request to give examples of violations of the law and provocative actions of Supreme Soviet commissions that Luzhkov

mentioned in his speech, the Moscow mayor says: "I worked with one such commission that investigated the situation regarding 23 February 1992. The commission appraised the disturbances that took place on 23 February last year in what was a very peremptory manner. It tried to put the blame on the Moscow mayor's office. It got nowhere and so it was unable to inform the public of its results. The esteemed Ruslan Imranovich [Khasbulatov] organized a commission that came to be headed by an active participant of the 1 May provocation. I think that this fact alone bears witness to the tendentiousness and illegality of the decision that was adopted and to its provocative nature. With regard to the person in the motor vehicle, I am unable to say anything. I think the investigators, the inquest bodies, the procuracy, will get to the bottom of these questions better than I can."

Replying to a question why he linked the May Day disturbances with the results of the referendum, Luzhkov says "the president and his policies won at the referendum." This statement is greeted with heckling, and Khasbulatov asks for calm saying: "You asked the question and the man is replying." Luzhkov continues that genuine reformers are now gaining the upper hand and this "laid bare the weakness of communist and pro-communist structures, and it is this weakness that made itself felt with all the frenzy at its disposal on 1 May."

Luzhkov is then asked about unsanctioned rallies: are bans on these rallies always justified? What is the logic behind these bans in general and behind banning people from Red Square on 1 May in particular.

Luzhkov replies: "As for the logic behind bans on rallies, I can quite definitely state that the mayor's office never banned a single rally. It is a very important factor and I would like it to imprint itself indelibly upon your memories. The mayor's office adopted decisions on marshalling the rallies with regard to their venues and times, so that rallies and demonstrations that take place simultaneously and are organized by various structures, at times diametrically opposed to one another, do not coincide venue-wise and time-wise. That is why the main and sole aim of the mayor's office is not to ban rallies but to marshal them in such a way as to ensure the safety of the people. As for Red Square, there is a decree by the president that defines the rules and regulations that apply to the use of Red Square. As a result of consultations held before 1 May, Red Square was not made available either to the trade unions which wanted to hold a rally there nor to communist structures. We always strive not to give any advantage to anyone who wants to hold their rally at the same place. That is why it was not possible to make Red Square available to the reds or to the trade unions, who wanted simultaneous rallies there. Incidentally, 25,000 trade union demonstrators held their rally very well indeed; there subsequently was a telephone conversation with the organizers who thanked us for the measures we adopted to ensure security and we thanked them for the way they held their gathering."

Deputy Mironov asks whether the mayor's office and Luzhkov personally sent condolences to the family of the member of the Special Purpose Militia Detachment, OMON, who lost his life in the disturbances. Mironov's second question is: "In connection with the fact that a large number of OMON officers sustained serious injuries as a result of bandit-like actions of communist storm trooper formations, are not the Moscow OMON fighters demoralized and will they be able to ensure order in connection with the fact that information has been received to the effect that communist guerrillas are preparing arms, nets, and all manner of contraptions to carry out pogroms in the city?" Mironov's third question concerns measures to ban communist rallies and demonstrations—have any yet been taken? Luzhkov replied that the Moscow government has made an apartment available for the family of the deceased OMON officer—his wife and his seven-month daughter. The sum 1 million rubles has been given by way of material assistance to them. Many public and business organizations are also helping the family. Replying to the second question, Luzhkov says: "The OMON fighters sustained more injuries and contusions than the demonstrators. This alone testifies to the restraint they showed in the course of the attack upon them, undertaken by this crowd, not a crowd really, but this guerrilla squad, I would say. I mean, there is no demoralization at all. It is simply that this time, on 1 May, the militia encountered behavior completely unexpected by them, an aggressive, excessively aggressive behavior on the part of the demonstrators, armed with various types of offensive weapons other than firearms, so far, shown on TV and which we were all able to see. I banned the 9 May demonstration by the communist structures until the results of the investigation are available."

Luzhkov denies that he failed to answer the second question and reiterates his reply, adding that the "OMON is ready to continue to ensure law and order." Khasbulatov adds, in a facetious tone, "we will not allow any demoralization, even if it is the mayor of Moscow who is going to be demoralized." This is followed by sporadic laughter and barely audible and very short applause.

A deputy calls into question the veracity of Luzhkov's account of the May Day events. Deputy Uvarov asks Luzhkov to show everyone present at the session the film he knows Luzhkov has of the May Day events. The same deputy asks why is it that democrats hold peaceful rallies, while violence, bloodshed, and excesses always accompany the demonstrations of the so-called opposition. Finally, the deputy asks Khasbulatov not to make somewhat insulting remarks about anyone present at this session, to which Khasbulatov jokingly replies that "the last remark has been thrown out." Luzhkov replies that there are quite a few videos available—if deputies want, a film show can quickly be arranged, using the materials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Moscow militia. Explaining the behavior of communist structures, Luzhkov implies that they see themselves as revolutionaries of the olden days and that "they fail to be

supported by the people, and this prompts them to undertake frenziedly aggressive actions."

An unidentified deputy informs Khasbulatov that he was given a video film, taken by Italian tourists within the crowd that was described as a group of bandits. The video shows people singing and dancing. The deputy asks for the video to be shown and proceeds to ask Luzhkov whether any instances of vandalism were recorded along the section of the route between Oktyabrskaya Square and Lenin Square. Referring to the events to be held on 8 and 9 May, the same deputy says he has heard that U.S. citizens and war veterans will be admitted to Red Square, where some show is to be held, and he asks whether Russian war veterans be allowed to enter Red Square on 9 May. Luzhkov replies: "The rules for Red Square are as follows: Popular festivites will be held there both on 8 and 9 May. The way I understand it is that no demonstrations will be allowed during that period, taking into account the fact that popular festivities will be held there. Anyone who so desires, veterans or otherwise, Russian or foreign, will be able to visit Red Square. This is my reply to your question and I think it is an exhaustive reply. Are there any instances of vandalism? Yes, there are. There are photographs and there are those who were affected and who suffered, physically, due to that crowd on the move. I am ready to present these to you." At this point, a deputy asks: "Along Leninskiy Prospekt?" Luzhkov continues: "In particular, I am ready to present these to the commission that will be set up, if there is a decision to this effect, a commission that will investigate all the issues connected with this May Day provocation."

Deputy Urazhtsev asks Luzhkov whether he believes in what he is saying. Does he not think the May Day events reflect the people's dissatisfaction with the economic reforms and the political situation that has emerged in Russia after the referendum? Urazhtsev agrees with Luzhkov's grievances about the 23 February 1992 investigation and goes on to complain that Luzhkov never bothered to answer any of his written questions during many preceding congresses. Luzhkov promises to address himself to the deputy's questions. He again voices concern about the inconclusive investigation of the 23 February 1992 events from which lessons ought to have been learned. He adds: "As for what I believe in or not, leave that to me. As for what I say, generally speaking, I always endeavor to have my feet firmly on this sinful ground; I always try to react practically to situations that emerge and everything I say I say with sincerity and with complete and absolute conviction."

Deputy Nosovets says he has no doubt that the mayor's office and the Moscow militia can maintain security in Moscow "but would you not agree that neither the mayor's office nor other bodies will be able to bring order to Moscow for as long as all manner of National Salvation Fronts and other agitation brigades, as it were, of a political nature and composed of deputies are able to find a niche for themselves in one small part of Moscow, in this case in the White House, the Supreme Soviet, and to set up their headquarters there and for as long as the Supreme Soviet leadership panders to their wishes?" Before Luzhkov has time to reply, Khasbulatov interjects: "This is a speech." Nosovets states that it is question. Khasbulatov replies: "No, it is not a question." Nosovets responds: "It is not up to you to comment." Khasbulatov says: "I beg your pardon, I am replying to it. I reject your accusations addressed to the leadership of the Supreme Soviet. The Supreme Soviet panders to no radical forces at all and that includes what you are doing, too. Ours is an unequivocal attitude to any radicals, that is clear. So please, do not provoke, nor accuse, either the leadership of the Supreme Soviet nor the majority of the Supreme Soviet."

Luzhkov asks to speak: "I do not agree with the esteemed Ruslan Imranovich. All those who took part in the 1 May provocations ran to the Supreme Soviet for help, protection, and moral support. This is a factor that ought to alarm all of you."

A deputy asks Luzhkov whether the word "festive" ought to be used when describing the demonstrations. Luzhkov says that despite serious and hard-hitting criticism voiced during the trade union rally, the demonstration held by the unions was a festive one. The other demonstration was anything but festive—it was a "political, aggressive demonstration."

A deputy asks whether the fact that democrats were allowed to hold a rally at a venue traditionally occupied by Communists was a factor in what followed. Luzhkov says that organizers of the Communist rally broke their promise and started moving where they were not allowed to be.

Interior Minister Yerin Gives Speech

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[Speech by Interior Minister Viktor Fedorovich Yerin at 6 May Supreme Soviet session in Moscow on May Day events—live]

[Text] Esteemed people's deputies, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to you all for your decision to honor the memory of a member of staff of the interior bodies killed while on duty. Today Moscow has begun to bid farewell to him. Unfortunately this sad count is increasing every day—this year alone we have lost over 50 personnel in clashes with criminals while fulfilling their service tasks of protecting law and order and combating crime. In conditions of increasing aggression, crime is making demands on the interior bodies to take increasingly decisive actions in order to secure people's safety, public calm, law and order and legality.

The most serious concern is aroused by the fact that in the recent past certain forces, in order to achieve their unseemly political aims, are changing over essentially to criminal methods of fighting for power. They are organizing and provoking acts of violence, nudging citizens

toward confrontation with the authorities, and instigating them toward strong-arm methods of putting pressure on law enforcement bodies. As events of recent years show, political adventurists, who border the criminal world or who sometimes directly take part in legally punishable actions, have been timing their actions to coincide with festivities. No doubt it is easier in such periods to push people out on to the streets. These adventurists exploit certain facts of our rather complex real life, heating up passions to the utmost, and acting on the basis of the principle—the worse the better.

Taking into account this factor, the Russian Interior Ministry and local law enforcement bodies were taking necessary measures to strengthen the protection of public order, and to ensure safety during pre-festive and on festive May Days. Everything was done to ensure that people could relax in peace, while those who intended to attend demonstrations and rallies could express their political views and convictions in a normal atmosphere. On 1 May, rallies, processions, and demonstrations were held in 67 regions of the Russian Federation. Over 100,000 of our fellow citizens took part in them. What is more, not a single serious incident was registered. Public order was maintained in all areas.

Extra attention was paid to the maintenance of law and order in the capital, where political passions have been running particularly high, and where the temperature of political confrontation has been constantly rising, especially of late. It is right here in the capital that certain political circles are most indiscriminate in their choice of means and methods in the struggle to achieve their goals. According to the mayor's office—the documents and their numbers have been quoted here—two mass rallies were planned. One was to be held by the Moscow Trade Union Federation. This was to follow a route from Triumfalnaya Square, along Tverskaya Street to Manezh Square, where a meeting was to be held. The other, organized by Working Russia, Working Moscow, the National Salvation Front, and a number of other organizations, including the Russian Communist Workers' Party, was to follow a route from Kaluga Square, via Krymskiy Val, to the central offices of the Union of Artists, where a meeting was to be held.

In order to ensure that law, order, and security were maintained, over 10,000 Interior Ministry personnel were on duty in the capital on 1 May. The minister had a reserve force of over 3,000 men, including Interior Ministry troops, at his disposal. On 1 May, from 0900 to 1100, representatives of trade union organizations—about 12,000 people in all—held a demonstration on Tverskaya Street and a meeting on Manezh Square. This rally proceeded in an organized and peaceful manner, without any breaches of public order whatsoever. That same day, around 10,000 supporters of the opposition movements and parties, which I have already referred to, gathered on Kaluga Square. Right from the outset the organizers of this demonstration strove to escalate the situation, to create an atmosphere of mass hysteria, to incite a confrontation with the authorities, going as far as a direct clash with the forces of law and order. Information to this effect kept coming in to us as soon as the rally on Kaluga Square began. We do not conceal the fact that we have an opportunity of receiving this information as it comes, directly from the crowd, and that it also tells us about the intentions these forces have. These were immediately obvious if you looked at the openly instigatory and cynically insulting content of many streamers and slogans, or listened to those who led the action, and who called, quite frankly, for insubordination to the authorities of Moscow who were in charge of the rally and its venue. On the 30th [April] there were open calls, made in particular by the National Salvation Front, to the effect that a march on Red Square would be organized.

At 1040, having ignored the militia warning that instructions of the Moscow Mayor's office had to be implemented unswervingly, to the effect that the rally had to be held at Krasnyy Val, one of the organizers of the action—city soviet deputy Anpilov—called on those gathered to march along the Lenin Prospekt to Vorobyevy Gory. There is conflicting information here and for the time being I do not have verified data to hand, but this was done either to hold yet another additional rally there, although in my view they already had a big enough rally at Kaluzhskaya Square, or to execute a maneuver and implement a task they had earlier set themselves of entering the city center.

Despite repeated demands by the militia that it was impermissible to depart from the route that has been allowed, and despite a second warning to the organizers about their responsibility for actions that were against the law, those gathered were formed at Kuluzhskaya Square into columns and began to move along Lenin Prospekt. This substantially disrupted traffic, posed a real danger to citizens, and could have led to the situation getting out of control, especially in circumstances in which instigatory calls continued to emanate from the crowd, and when the intention of certain forces to carry out a large-scale provocation with far- reaching consequences was becoming ever more clear. In order to put an end to the violation of the procedure for holding mass gatherings, as set out by law, and in order to avert the growing threat to public security and to citizens, it was decided to block Lenin Prospekt. This decision was also dictated by the possibility that the organizers would use the march along the back streets to get people to come to the Manezh—where, as I already told you earlier, a many-thousand strong demonstration and rally was held by the trade unions at that time—was not only not being ruled out, but on the contrary, was very high and very probable.

In order to fulfill the tasks that had been set, subunits of the bodies of internal affairs, including the Special Purpose Militia Detachments [OMON] were redeployed in the region of Gagarin Square—1,300 OMON people were put in place there. Eleven militiamen were posted outside building No. 37 and the thoroughfare was cut off by motor vehicles. It is necessary to talk in such detail

about the motives behind and the purposes of cutting off Lenin Prospekt, because there are people who assert, in what is an unfounded manner, that this decision was unjustified. People's deputy Benov even said that this decision was criminal—this at least is what was reported to me as having been said yesterday at the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

In order to remove these issues from the agenda I will quote the Law on Militia, adopted by you, esteemed legislators. It says that the Militia has the right to cordon off or block certain areas while acting to prevent group actions that disrupt traffic, that it also has a right to temporarily prevent citizens' access to certain areas and facilities, and to instruct them to leave these areas and facilities in order to protect the life, health, or property of citizens.

At 1120, the column approached the militia ranks. Without reacting to appeals to halt, a group numbering over 1,000 people detached itself from the main body of the march. Mainly these were physically robust, young people. They attacked the militia, hitting officers with truncheons and iron bars; stones and empty bottles were also used. Three buses were directed against militia officers to ram into its ranks. Those taking part in the disturbances were moving the motor vehicles that were cutting off the thoroughfare, without paying attention to the fact that militia officers would find themselves under the wheels of these vehicles. In order to put an end to the disturbances and in strict accordance with the existing laws and regulations in force, the militia used rubber truncheons.

At 1140, two fire engines equipped with water cannon were used. The crowd of hooligans was stopped, but they continued to commit excesses. They set fire to two motor vehicles and prevented firemen from putting these fires out. A further 40 or so motor vehicles were damaged by truncheons and stones, including 12 militia vehicles. The fact that 139 shields, 78 bulletproof vests, 106 helmets, and 16 radios were seized from the militia or completely destroyed also bear witness to the aggressiveness of those who were taking part in the disturbances. Two hundred and five officers, including 181 OMON officers, sustained various bodily injuries. Twenty seven of them were hospitalised. Two hundred and eighty two civilians were affected—more than 12 have been hospitalized.

At 1230, the crowd was pushed far back into Leninskiy Prospect, in the direction of Kaluzhskaya Square, and there again calls were heard—I would say calls inciting concerted actions—for civil disobedience against the legal authorities. At 1410, the rally participants went back to Kaluzhskaya Square, from where some 5,000 people proceeded to Free Russia Square, using various means of transport. There they continued to behave in an aggressive manner, smashing glass in several trucks and in buses carrying militiamen, who we had been compelled to transfer there to ensure public order. The demonstrators were arming themselves with metal bars and other building implements. Calls were heard to throw stones and to rout the OMON.

The Interior Ministry Collegium conducted a comprehensive assessment of the situation and of the practical measures used by law enforcement bodies of the city of Moscow in response to the aggravation. Its conclusions are unambiguous. The actions taken by militia were totally adequate considering the degree of danger to the public with regarfd to the events that had taken place. These actions were strictly in keeping with the law, and their only aim was to ensure safety and to maintain law and order in the city. I would add that the militia staff on many occasions showed inadmissible self-restraint. This is what caused so many casualties among the staff and left so many injured. In carrying out their official duty, in following their oath of allegiance, they were behaving courageously and with dignity. But I would say that sometimes they showed excessive self-restraint, placing themselves in position of the blows. In this context any attempts to blame the law and order protection bodies for what has taken place, or to endeavor to claim that responsibility must be shared equally by those who organized the disturbances and those who opposed them, are untenable and are being made with unseemly political purposes in mind.

With regard to the instances of mass disturbances, criminal proceedings have been instituted on the basis of Article 79 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code. The Procuracy is in charge of the investigations. The bodies of internal affairs are extending as much support and assistance as possible. We have made available a requisite number of investigators who have joined the joint investigation team in which, apart from us, investigators from the Ministry of Security are working. Criminal investigation is simultaneously underway to establish the identities, both of the organizers and the active participants of the illegal actions. The Identities of eyewitnesses are being established. Materials to hand and the documentation of all these actions, including the video recordings, have been handed over to the investigation bodies and are being actively used to establish the specific guilt of each individual law breaker.

It appears premature to give juridical assessment of the events that have taken place before the investigation is over. Nonetheless, the identities of more than 100 people, including those of the law breakers requesting medical assistance, have already been established. So far, the Procuracy has unfortunately decided to arrest only one active participant. I think, however, that as more materials become available and as more initial teething problems of an organizational nature are resolved, this work will be carried out more actively. Incidentally, we have analysed those caught red- handed: among them are workers, blue-collar workers, students, and older school pupils; that is why we simply cannot talk of some other categories of people, as some endeavor to do, claiming that only old ladies and the elderly were detained.

Administrative depositions, based on Article 166 of Section 1 of the Russian Federation Adminstrative Code have been compiled against five organizers of the unsanctioned march along Lenin Prospekt. So far only one person has been brought to book for real: the court found it necessary to fine him 15,000 rubles. No verdicts have yet been reached where the others are concerned. What has been heard here concerning the issue of whether these depositions are or are not being compiled and what decisions are being made concerning the depositions—I would be very grateful to the people's deputies if they could really attentively investigate what decisions are made concerning the dozens of depositions internal affairs bodies regularly compile against the organizers of all these marches and demonstrations and send to people's courts. I can imagine that a rather interesting picture could emerge.

It is necessary to point out that the same individuals who organized this—in quotation marks—1 May demonstration, breached the established order of the organization of mass actions, and attempted to provoke clashes with the forces of law and order many times before. The dates which have already been mentioned here are 23 February, the Ostankino events in June, and 23 April in Moscow. One cannot exclude the possibility of similar provocative actions being repeated during the upcoming Victory Day festivities. Appeals for active resistance against law and order forces can be constantly heard near the White House—every morning, day, and night.

Taking into account the current situation, internal bodies, in conjunction with other law enforcement bodies, are taking the necessary steps to ensure social order and safety, and to prevent possible excesses.

I am sure that personnel of the Ministry of Interior and troops of the Ministry of Interior will fulfil their tasks. People need social peace and safety, they need to feel confident that their lives and those of their children and friends and relatives are not in danger. That is why Muscovites supported and appreciated the firm and decisive actions of the Militia on 1 May; they also hope that in future the forces of law and order will have enough decisiveness and courage to put a stop to hooliganism and other criminal actions, whatever political excuses they are committed under. The Ministry's Colleguim can firmly assure you today that any future provocations which endanger public safety will be firmly and unequivocally rebuffed, in full compliance with current legislation. Thank you for your attention.

Yerin Answers Questions

LD0705125293

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1138 GMT on 6 May broadcasts a relay of the Russian Supreme Soviet session in Moscow, which gathered to discuss the events surrounding the May Day celebrations in Moscow.

Following his speech, Interior Minister Yerin answers deputies' questions. Deputy Balashov, referring to a recent change in Aeroflot anti-hijacking procedures, points out that in cases of hijacking, rather than attempting to arrest a criminal inside the plane and thus inflict unncecessary suffering on innocent passengers, the hijacker is now allowed to take any aircraft to his destination, where he is arrested by authorities. In a similar situation, would the Ministry of Interior have provisions for other, more civilized forms of protecting public peace in order to minimize the damage on both sides? Also, what should the Supreme Soviet do in order to assist the Ministry of Interior in this undertaking?

Answering the question, Yerin states: "Interior Ministry bodies have the potential and I believe made full use of it in preventing such a clash. Necessary explanations had been made, official warnings had been issued to activists and organizers, and so on and so forth."

Deputy Shashviashvili says he sincerely respected Yerin until his speech. He then asks who gave the orders to block Leninskiy Prospekt, and who had been in charge of the operation. Shashviashvili says he regrets the death of the young militiaman, but that evidence from eyewitnesses suggests that at least five people had been killed among the demonstrators. "Of these, one body was taken in an unknown direction by a Riga Automobile Factory van, escorted by another vehicle, and a Ulyanovsk motor works vehicle—both were militia vehicles. Where was this body taken to, and where can it be found?" Shashviashvili asks.

Yerin responds: "I see. Statements of that sort started coming from the moment the clash in Leninskiy Prospekt began, and an intense—a very intense—search for these allegedly missing bodies has been launched. Since no one managed to find the bodies, as early as on 2 May here, under these very walls, calls were heard to prepare beforehand plastic bags, to fill them with red ink, and to use them in the next round of clashes, in order to create an illusion that the militia are very bad and that they beat up innocent people.

"No one was killed in the clashes, except for the young man who is to be buried on Saturday. There have been attempts, on the part of some deputies too, to turn a body of a sick man, who died as it were of natural causes, into this alleged missing body. This sick man mind you was a foreigner, and had been in hospital since the middle of April, without leaving it once.

"I think that you either respect me or you do not; it is up to you, but I have to answer for my words. If you have any factual information I am ready to receive it from you in my capacity as internal affairs minister. In order to ensure complete safety, I am also prepared to propose that you send it directly to the procurator general, or to the head of the investigating team in charge of the criminal proceedings, which is fully answerable to the law for the impartiality of their investigation."

Yerin continues, saying that regulations governing order are set out in the relevant legal documents, and that any decisions on the redeployment of personnel and use of resources are made directly by those in charge of the operation on the ground.

Replying to a question from an unidentified person about who was in charge of the operation, Yerin says it was a commander. He adds: "You may consider that the minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation was simultaneously in charge of the operation. I have no intention of shirking responsibility. I was in charge."

Deputy Andronov, stressing his respect for the minister, who always replies honestly to questions, tells Yerin he witnessed the first clash between demonstrators and militia. He says he was accompanied by "four Americans who filmed all that, and there is a video cassettee and here are their names: Ellen Ray, Stewart Sender, Kevin Keating, and Peter Tooke. They are now in Moscow." Andronov says that after Anpilov suggested to the demonstrators to go away, the demonstrators started moving along the only militia-free road—Leninskiy Prospekt. Then heavy militia vehicles started chasing them, says Andronov. The demonstrators stopped the vehicles; more militiamen were brought in to get the demonstrators away from the vehicles and it was at that point that the first hand-to-hand fighting took place. Andronov is interested whether this first instance of clashes was reported to Yerin.

Yerin replies to Andronov: "All right, I will try to explain. When those who were in Kaluga Square started moving along the Prospekt, in the direction of Gagarin Square, a very complex task appeared for the Moscow Militia—to stop them marching further and possibly reaching the center. We had enough forces there and knew the route. We knew they would be moving toward the Krymskiy Val. Correspondingly, the necessary forces and resources were also to be found behind Krymskiy Val, behind the venue where the rally was to take place. Naturally, the reserves were deployed in places where our tactics required them to be. Indeed, when this column began to move and when the problem of stopping the traffic there arose, because the movement forward had to be stopped, a column of trucks, empty trucks, with no militia officers inside, tried to go there to get out along the parallel streets beforehand, so as not to use civilian, casual [word indistinct]."

An unidentified voice says: "They were moving along Leninskiy Prospekt, heading directly for the demonstrators."

Yerin continues: "I was personally an eyewitness of how indeed a group of people, some 200 to 300 people in my view, directly opposite the underground, the Koltsevaya station of the underground, did indeed stop the first vehicle. The drivers' decision was absolutely correct—I mean they became convinced that here it was necessary to disperse; but this was before the main clash and we again witnessed the fact that militia officers tried to cajole and persuade people, as it were, not to use any force. Attempts were made to move the vehicles and we saw this as an element of confrontation. Then these vehicles were quite simply redeployed. They did not disappear anywhere, and I know where they were sent. They did indeed arrive by a roundabout route, but this delay unfortunately led to the civilian transport, national economy transport, being damaged, in addition to our trucks."

Andronov says: "So you confirm this fact."

Yerin replies: "Yes, such a fact did take place."

Deputy Lyubimov asks Yerin: "At the beginning of your speech, you mentioned that rallies and processions took place in 67 areas of the Russian Federation. So, my first question is: Has it ever occurred to you that in the places where no restricting decrees were imposed, and where there were no heads of operations, rallies and processions went off in a friendly way, with no losses, bloodshed, or beating?"

In the second question Lyubimov contends that in their speeches today, officials displayed a negative bias against anyone taking part in demonstrations.

In his third question, he states that today the Nezavisimaya Volna radio station described the May Day events as an outset of the civil war and asks: "Do your informants have any reports on who tries to start the civil war, who instigates and incites?"

In his answer, Minister Yerin says that by assessing the dynamics of ensuring public peace in different regions, he has come to a rather evident conclusion: "As usual, it depends on two main components: on how the organizers of a procession or event behave, and on how professional and precise the forces of law and order are in their actions".

On the issue of a negative bias, Yerin comments that he has the right to emotional judgment, and after he viewing all the videos of the demonstration, he can only describe the actions of those who attacked the forces of law and order as extremely aggressive. He dismisses the third question as bearing no relation to reality today: "I believe that the people of Russia will have enough wisdom and restraint to prevent another civil war," he responds.

A woman deputy from Vladivostok asks Yerin three questions: What offenses were committed on May Day in Moscow by democratic organizations? Who was responsible for deploying unarmed policemen against armed demonstrators? Is the minister aware that outside the White House people are being told how to make homemade weapons for use on 9 May?

Yerin answers: "Thank you. I will answer each of those three questions in turn, if you don't mind.

"Yes, in a number of instances the democratic forces also contravened established procedures for holding

such rallies. They did not always stick to their timetable. The actual number of people present did not always agree with the number stipulated in the application. There was evidence of this. But I am not aware of any evidence that they were aggressive, that they resisted the forces of law and order.

"Second, who will be held responsible for the fact that the officers who had to confront this aggressive mass—or citizens, as I have just been corrected—were unarmed? Nobody will be held responsible, because they were not supposed to be armed. However, it is perhaps true that we did not use the entire arsenal of equipment which we have at our dispoal, in accordance with existing legislation, to put a stop to trouble. This is another matter, and I entirely agree with you on this. We will be learning lessons from this, too.

"As many questioners have pointed out, throughout the civilized world the police have long operated in such circumstances without coming into contact with demonstrators. This is very simply done. A cordon is formed. A line is designated and organizers are told that they will be escorted as far as that line. You may have heard a recent interview in which it was stated that police over there escort demonstrators. You will be escorted up to that line. However, if the line is overstepped the first thing which happens, as a rule, is an order to open fire with tear gas, to force the crowd to disperse. If this does not work, water cannon are used. If this does not work, rubber or plastic bullets are used. That is the sequence adopted by police forces throughout the world. It goes without saying that here too we have to draw appropriate conclusions, because such losses cannot be sustained."

Supreme Soviet Chairman Khasbulatov asks: "What about the third question?"

Yerin says: "Yes, the third question. We know what is happening outside the White House. We know about the calls which are being made there. Yes, indeed, this is unfortunately so. I agree with you. But things which people say and express do not always amount to a crime. Usually they do not amount to a crime."

The following debate follows:

[Khasbulatov] "Please be more specific. Who is making these loudspeaker announcements? Who is making these calls? After all, the hint is obvious. Why be shy?

[Yerin] "Ruslan Imranovich, no doubt you know just as well as I do.

[Khasbulatov] "I do not know.

[Yerin] "They are the leaders of the National Salvation Front, including people's deputies. They include Viktor Anpilov, a deputy in the Moscow soviet. They are all well known. But if anybody doesn't know who they are, they can...

[Khasbulatov, interrupting] "Thank you, Viktor Fedorovich. You appeared to be saying, hinting, that Khasbulatov himself might have been behind this.

[Yerin] "No, not at all.

[Khasbulatov] "Such suggestions are a waste of time."

Deputy Mazayev, himself a militia officer, says that in such colossal political provocations, in such dirty provocations, those who suffer most are the militia and the population. He adds: "I have learned from experience that clashes with civilians usually become inevitable, either when the leadership is determined to take harsh measures against demonstrators, to use force, and to act in accordance with the thesis at any cost, don't let them pass, or else when the operation itself is carried out sloppily, even if the crowd of demonstrators includes fighters and more or less organized detachments". He asks which of these two causes was predominant on 1 May, and asks a further question:

"Can we speak of impartiality on the part of the Militia, the Internal Affairs Ministry, in political actions, when the internal affairs minister himself—while saying that the militia and the ministry are independent, and that one should not divide people into the white and the red, the left-wing and the right-wing—himself makes speeches at the Vasilyevskiy Slope, himself takes part in a political rally organized by one of the political forces, a rally to which Luzhkov, the mayor, brings in demonstrators in comfortable busses with toilets on board. These demonstrators are protected by militia, while the other section of the population is sort of pronounced outlawed. Not to mention the fact that on the eve of the referendum, the internal affairs minister and his collegium sent out an appeal to support Yeltsin.

"In this situation, how can one speak of impartiality on the part of militiamen, when they are placed under such restrictions? How can one speak of the oath of allegiance that we took—allegiance to the law and the people—the people as a whole, not just one section".

Yerin starts his reply by saying that he was and will remain loyal to his oath of allegiance, and that it is not up to Mazayev to assess his loyalty. Mazayev contests this assertion.

Yerin responds: "I would cross out the reference to the use of force in your first question. Militiamen, of whom I take it you are one, did not use force. They were faced with force. This is how I as minister assess their actions.

"The second question now, concerning political actions. Yes, the law says that the internal affairs bodies should not get involved in political activities, in party politics, and this rule is strictly observed. Why don't you read the appeal form the Internal Affairs Ministry Collegium attentively—incidentally, a similar appeal has been issued to the internal affairs bodies with regard to the events of 1 May. As a member of internal affairs bodies, and undoubtedly as a people's deputy, you have access to

these documents. After you have read them, I am ready to discuss their contents with you in detail. They contain no demands or requests or calls to support this or that side. They say that in these hard times it is necessary for the staff of the Interior Ministry bodies to support Russia. This is what the Collegium calls for.

"As for me personally, I can report that in my capacity as internal affairs minister I attend virtually all rallies, whatever their slant, wherever they are staged, and whoever stages them. I belive it to be my professional duty not only to receive reports by telephone and memos, but also to attend the sites personally, to watch these events, and to supervise the actions taken by my staff who maintain law and order there. According to the information at my disposal, the staff are encouraged by this; the minister attending the sites where they are carrying out their duty for hours, sometimes days on end."

Concluding the session of questions and answers, Speaker Khasbulatov concludes: "These are citizens of Russia, and we must be with them, at the same rally. My position is: All those celebrating, all those rallying, are in fact one big rally." At this point Khasbulatov cuts short further attempts to ask questions.

Deputy Benov on Inquiry's Findings

LD0705143693

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1209 GMT on 6 May, during its relay of the Russian Supreme Soviet session held in Moscow, broadcasts the address by Deputy Gennadiy Matveyevich Benov, on behalf of the commission of inquiry into the events at the 1 May celebrations.

Benov says: "Esteemed Presidium, esteemed colleagues. After the events on 1 May, by an instruction of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, a deputies' commission was set up, including deputies of the Russian Federation, people's deputies of the Moscow soviet, and of two of the capital's districts. This temporary commission has prepared a preliminary report summing up some results and conclusions, which we are presenting to you."

Benov reminds the deputies that 1 May was a national holiday in Russia, as well as in Kazakhstan and in Belarus. In those two countries the leadership joined the people in the streets. "Where the leaders realize that the important thing in organizing festivities is not to implement restrictions, not to rehash everything to their own liking, where they are aware of their political and moral responsibility to their fellow citizens, there the festivities proceed normally, unmarred by anything. But when the principal aim of the authorities is to impose bans and restrictions on a large section of the people, what kind of festivity is that in Russia," Benov asks. He says that bans were at variance with traditions and habits, and this resulted in conflict. He draws a parallel with the earlier suppression of Christian holidays. The investigation will determine the cause and the circumstances, he says.

Benov says that in accordance with the Russian president's decree No. 524 of 25 May 1992, applications were filed at least 10 days in advance of the planned rallies. The mayor of Moscow considered these applications on 25 April. In the event, the Moscow Federation of Trade Unions was allowed to march along their original itinerary, from Mayakovskiy Square to Red Square. "However, a whole range of public patriotic organizations and political parties were denied their original itinerary—Oktyabrskaya Square-Sadovoye Ring-Manezhnaya Street-Red Square—by the mayor of Moscow. He also fixed the alternative itinerary, from Oktyabrskaya Square to Krymskiy Val," Benov adds. Benov states that makes a distance of about 300 to 500 meters, which is unsuitable for a May Day rally with more than 100,000 participants. Benov describes the decision as bewildering. "I reiterate: An application is not a request for the rally to be permitted, but a basis on which the executive bodies should arrange the maintenance of public order and safety of those who participate," he says.

The president's instruction of 28 April this year, and the subsequent decision by the mayor, dated 29 April, also infringed on the rights of the Moscow trade unions organization, limiting their itinerary to Manezh Square. "Therefore the Commission's preliminary analysis of the legal basis for preparing and holding festivities shows that there have been breaches of the Constitution and of legislative acts relating to rallies, demonstrations, marches, and pickets," Benov stresses.

Benov goes on to say that there are good grounds for describing the measures limiting parades on 1 May Victory Day as emergency ones, that are not contained in the Constitution or framework of laws. He adds: "In the opinion of the Commission, the president's ban on holding public celebrations in a number of squares and streets in the center of the capital, which came out on the eve of the May Day demonstrations, was unconstitutional, just as the use of an unsuitable number of forces and equipment in the area of Oktyabrskaya Square to form powerful barriers and reserves on the day of holiday processions can hardly be justified."

Benov says says there was a huge difference in the forces allocated to Mayakovskiy and Manezh Squares, and to Oktyabrskaya Square. "From the very start many people on Oktyabrskaya Square took this as a humiliation to their dignity and as a deliberate attempt to cast a cloud over the holiday," he adds.

Moving on to the political aspect, Benov says: "One has the impression that the tragic events of 1 May in Moscow were a pre-planned political provocation, first and foremost by the Moscow executive authority."

Benov points out that the utmost responsibility of the authorities is to ensure order and safety of people. He continues: "This was a provocation organized by right-wing radicals and by leaders of left-wing radical forces who took the bait of the provocation. This is being used

by political radicals in order to drag the Russian Supreme Soviet into political confrontation. Beginning with 1 May, the mass media have started a fierce and frenzied propaganda campaign in order to have the soviets dissolved—something many are saying now publicly on television, without even a trace of embarrassment—and also in order to discredit the Supreme Soviet in the eyes of the society".

Benov continues to lambast television: "A flood of blatant appeals to violence, even to interning leaders of the opposition, is hitting us from television screens", he says, and to confirm this, Benov cites a 4 May discussion participated in by Vasiliy Selyunin, agrarian economist, and Deputy Sergey Yushenkov. He also quotes deputy Ilya Zaslavskiy, who went on the Moscow channel to speak very harshly of the May Day instigators. Benov completes his denunciation of television by saying that television has today become the place of political assassination of the opposition.

Speaking of the demonstration, Benov states that most people who took part in it were nonpartisan and nonpolitical, and again urges the legislators to stop "this flood of lies, whichever side they come from."

Stating that on Oktyabrskaya Square, the people who took part in the demonstration found themselves in a trap, with only one unblocked exit, he continues: "There were some appeals to go to Manezh Square via the Crimea Bridge, but the bridge was blocked off; that is why, in order to avoid possible clashes, organizers took people away from the city center, along the Leninskiy Prospekt, the only way that was not blocked off, toward Vorobyevy hills, where it was decided to hold a rally and then call it a day. This was announced to the demonstrators.

"So, where is the logic in the actions of Moscow administration, which chose not to ensure order and safety for the procession, even though this itinerary had not been planned?" "Swiftly relocating men and resources, they managed to build a wall which confronted the peaceful demonstration. I do not justify, however, the actions of that extremist group which provoked the fight on the side of the demonstration," Benov adds.

He continues: "The sacrifices made in order to stop the demonstration on the Leninskiy Prospekt from happening were excessive. This is the price of a political provocation incited against our people." Benov says: "The clearly moral aspect: The desire of the town authorities to bring about a clash between the militia and the people, to set them against each other, is clearly evident. What in fact happened by Gagarin Square was a clash between our younger generation and their fathers and grandfathers, mothers and children.

"The cynicism and brutality of the events of 1 May should be the object of particular consideration by the commissions of the Supreme Soviet, for young people are our future.

"The commission has received, and is still receiving, more than 500 statements from victims, and more than 7,000 from participants and eyewitnesses."

Benov tries to read out a sample statement, but Khasbulatov interrupts, saying he has already given this information. Benov gives the conclusions of the commission:

"The commission believes that all aspects of the tragedy should be the object of a detailed and objective investigation by the Council of Ministers. It considers that the Supreme Soviet should ask the government why it did not carry out measures to protect public order in the town of Moscow.

"Two: The Commission also considers it essential for the Supreme Soviet to set up a special deputies commission to investigate the tragic events in Moscow, which were aggravated by the death of a young Russian lad, Militia Sergeant Vladimir Tolokneyev. All the materials and eyewitness accounts given to our working commission that was created on the instruction of the chairman on 1 May will be put at the disposal of this commission.

"The commission also considers that it should contain deputies who did not themselves take part directly in these events, in order to put an end to speculation about the formulation and the different opinions of the members of the commission.

"Last: In our opinion the most important thing is that it is essential for all of us to draw serious conclusions in order to ensure that such a thing never happens again. In two days' time our people will be celebrating the most glorious holiday, Victory Day. Muscovites are also preparing to celebrate it. But as you have already heard, there are restrictions forbidding parties and movements other than the Union of Officers and the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] to hold public celebrations or to hold rallies, demonstrations, or street marches. Will this ban hold people back? Won't it make it even worse? As the saying goes, you should measure seven times before cutting once.

"In such a situation the Supreme Soviet should take under its control the actions of the government and the executive authorities subject to it, and ensure that the people get celebrations worthy of Victory Day, which is a great day for all of us. It should ensure that every citizen has the chance to implement their legitimate rights to pay homage to the memory of those who fell in the struggle against fascism, for the freedom and independence of our motherland.

"The leadership of the Supreme Soviet and of other branches of power could come into the streets on that day and celebrate it along with the workers. Let's say, they could attend a rally at the memorial on Manezhnaya Ploshchad, at the tomb of the Unknown Warrior.

"In the opinion of the commission, the Supreme Soviet should put to all parties, movements, women's, youth, and trade union organizations, an initiative that they

should guarantee jointly the fitting celebration of Victory Day. This could be a real step along the path of national accord, and a barrier across the path of those who aim to push the country off its peaceful path, to push society towards schism, and the establishment of a dictatorship. Thank you."

Benov Answers Questions

LD0705152193

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1228 GMT on 6 May, during its relay of the Russian Supreme Soviet session in Moscow on the May Day events, broadcasts the question and answer session by Deputy Gennadiy Benov, following Benov's address to the session on behalf of the commission of inquiry into the May Day events.

When Benov finishes his address, Khasbulatov invites questions. An unidentified deputy asks two questions based on the documents presented to deputies; the first is about reports that children were injured, and the second is about the mandate that members of the commission were given.

Answering the second point first, Benov says that the group had only a very short time to examine evidence and present its documents, and explains that he had to give authority to any deputy who was available to investigate reports. He does not answer the first question.

A deputy from Dagestan recalls that at the demonstration on 28 March 1991, the first of its kind where troops were used, violence was prevented by deputies placing themselves between the Special Purpose Militia Detachments [OMON] and the crowd, and asks why this did not happen this time. Benov says he was there as a citizen, and not at the forefront.

A deputy from Tomsk questions Benov's position heading the commission, when he took part in the rally, and asks what the commission did other than a "selective reading of newspapers" and assessment of the referendum results.

Benov says the commission was in constant contact with the Procuracy, the Ministry of Security, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which were also conducting an investigation. Furthermore, after the rally, people came to the Supreme Soviet, who they started to talk to and hear eyewitness accounts.

The next question is from Mironov, from Otradnyy in Zelenograd: "I understood from your highly moral answer to the question from Deputy Nosovets that you, like Deputy Travkin, after the results of the referendum, resigned your authority as a deputy when you learned that the people had said no to those deputies who voted against the president and against the reforms. I understood that you now, as a moral person, will release this commission from your membership." He elaborates on his point, while other deputies demand that he put his question, and is interrupted when he says the country saw that it was the police who were attacked.

Benov answers: "I think the whole country did not see the full picture, and I think that (?they are now gilding the lily), saying unambiguously that thugs came along. I was in the column myself and I did not see anyone with sharpened rods or with chains which were shown that same day, 1 May. You have some explaining to do about those chains: Where did they come from? And where did those rods come from, and those trucks? So we must not get ahead of events."

Benov says his position is moral because he has given an objective account so that the Supreme Soviet can take measures to prevent either side breaking the law.

At this point Khasbulatov calls an end to Benov's appearance. The deputies make procedural decisions. Khasbulatov calls for restraint among them and then declares a recess.

Stepashin Calls For Rally 'Moratorium'

LD0605231293 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1315 GMT 6 May 93

[Speech by Sergey Stepashin at 6 May Supreme Soviet evening session in Moscow—live]

[Text] Esteemed colleagues, the dramatic events of the last months and days show that there has been a sharp increase in the activities of extreme political forces which are accusing each other of engendering crisis and are plunging Russia into a still deeper crisis and pushing society towards civil war. The confrontation of political forces is on such a brink—as the events of May Day and their analysis demonstrate—that even the prospect of the spilling of blood cannot bring the ultras of every hue to their senses. The People's Deputies, like the great majority of the citizens of Russia, are increasingly becoming the hostages of that confrontation. The opposition of the two branches of power of the Russian Federation and their mutual discrediting in the media is leading to a loss of popular confidence in the authorities, to a splitting of society under the influence of various political forces and an increased threat to security, the individual, society and the state.

In these circumstances, Russia's Security Council ought to have had something to say; however, that body, judging by its passivity, is proving to be ineffectual for those same reasons. Today the defense and security committee of the Russian Supreme Soviet, in accordance with the law on security, considers that it has a duty to draw the attention of the broad public, of the Supreme Soviet, and of the highest leadership of the state to the fact that the steady trend toward an increase in internal dangers has brought us to an ultimate line that we must not cross. The law demands that the state bodies defend the vital interests of the individual, of society, and of the

state itself, which in the conditions created by the present political confrontation is showing itself to be ever more ineffectual.

For these reasons, the committee, by agreement with the leadership [as heard] of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions, Klyuchkov, the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Volskiy, and a number of other centrist forces, deems it necessary to propose to the supreme bodies of power and the country's political forces a declaration of harmony in the name of the security of Russia, the main points of which are the following:

First, to exclude entirely from their activity calls for the use of force and attempts to use force against the legitimate authorities and their political opponents, and incitement to civil war and interethnic dissension.

Second, to wage the political struggle strictly within the framework of the laws and work for their improvement or revision in order to overcome the contradictions arising in the process of their implementation; attempts to involve the coercive forces of the state in supporting political programs and demands that they be regarded as unlawful, immoral, and hopeless [as heard]. At the same time, we consider it necessary and justified to act strongly under the law against all acts of violence aimed achieving political ends.

Third, in the next two or three months to submit for the consideration of the subjects of the Federation, political parties, and public organizations jointy drawn-up basic principles and drafts of agreements for extricating the country from the crisis and for combatting inflation, corruption, and crime. To adhere strictly, in relations with the republics of the former Soviet Union, to a policy of strengthening statehood and stabilizing relations among states.

We call upon all political forces and public movements to introduce a moratorium on holding mass rallies, demonstrations, and other political actions until the end of this year. This is intended to assist the government's efforts to ease the yoke of the economc crisis. The moratorium can be extended if the threat to Russia's security continues. Naturally, this does not apply to 9 May. Thank you for your attention.

Khasbulatov on Constitution Question

LD0605174593 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1322 GMT 6 May 93

[Reply by Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov to a question by Deputy Gorelov at a Supreme Soviet session in Moscow—live]

[Text] [Gorelov, speaking from the floor] Ruslan Imranovich, what would you advise the Supreme Soviet and me, as a member of the Supreme Soviet, to do in order to keep you within the framework of the Constitution which you constantly express concern for and which you say we should all act within? What am I referring to? I am referring to the creation of this commission. I have carefully reread Articles 115 and 116 of the Constitution, and I see that you have no such right. Yesterday, in response to Kovalev's question you said: I have this right, I am not introducing it; so please tell me under which article. I am not at all opposed to the creation of the commission, but I do not want you to arrogate to yourself... [changes thought] To be more precise, please advise us what should be done to prevent you taking over the rights of the Supreme Soviet and setting up such commissions in my name.

And my second question: Yesterday at the presidium meeting you repeated, four times I believe, that we will not allow violations of the Constitution and anticonstitutional actions. Well, let us suppose that there is a bad government—we have been talking about this all the time today, or rather you have been telling us this all the time, constantly whipping up the situation, saying that the government or the president wants to violate the Constitution—what mechanism do you envisage to prevent these violations? Suppose a bad government or a bad president decides to violate the constitution or has violated it. What are we to do? Do we take the decision to disband ourselves, do we have strong-arm structures, or do we create them. Perhaps you have more information than I have on this question. Is this some sort of secret of the Presidium or the chairman? There are my two questions.

[Khasbulatov] Let us start with the last one. Until the Supreme Soviet meets, I by my instructions revoke any respective enactments which violate the constitution, if there are any. I am speaking approximately.

Now, I do not know whether we should now debate the rights of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet. I would like you to understand this all the same. Why should we debate the constitution?

Esteemed colleagues, I would like to remind you that this is the second time a major clash such as this has taken place on this scale in the Russian state in the 20th century. It is a major tragedy which the whole of world public opinion is observing today. Of course, as you understand yourselves, there had to be some sufficiently effective actions by the Supreme Soviet, because telephone calls kept coming in from our regions asking what we are doing, what is going on here, why nothing is being said. What else could we do? Of course it was necessary to set up a commission, even though it would just be a temporary one until the Supreme Soviet meets. I do not know what discussions or doubts there could be about this. [shouting from hall]

Wait, please wait, you have already spoken, you have already spoken. I am explaining thus further, not for your personal benefit, because I could have a private chat with you, but for the members of the Supreme Soviet,

As you have seen from the report, a certain amount of preliminary work has been carried out which shows that before we convened this session of the Supreme Soviet we had a certain amount of material which the chairman of this commission will present to you. Therefore, of course, your attempt to cast doubt on our actions, the actions of the leadership, are unfounded, totally unfounded.

Second, esteemed colleagues, I appeal to you once again. The referendum is now behind us. Let us also leave these battles behind us. It is now necessary to bring society together. What we need now is to work out positive approaches. One such decision, it seems to me, which could have a cohesive effect, would be a very clear decision from our Supreme Soviet today, from today's session, giving an assessment, a political assessment of the events which have taken place, with all their tragic nature.

Therefore, if you are not opposed to this, let us begin work. I assure you that I, naturally, violate the Constitution less than anyone, in fact less than you do, Deputy Gorelov, by asking such questions.

Deputy Chelnokov Warns of Violence

LD0705013793 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1326 GMT 6 May 93

[Speech by Deputy Mikhail Chelnokov at the 6 May evening session of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow—live]

[Text] [Chelnokov] Esteemed colleagues! I hope, although unfortunately I am not totally sure of that, that the investigation will give us a full picture. However, as of today, the picture is more or less clear. We will proceed from facts. Lenin Prospect was cordoned by the special purpose militia detachment [OMON] and demonstrators were not told that. It seems to me that this is one of the most important facts to which we should draw our attention. It was this fact that led to the bloody events in Moscow.

I would like to remind you of Article 49 of the Constitution, which says that the citizens of the Russian Federation have a right to gather peacefully and unarmed, to hold mass meetings, street processions, demonstrations, and pickets on condition that the authorities are notified in advance. It became common practice throughout the world a long time ago that if blood is shed on the streets of cities during mass street events, the city administration resigns.

I don't know, perhaps we have an unique country, perhaps it is unique in this respect, but at least I would like this fact to be taken into consideration when today's resolution is being adopted.

What else can be said about the fact itself? I have met a lot of people, numerous eyewitnesses. I have been accosted on the underground and told that it was a premeditated provocation, a provocation in which the militia men and the population had been made to clash head-on. I would like to call on you not to stir up hostility between the militia and the population. Rank and file militia men, as well as demonstrators, had been set up. I would like to stress this.

Essentially, the action was premeditated. There were instigators in the crowd and there is a lot of evidence. One piece of evidence is the fact that junior Sergeant Andrey Sergeyevich Kazakov, who was behaving as an instigator and beating up members of the militia, when he was caught, was without any identity card of a militia employee.

Esteemed colleagues: At present, we should be aware of the fact that this provocation can be repeated in two days' time and after that a state of emergency will be deliberately introduced. All this is being done just for this purpose. I am not proceeding from bare facts. A few days ago I spoke to a militia general who told me literally the following: OMON has become absolutely brutal and on 9 May—I am quoting his actual words—it will beat people differently compared with 1 May.

Therefore, esteemed colleagues, I think it is absolutely necessary for us to adopt a resolution on 9 May. Yuriy Sergeyevich Sidorenko and I are proposing a draft resolution which is not vague but which makes people personally responsible for the demonstrations on 9 May. I ask you to adopt this draft as a basis.

The last thing—Ruslan Imranovich [Khasbulatov], you asked Nikolay Nikolayevich Gonchar about a strange and harmful draft prepared by the small council [malyy sovet]. He did not read it out. I have it. If I may and if the audience do not object ...

[Khasbulatov, interrupting] We will photocopy and distribute it; no need to read it out. Have you finished? Your time has run out.

[Chelnokov] Thank you.

Decision on Victory Day Celebrations

LD0605185793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1700 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] This evening the Russian parliament adopted a decision on the celebrations to mark the 48th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. In adopting the document, the parliamentarians pursued the objective of preventing a repeat of the bloody incidents which took place in the capital on 1 May. The decision makes it encumbent on the Moscow Soviet to take the necessary measures to ensure law and order in the capital. Yuriy Voronin, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, has been instructed to ensure control over the actions of the Moscow authorities.

The decision establishes the personal responsibility of the mayor of Moscow and the chief of Moscow's Main Directorate of Internal Affairs for the staging of the festive events in the capital, as well as the responsibility

of the minister of security and the minister of internal affairs for the celebrations of Victory Day throughout Russia.

An appeal by the Supreme Soviet to compatriots in connection with the Victory Day celebrations has also been adopted.

Statement on May Day Clashes

LD0605215093 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1925 GMT 6 May 93

[Statement issued by the Supreme Soviet on 6 May; read by Vladimir Ispravnikov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet]

[Text] Esteemed compatriots, I have been instructed by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet to read out the text of a statement of the Supreme Soviet on the May Day events in Moscow.

For the first time in several decades, there occurred a clash between participants in the demonstration and the public order bodies during a festive procession on 1 May. Blood was shed. According to preliminary information, over 500 people were injured. Those include workers, engineers, scientists, doctors, army servicemen, people working in the law enforcement bodies, veteran soldiers and workers, and women.

The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet believes that the executive authorities in the city of Moscow failed to take all the required measures in order to ensure that the procession had a peaceful and safe character.

Respecting the constitutional right of citizens to the freedom of processions and demonstrations, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet expresses its sincere sympathy for the victims and their families and condemns the anticonstitutional actions of the people who provoke unlawful acts, an aggravation of the internal situation in the country, increasing instability and mounting conflict processes.

The country needs peace, stability, and the observance of the rights of and guarantees for every citizen. This was also demonstrated by the all-Russian referendum. The people have not withdrawn their credit of trust from either the president or the people's deputies of the Russian Federation.

The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet declares firmly that defending the Constitution, law and order, the people's interests, and democratic reforms in Russia has always been, is now, and will remain the chief aims and tasks of the representative power.

Adopted on 6 May 1993.

Constitutional Commission Convenes 7 May

LD0705084093

[Editorial Report] Moscow Programma Radio Odin Network in Russian at 0730 GMT on 7 May broadcasts a live or recorded 4-minute report by Mayak commentator Aleksandr Ruvinskiy from the Russian Supreme Soviet being held in Moscow. Ruvinskiy says that the chambers should have held their sessions in the Supreme Soviet today but the Soviet of the Republic has failed to gather for a session. The Soviet of Nationalities is in session, but not many people have turned up.

Ruvinskiy says that everyone is interested in the session of the Constitutional Commission. The session is being chaired by Ruslan Khasbulatov and is discussing the draft constitution proposed by the president. Ruvinskiy adds: "Nikolay Ryabov, deputy chairman of the Constitutional Commission, has opened the session. He assessed the draft, although the president himself or his representative should have done this, but this did not happen. Ryabov, describing the draft constitution, said that its main advantage is that it is simple and easy to understand".

The next speaker, Oleg Rumyantsev, senior secretary of the Constitutional Commission, points out that the draft gives more power to the president and restricts the Parliament. Ruvinskiy then introduces a recording of Yuriy Slobodkin's address at the session, who says: "Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin and his supporters have openly challenged the legislative power, and to ignore this or try and soften the situation simply means to avoid giving answers to direct and clear questions".

Ruvinskiy concludes by saying that "the session is still under way, the press is attending it, and a draft decision has already been circulated, in accordance with which it has been proposed not to accept the presidential draft as a basis. But the decision is yet to be adopted."

Khasbulatov Opens Discussion

LD0705102793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1011 GMT 7 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova and Yuriy Filippov]

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—A plenary meeting of the Russian Constitutional Commission opened at the Supreme Soviet here today. Vice-Chairman of the Commission Ruslan Khasbulatov noted, opening the meeting, that the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies had instructed the Commission to draft a new constitution of the Russian Federation. But various circumstances and preoccupations, including extraordinary congresses, "did not contribute to this work", he noted, adding that "a favourable situation has now appeared to cope with this job". He said he was not "referring to time-serving circumstances".

In Khasbulatov's opinion, it is now necessary to "dynamise the process, linked with the drafting of a new basic law and submitting it for approval to the Congress of People's Deputies". He noted that the referendum had displayed the society's desire to perpetuate the existing system of government, even if it was not very perfect. The vice-chairman of the Constitutional Commission stressed that "the constitutional road of development presupposed the adoption of a constitution through state institutions, through the congress". At the same time, he did not deny the possibility of discussing some propositions of the draft, submitted by the president. The speaker of the Russian Parliament recalled that the president of the Russian Federation was chairman of the Constitutional Commission and that the draft drawn up by the commission he headed was accepted as the basis for further discussion. The task today is to take into account all the amendments to this draft.

Khasbulatov urged the commission members to "abstract themselves from personified approaches and not to adapt the draft to some concrete personality, but to take into account the interests of the state and the people".

The speaker said that the president and his representatives were invited to the commission meeting. Their absence "does not relieve us of the duty to carry on intensive work". It is worth recalling in this connection that in his Thursday TV statement, President Yeltsin said: "I have been informed that the chairman of the Supreme Soviet was convening a meeting of the Constitutional Commission on May 7. I hereby declare that this decision is unlawful. I recall that the president of Russia is chairman of the Constitutional Commission. And I shall decide on the convocation of the Constitutional Commission whenever I find this necessary".

Khasbulatov said the team could be enlarged by including into it people wishing to work on the draft. He said the authors of the presidential draft should take part in its work. Referring to information on hand, he said that sixty per cent of the presidential draft were borrowed from the document drawn up by the Constitutional Commission.

Khasbulatov called for concord now that "the referendum battles are over. But this must not be done through concessions. We must take into account everything that is reasonable. This will also be an element of civic peace".

Dwelling on the presidential draft of the Russian Constitution, Vice-Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Nikolay Ryabov said that "its simple wording" was among the document's main "merits". True, he noted that this could not serve as the main yardstick for adequately assessing the country's basic law. Ryabov pinpointed the chapter on the Federal Treaty among the other merits of the document, drawn up by the team headed by Sergey Shakhray and Sergey Alekseyev.

He noted also that the document clearly delineated the powers of the three authorities, adding that the Russian Constitutional Commission should strive towards this end, too.

However, Ryabov mostly focused his attention on the provisions of the draft constitution which, he said, "must be further elaborated". He noted the correctness of complaints that the submitted draft would restore a constitutional monarchy in Russia with unrestricted powers of the head of the executive branch of government and would curtail rights of the representative authorities. He noted that "the submitted draft does not even mention that the Parliament is a legislative body". "Moreover," Ryabov added, "the Parliament is practically deprived of any chance to control the actions of the president and the government he forms."

The Constitutional Commission's executive secretary Oleg Rumyantsev said that he did not "want to touch on the numerous positive aspects" of the submitted document. He preferred to analyse the provisions "contradicting the constitution in force". He mentioned as such the "substantially upset balance of authorities". The MP [members of parliament] noted that in his draft constitution "the president is placed outside and above the three divided branches of government and this is typical for authoritarian regimes, which are a far cry from democracy". Rumyantsev displayed particular concern about the fact that in accordance with the submitted draft the "country will be governed by the president, while nobody will be responsible for the economic and political course". He stressed that the document moved to set up two parallel executive structures—the governmental and the presidential, adding that real power would be concentrated in the hands of the president. "All this is reminiscent of the CPSU Central Committee," he noted.

Rounding off his statement, Rumyantsev moved that the Constitutional Commission should not accept the presidential draft constitution as the basis for further discussion.

Rejects Draft Constitution

AU0705095693 Paris AFP in English 0930 GMT 7 May 93

[Text] Moscow, May 7 (AFP)—A parliamentary commission tasked with drafting a post-Soviet constitution for Russia on Friday [7 May] rejected as a whole President Boris Yeltsin's proposals for the country's new basic law.

The constitutional commission said the draft, which calls for an executive presidency and replacement of the current hardline parliament with a smaller bicameral legislature, would not serve as a basis for the new constitution.

The commission said in a resolution that "several elements of the draft violated basic civil rights and the

division of powers" between the legislative and the executive authority of the state.

The decision came after Yeltsin, in a televised address broadcast Thursday [6 May] evening, called for fresh elections no later than this autumn to a new federal assembly contained in his proposal for a constitution.

The parliamentary commission said however that the text "contained certain standards that would be used in a new constitution", for example provisions that deal with the government's independence from the presidency and increased regional powers.

Nikolay Ryabov, deputy speaker of parliament, earlier in the meeting accused Yeltsin of attempting to establish a "constitutional monarchy" in Russia, charging that the presidency "contained elements close to an autocracy."

Ryabov noted that according to the Yeltsin draft, presidential decrees have force of law and that the president can put a hold on any law voted by parliament through the constitutional court whoses judges he appoints.

Yeltsin on Thursday charged that the constitutional commission, which he heads, was meeting illegally and without his consent but presidential aides nevertheless presented the draft to members.

Parliament defended another draft advocated by deputy and legal expert Oleg Rumyantsev in which the president would be forced to seek approval from lawmakers to appoint the government, the central bank chairman and judges to three major tribunals.

Rumyantsev, commenting on the Yeltsin draft, said: "It is a mistake to say that this draft was inspired by models of Latin- American dictatorships."

"Countries in Latin America rejected this type of constitution 40 or 50 years ago."

Yeltsin won backing in an April 25 referendum on confidence in his presidency and on approval of his reforms but failed to gather the required support to push through early parliamentary elections.

The Russian leader released a few days before the referendum his draft constitution which also recognizes private ownership of land, stating that his victory in the vote would give him a mandate to bring in the country's new fundamental law.

Under the current Soviet-era constitution, the fullscale parliament, the Congress of People's Deputies, is the only authority empowered to adopt a new constitution.

Following the meeting, chief justice Valeriy Zorkin of the Constitutional Court commented that there was no room for instransigence in discussions on constitutional reform.

"The May Day events have shown us that there is a wave of radicalism in the country and that this phenomenon must not be reflected in the adoption of the new constitution," Zorkin told AFP.

The chief justice was referring to violent clashes between riot police and hardline pro-communist demonstrators at an anti-Yeltsin protest last Saturday that killed one and injured about 570.

Draft Limits Human Rights

LD0705093693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0930 GMT 7 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—The draft constitution of President Boris Yeltsin "considerably limits economic, political and civil rights of man and citizen", the Constitutional Commission said in a statement adopted at its Friday [7 May] meeting under the chairmanship of Yeltsin's rival Ruslan Khasbulatov, who is deputy chairman of the commission.

However, the statement added that Yeltsin's constitution "contains a number of provisions which are to be taken into consideration while working on the draft Russian constitution" proposed by the Constitutional Commission.

Yeltsin, who is the chairman of the commission, said on Thursday he did not convene the meeting of the commission and would do that when it is appropriate.

However, the commission recommended to the president to create a working group jointly with deputy parliament speaker Nikolay Ryabov, a close ally of Khasbulatov, to complete the work on the draft constitution.

The commission approved the basic provisions of its draft constitution and decided to submit them to the president, the parliament and republics within Russia for consideration.

It also proposed to soviets of all levels jointly with local executive authorities to consider the draft by June 1 and submit their proposals to the Constitutional Commission.

Official Positively Assesses Draft

LD0705101793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1002 GMT 7 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—"The president's draft constitution contains a quite reasonable provision about the right of the president to dissolve the Parliament, as well as about the resignation of the government on the demand of the Parliament," Viktor Sheynis, deputy executive secretary of the Constitutional Commission of

the Russian Parliament, told ITAR-TASS. In his opinion, this creates the needed balance of power.

Sheynis assessed positively, on the whole, the president's draft constitution, but made some remarks concerning its individual provisions. Despite the opinion, which is shared by almost everybody, that the chapter about human rights envisages all the necessary guarantees, he believes that it lacks some important elements. He described as one of the defects of the draft constitution "the absence of a provision on a parliamentary representative in charge of human rights and of a special article on the right of an individual to determine on his own what nationality he belongs to, or not to mention his nationality at all." In addition, Sheynis believes the draft constitution does not include a provision "on the rendering of assistance to an individual by voluntary associations of lawyers, with the exception of authorized bar associations."

Sheynis believes the division of functions between the two chambers of Parliament—the Council of the Federation and the State Duma, which is envisaged by the president's draft constitution, is not the optimal one. He recognises the need for the specialisation of each of the two chambers, but he thinks that the emphasis is unduly shifted to one of the chambers, the Council of the Federation. In his opinion, this may give rise to some parochialism, because representatives of republics and regions will be given the right to settle personnel problems, ratify international treaties and so on. "The shift towards the upper chamber is unjustified," Sheynis said.

He urged the Parliament to draft the new constitution jointly with the president's side. With this in view, he continued, the legislators should realise that the tactics of confrontation with the president suffered a crushing defeat at the referendum.

Khasbulatov on Yeltsin's Absence

LD0705124393 Moscow Programma Radio Odin Network in Russian 1100 GMT 7 May 93

[Text] A plenary session of the Russian Federation Constitutional Commission has begun at the Supreme Soviet today. Drafts of the Russian Constitution are being examined there. Opening the session, parliament Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, deputy chairman of the commission, reported that the absence of the president and his representatives does not deliver us from the need to work hard.

I would like to remind you that, when speaking on television yesterday, Boris Yeltsin stated that the decision on setting dates for Constitutional Commission sessions is illegal, as its chairman is the Russian president himself. Boris Yeltsin stressed that he will make a decision on convening the Constitutional Commission when there is a need for it.

Further on Commission Meeting

LD0705130093 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1100 GMT 7 May 93

[By correspondent Vladimir Luskanov; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] In Moscow today, the constitutional commission discussed the presidential draft for a new constitution. It did so in the absence of the commission chairman or a representative of the president. According to Deputy Supreme Soviet Chairman Nikolay Ryabov, the constitutional commission was fully entitled to examine the presidential draft since Boris Yeltsin had officially forwarded it to the commission the previous day.

[Begin Luskanov recording] Altogether, 48 of the constitutional commission's 96 members gathered at the White House. As we know, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who is chairman of the commission, has described the present session as illegal. For this reason, neither he nor his representatives took part in the meeting. His place as chairman of the commission was taken by Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov, the deputy chairman of the commission. Khasbulatov believes that conditions are now favorable for speeding up the drafting and adoption of the new constitution.

The Supreme Soviet set a clear timetable a week ago for this work. The preparatory stage has to be completed by 10 October. Another congress is then to be convened on 17 November so the new constitution can be adopted. The draft constitution published by Boris Yeltsin simply does not fit in with these plans. The latest dispute between the executive and legislative branches is basically over the fact that the Supreme Soviet draft and the president's draft agree on virtually everything, except who should hold power in Russia, the president or the parliament.

Having spent 90 minutes examining the presidential version, the constitution commission basically rejected it, although not outright. A resolution that it adopted acknowledges that a number of clauses in the Yeltsin draft need to be borne in mind when the draft constitution is finalized. However, the commission's decision says the presidential draft substantially restricts human and civil rights. In this situation, the commission suggests that Boris Yeltsin and Nikolay Ryabov, his deputy on the commission, jointly form a working group to complete work on the draft constitution.

As one member of the commission put it behind the scenes, if the president rejects this option, the commission is prepared to find other ways of completing work on the constitution.

New Constitution May Be Adopted in Fall

LD0705121993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1156 GMT 7 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Yuriy Filippov]

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—Executive secretary of the Russian Constitutional Commission Oleg Rumyantsev told a briefing here today that the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation could be convened this September or October to adopt a new Russian constitution.

Addressing a meeting of the Russian Constitutional Commission in the morning today, which discussed the presidential draft of the fundamental law, Rumyantsev moved it should not be accepted as the basis for further discussion. His proposal was not included in the text of the commission's final decision, which has apparently allowed Rumyantsev to tell the briefing that the commission "had escaped confrontation".

The executive secretary noted with satisfaction that the commission "did not adopt any crushing decisions", although, he claimed, the world constitutional practice knew no constitution like the one drafted in the "workshop" of parliament members Shakhray and Alekseyev.

Parliament Session 'Almost Empty'; To Meet 13 May

LD0705125793 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 7 May 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The session of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet was to have continued its legislative activities today. Parliamentary observers were confronted this morning by the sight of an almost empty hall. Later the situation was clarified by Deputy Zhigulin.

[Begin Zhigulin recording] The Constitutional Commission is meeting today and our rapporteurs are, in fact, there, dealing with matters that we have not examined. You should have been warned, but I did not get around to it. Our session today is simply not prepared technically. We have planned that it will be held on the 13th with the questions that we have not examined. So I hope that all of you have a good holiday. [end recording]

Regional Affairs

Chenromyrdin Continues Visit to Orenburg Oblast

Tours Orsk

PM0605153393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 May 93 p 1

[Valeriyt Vedernikov report: "Grain and Metal: Viktor Chernomyrdin's Visit to Orenburg Oblast Continues"]

[Text] Orenburg—The prime minister spent the first day of his three-day visit to the Orenburg region in Orsk, which is rightly considered the industrial heart of the oblast's eastern zone. He went to the Iriklinskaya hydroelectric power station, where he saw how they organized the discharge of flood water. Thirteen rayons in the oblast have suffered from flooding this year. Enormous material damage has been caused. Thousands of homes and hundreds of hectares of land have been inundated and a large quantity of livestock has been lost. There have also been human casualties, unfortunately. The oblast is awaiting government help in clearing up the aftermath of the disaster.

Next the prime minister visted the Orsk Mechanical Plant. A meeting was held with leaders of industrial enterprises in the eastern Orenburg region including from the cities of Orsk, Novotroitsk, and Gay. Attention focused on questions connected with the further development of the metallurgical sector.

V.S. Chernomyrdin is being accompanied on his tour by Vice Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha, who is responsible for agricultural questions. There was a detailed discussion with agrarians from rayons in the virgin lands. They discussed progress in the sowing work and problems of implementing the land reform.

Comments on Reforms

LD0605194793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1733 GMT 6 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Goncharov]

[Text] Orenburg, southern Urals, May 6 TASS—The reform process in Russia is irreversible. "We have already gone so far in effecting transformations that the flywheel of reforms can no longer be stopped," Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said on Thursday at a meeting with the chiefs of rural administrations, directors of farms and joint-stock companies and farmers of Orenburg region. The premier has been staying in the region for the second day.

The prime minister emphasised that "it is essential to develop all forms of ownership. The government grants credits to all owners equally". How to use and spend the granted funds is another matter. It is now impossible to continue the practice when huge credits were invested but never repaid, he said.

Chernomyrdin noted with regret that the government-assigned money reaches the countryside too late. "We have not so far created a mechanism for a speedy transfer of funds but we shall do this without fail. Banks are largely to blame in this respect," he said.

The premier censured the establishment of close joint-stock companies in the countryside. "In that case you will remain without a social welfare sphere: without teachers, without physicians," Chernomyrdin said.

Chechen Parliament Appeals to Dudayev for Recognition

LD0705122693 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 7 May 93

[Text] The Chechen parliament has appealed to President Dzhokhar Dudayev to abolish all anticonstitutional decrees, abolish presidential rule, and recognize the parliament as an effective legislative body. The parliament also proposed that talks be started. Meanwhile, the Central Electoral Commission has also issued a statement. According to the document, a referendum on confidence in the president and parliament and on the expediency of the post of president is to be held in the republic on 5 June. Meanwhile, supporters of General Dudayev and the opposition continued their rallies in Groznyy today, but they are not as well supported as they used to be. The talks between representatives of the government and the opposition have so far failed to produce any results.

Chechen President Orders Enforcement of Law, Order

LD0605220193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2014 GMT 6 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Groznyy May 6 TASS—Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev said that "he does not object to rallies as long as their participants observe law," adding that "participants in rallies should not bar traffic and litter squares."

The CHECHEN PRESS news agency reported that during a conference of leaders of the ministry of security, national guards, national security, and the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic on Thursday [6 May] a plan was discussed on taking necessary measures to carry out a regime of a state of emergency.

The Chechen president demanded that tasks given to the army and law-enforcement bodies be unconditionally fulfilled. The president demanded that Colonel Musu Derbishev, chief of the headquarters for exercising a curfew, report on the situation in the Chechen Republic every hour.

Mordovian Power Struggle Disrupts Economy

LD0705020193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1715 GMT 6 May 93

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksey Papeta]

[Text] Saransk, 6 May—The Russian Federation constitutional court will probably consider the question of the abolition of the institution of the presidency in Mordovia on 28 May. This was announced today by Nikolay Biryukov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Mordovian Soviet Socialist Republic, speaking on local radio.

In the meantime, President Vasiliy Guslyanikov and his team continue to function. The Mordovian president has stated that he would like a constitutional court decision that linked dismissal with an expression of the will of the people who elected him. But parliament is unwilling to tread that path.

Meanwhile, the formation of a parallel government, the cabinet of ministers, has led to failures in the actions of the executive, and, above all, normal financing has been disrupted. The dyarchy in Saransk is echoed in Mordovia's towns and rayon centers. The situation in the economy is deteriorating. As of today, farmers have sown only two-fifths of the area earmarked for cereals.

On the whole, however, the situation remains calm. There is no record of any public order violations, rallies, or demonstrations connected with the dyarchy.

Tatar President Insists on 'Treaty Basis' of Ties

PM0605151593 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 May 93 p 1

[Report on interview with Tatar President Mintimer Shaymiyev by EFIR-DAYDZHEST, No. 83 under the general heading: "Voices: There Will Be No Democracy Left;" place and date not given]

[Text] Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaymiyev discussed the special status of Tatarstan's relations with Radik Batorshin.

Speaking about Boris Yeltsin's proposed draft Russian Constitution, Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaymiyev said: "As far as Tatarstan is concerned, whatever draft Constitution is proposed, we will act on the basis of the results of the referendum held in Tatarstan last March and with consideration for the attitude of Tatarstan's population to Russia's April referendum.

"Tatarstan's relations with Russia must be built on the following in the Russian Constitution: Tatarstan is a state that is a subject of international law, associated with the Russian Federation on a treaty basis."

International Affairs

Russia's Adamishin Comments on Talks With Kravchuk

LD0605193293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1918 GMT 6 May 93

[By UKRINFORM-TASS]

[Text] Kiev May 6 TASS—"Russia considers its relations with Ukraine to be not only of priority importance, but as one of the most important problems, even the most important," said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin here today upon completion of a meeting with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk. Adamishin is a special envoy of the Russian president, currently on tour of CIS capitals to study approaches of leaders of these countries to cooperation with Russia both on a bilateral basis and in the framework of the CIS.

Kiev was chosen as the first stage of the tour not accidentally, the Russian diplomat said. "My main goal was to listen more to what I was told," he said. On the basis of information Adamishin received he arrived at the main conclusion that both countries share a firm opinion that it is necessary to take steps in the direction of the improvement of relations between the two independent states.

Adamishin pointed out that the Ukrainian president had thoroughly outlined his view of the development of relations between Russia and Ukraine. "During the meeting Kravchuk focused on the history of these relations, without omitting sore points, and confirmed that the Ukrainian leadership is attaching a great importance to the development of relations with Russia and wants these relations to be really friendly and honest," Adamishin said .

Discusses Relations With Plyushch

LD0605213593 Kiev UKRINFORM in Ukrainian 1347 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] [no dateline as received]—Relations between Ukraine and Russia should be built in accordance with principle of justice; this was the opinion repeatedly expressed during a conversation in Kiev on 5 May between Ivan Plyushch, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council, and Anatoliy Adamishin, first deputy foreign minister of the Russian Federation.

The guest stated that President Yeltsin and other Russian leaders have repeatedly stressed that relations with Ukraine are of primary importance to us in Russia. Our very survival may depend on how things in Ukraine turn out and what shape our mutual relations with Ukraine take. In turn, a lot in Ukraine also depends on how it organizes its relations with Russia and how things are in that country. The Russian leadership believes that relations with Ukraine must be established on a full-scale interstate basis. Forever gone are the times when we were divided into the elder and the younger brother.

The chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council agreed that Ukraine cannot do without Russia; nor can Russia do without Ukraine. At the same time he drew his guest's attention to problems which, in his opinion, are obstructing the building of the very kind of relations described. First and foremost, he said, the problem is that treaties and agreements concluded between our states are all but failing to work or are not working at all. The fact that relations between enterprises have been severed, and a mutual payment mechanism has not yet been worked out, has had a very negative effect on the economy of both countries.

Ivan Plyushch appealed for civilized partnership relations to be set going. The problems hindering normal relations between the two countries include the activities of the Ostankino television company, whose programs very often draw the attention of its audience only to negative information about Ukraine.

Ivan Plyushch told his guest that the Russian Foreign Ministry has also helped form a negative image of our state. There are clever and highly-qualified people of authority working there, but even they are helping to bring about the current situation by making comments in other countries which depict Ukraine as a state which allegedly intends to become nuclear and refuses to destroy the missiles on its territory.

In his turn, the guest cited facts characterizing in a negative way actions by the Ukrainian side.

The Supreme Council chairman acknowledged that a number of ill- considered measures impeding our common cause have been taken by both sides. He said Ukraine and Russia should build their relations in accordance with the principle of justice.

In spite of a certain pungency in these remarks, the conversation was held in an atmosphere of real friendliness and a spirit of mutual understanding.

Leonid Smolyakov, the Russian Federation's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Ukraine, took part in the meeting.

Morozov Bans Russian Deputies From Military Bases

LD0705103893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1030 GMT 7 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Gordeev]

[Text] Kiev May 7 TASS—"Chauvinistically-minded people's deputies of the Russian Federation will be not allowed to enter the territory of Army units and institutions deployed in the Crimea," says the order, issued by Ukrainian Defence Minister Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov to commanders of the Black Sea Fleet, the Ukrainian naval forces and troops of the Odessa Military District. According to the order, the purpose of this step is "to avoid the undesirable development of the

situation with possible tragic consequences, similar to those that took place in Moscow on May 1."

A group of Russian legislators are expected to come to the Crimea today. The Ukrainian defence minister banned contacts between servicemen and members of that group or its representatives. The officers who violate the order will be dismissed from the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the defence minister stressed.

Kravchuk Comments on Relations With Russia, Slovakia

AU0605154193 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 5 May 93 pp 1, 5

[Interview with President Leonid Kravchuk by Vladimir Janucura in Kiev; date not given: "We Want To Be Friends"]

[Text] As we have informed you, President of the Ukrainian Republic Leonid Kravchuk granted a nearly one-hour interview to our paper last week. He received two PRAVDA reporters in his residence in Kiev, a building that belonged once to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Today, the blue-and-yellow flag of the independent postcommunist state is raised over this building, a flag of a nuclear power and our largest neighbor—a country in which complicated social, political, end economic processes are under way. Slovakia cannot be indifferent to what is happening east of its borders. Slovakia and Ukraine have a large number of common and vital interests. We wanted to learn more about it—from the first hand, so to speak—since we are in a period of preparation for a meeting between the heads of both countries.

[Jancura] Slovak readers are informed about the political development in Ukraine through other media, usually from Moscow, since our media still do not have accredited reporters in Kiev. The information we are receiving induces controversial feelings—certain hopes are raised, but also serious fears. How do you evaluate the current political situation, Mr. President?

[Kravchuk] The situation is not simple and is a logical consequence of the situation that prevailed in the former Soviet Union. After the disintegration of the USSR, even more problems appeared, particularly after the disintegration of economic links within an economy which may have relied on a planned, centralist, and administrative style of management, but which was, nevertheless, an existent economy. Now, the economy has been dispersed between regions and mutual links have ceased to exist, which could not have failed to have had an impact on Ukraine's position. By this, I want to say that the economic situation is most difficult. Up to 85 percent of fuel and energy consumption must be secured from imports. Ukraine has inherited a very bad economic structure. Its greater part was oriented toward military and industrial production, heavy industry, and sectors that did not require large investment capital but did not provide anything useful for satisfying human needs, either.

[Jancura] What about political development?

[Kravchuk] I would describe the political situation as generally stable, but not free of problems. These are linked primarily to the START I treaty, privatization, land reform, approval of the new constitution, etc. All this induces different and even opposing views, opinions, standpoints, and discussions in our parliament and between political entities. However, we consider it to be a natural process, which should disturb no one.

[Jancura] You yourself have indicated complications that arose after the disintegration of the USSR. The entire world is attentively paying attention to Russian-Ukrainian relations, in particular. How will they develop, in your opinion?

[Kravchuk] First, we must realize that we have a large complex of problems, beginning with military and political ones—the problem of the strategic nuclear forces is one—then we have the Black Sea Fleet problem, and, finally, let us say, problems of the division of property and of settling mutual claims. Not to speak of cultural values, which will be another step in the property settlement.

[Jancura] What about territorial claims?

[Kravchuk] On our side, we have no claims against any country, and we have said this officially. Unfortunately, in Russia, there are still people who are constantly raising the problem of Crimea and Sevastopol. This makes the situation more complicated, despite our efforts to solve this problem at the level of commissions, government, and presidents, in a patient manner, step by step, without escalating the conflicts. Our destiny is to reach an agreement with Russia, otherwise we would have condemned ourselves to everlasting fights and conflicts, which we cannot allow in view of the historical experience of our nations and their future relations as equal partners. This is why we must continue making efforts on both sides to find a solution acceptable to both sides. I would like to stress that none of the parties should be exclusively blamed for the situation. One should be blamed more, the other less, but that is not important now. The main thing is to find, at the negotiating table, an outcome to the situation.

[Jancura] What future are you predicting for the Commonwealth of Independent States?

[Kravchuk] Look, we have been living within the CIS on the basis of the status drafted in Minsk and Almaty. There, we agreed on a commonwealth which is similar to a discussion forum. Now they, particularly Russia and Kazakhstan, are initiating the establishment of narrower and deeper integration links within the CIS. They have even signed a new statute. Ukraine has not. Some other countries agree with it, in general. Ukraine is reserving its right to make its decision later. Actually, it would not

be possible today, anyway, in view of the valid resolution of parliament, defining relations between Ukraine and the CIS.

Should the said group of states really create a new structure, then we would have a problem of what to do with the rest of the CIS. There may be ambiguous relations which would give rise to an undesirable situation. I think, however, that even in this case it would be necessary to search for a different form of relations between states and the territory of the former USSR, and to prevent a disintegration of the CIS. At this stage, we must preserve it. What will happen later, we will see. If the CIS does not prove it's raison d'etre, we will search for a different form of relations between the states on the territory of the former USSR.

[Jancura] Economic relations, in particular, I assume....

[Kravchuk] Yes, Ukraine is in favor of economic integration, but not political integration since this could lead to the revival of old structures, including the old Soviet Union.

[Jancura] Even now, they speak and write about establishing an organization within the CIS, analogous to CEMA. What is your opinion on similar projects or visions?

[Kravchuk] In Ukraine, there is no substantial support for such ideas. I believe that, in this respect, we do not have to rush. The main thing is to achieve coordination in the economic sphere, either among the states within the CIS or in a different East European space—which is quite realistic. This would bring benefits, since the economy will decide our next steps, of course. If we start solving all our problems simultaneously, we will solve nothing.

[Jancura] You have spoken publicly several times about securing stability in East and Central Europe. Would you like to add something on this subject?

[Kravchuk] I believe that we should take steps to secure the security of the countries in this region, but not through a new organizational structure, or a closed security system. Our system should form a constituent part of pan-European security—a narrow cooperation between countries of this region and Europe. I am stressing it, since sometimes there are fears, and they are asking me: What would happen to Russia in such a case? Well, Russia, as a nuclear power, does not need such an umbrella, which cannot be said about a small or a medium-size country to which certain protective actions secured by other, larger countries, are indispensable. It is not a coincidence that NATO was established, or the Warsaw Pact. The latter disintegrated, and principal changes took place in Europe, which have strongly influenced the balance of power in the global system of international relations. The democratization process in the countries of the former Soviet dominance is complicated and has a long term character. In some countries, these processes are accompanied by crisis-inducing social and political phenomena that sometimes change into conflict situations, which are threats to international peace and stability. That is why I think that Slovakia, Ukraine, and the other countries of our region should seriously consider their own security, cooperation, and the coordination of their efforts to defend their common interests, including those that have a pan-European dimension. I mean, particularly, the joint course of action of our states in international organizations and within the CSCE, particularly in the matter of transforming this forum into an efficient mechanism of pan-European security.

[Jancura] How do you see the role of Slovakia in the development of relations between Ukraine and the surrounding world?

[Kravchuk] The development of relations with Western neighbors—countries of Central and Eastern Europe—in which Slovakia has one of the foremost positions, is one on the issues of Ukrainian foreign policy. Common borders, great possibilities for mutually advantageous cooperation, geopolitical position, historic and cultural traditions, and political and economic interests—all represent a group of our common "European" and regional interests. Besides, we also have common problems. I have spoken about some, already. In both our countries, we must overcome the consequences of the totalitarian regime. I would like to mention one of the problems we have: both Ukraine and Slovakia are interested in drafting national economic programs and introducing liberal market models, oriented toward people. Or, another example: the arms industry of Ukraine—and Slovakia's, as well—must be converted and modernized while introducing modern manufacturing processes that also open prospects for mutually beneficial cooperation on a bilateral, and also multilateral, basis.

[Jancura] Please let us stop at the problem of economic cooperation. It is an undisputable fact that the mutual trade turnover between Slovak and Ukraine has been declining lately. Reasons for that are generally well known. What is the outcome of this situation?

[Kravchuk] We must realize, once again, that Ukrainian-Slovak economic relations were established within a context of Ukrainian-Czechoslovak relations. Only now can we cooperate as two independent states. Of course, we want to build on everything positive we had here in the past, but we also want to build foundations for qualitatively new relations. On 1 March, when I had a telephone conversation with Mr. Michal Kovac and congratulated him on being elected Slovak president, I invited him for a visit to Ukraine. We have prepared many documents for this visit. Through your paper, we want to announce that the process of establishing a reliable and contractual basis for our bilateral relations has begun. We are prepared to conclude an international treaty, and preparations for signing documents on cooperation between our foreign ministries in the sphere of transportation and communications have already begun.

[Jancura] Finally: what would you like to say to our readers, Mr. President?

[Kravchuk] Well, I believe that I am well informed on events in Slovakia and I know that you are doing well in tackling problems connected to the division of the property of the former federation. I understand that this is not a smooth process. This is why I would like to wish your readers, and all the Slovak people, that this period of "divorce" pass peacefully, no one of the republics should lose, and common and justice should prevail. Second, I wish you success in building what you have decided on—a law abiding, democratic, and civilized country. I would like to assure you that Ukraine will be a reliable partner to Slovakia. We are concerned with goodneighborly and friendly relations with Slovakia.

In these beautiful spring days, I wish you good health, happiness, and success!

[Jancura] Thank you, Mr. President, for your interview.

Republican Party Wants State Control of Nuclear Arms

MK0605124693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 May 93 p 3

[Vladimir Skachko report under "Ukraine" rubric: "Republicans Favor Nuclear Ukraine. 'We Have Torn Moscow Away From the Ukrainian Nipple and Have Started To Get Mastitis'"]

[Text] The fourth congress of the new Ukraine's oldest political party—the Ukrainian Republican Party—has taken place. In his report Ukrainian People's Deputy Mikhail Goryn stated, commenting on the results of Ukraine's acquisition of independence: "Reality has exceeded the most pessimistic forecasts. The economic crisis is deepening, the living standard is falling unrestrainedly, and the number of paupers is increasing. In hospitals there are not enough medicines for sick children, and in schools there are not enough textbooks. The army is using an alien language, the Black Sea Fleet obeys the orders of Russian admirals. Like mushrooms after rain political parties propagandizing the wrenching of certain territories from Ukraine are growing. And on top of all this is an orgy of crime, with the law enforcement organs powerless. Ukraine is in dire straits, the profound administration crisis paralyzing its will." Presidential adviser Bogdan Ternopilskiy, one of the party's leaders, said: "We have torn Moscow away from the Ukrainian nipple and have started to get mastitis." He received stormy applause.

Despite attempts to find a foreign enemy to excuse internal disorders, however, most congress decisions concerned domestic problems. In the economics sphere the Republicans are advocating the acceleration of reforms and a structural perestroyka in the economy. In their opinion, changes for the better can be achieved by overcoming the fuel and energy dependence on Russian power sources and the population's psychological unpreparedness for difficulties. The first must be solved by finding alternative oil and sources and by drawing up a large-scale energy conservation program, the second by accelerating unpaid privatization.

The Ukrainian Republican Party has once again come out as a pro- presidential party. The Republicans have criticized Leonid Kravchuk for handing over tactical nuclear weapons to Russia, flirting with the CIS, for what is in their opinion an incorrect cadre policy, and the Yalta-Dagomys process, but Goryn stated that if necessary to confirm real statehood, the Ukrainian Republican Party will come out in support of direct presidential rule.

Kuchma's government has been criticized for lacking a program of reforms and radical reformist steps, for its inability to "launch" reforms and become a cabinet of like minds. At the same time the Ukrainian Republican Party has stated that it will support the granting of extraordinary powers to the government and will advocate the formation of a government of professional reformers without the Supreme Soviet's participation.

The most flak has been taken by parliament, whose hostages, in the congress' opinion, both President Kravchuk and the government have become—which to the old nomenklatura's advantage is blocking all progressive decisions. Therefore the Republicans, having declared the current system of soviets ineffective, advocated a radical reorganization of the representative branch and elections to parliament on a multiparty basis. The new Ukrainian Constitution, in the congress' opinion, must be adopted by a Constitutional Assembly and not the Supreme Soviet, as the existing constitution states.

But the Ukrainian Republican Party's position on nuclear weapons was most radical. In the opinion of its members, Ukraine now faces a choice: to be a strong European state or a "beet republic." The Ukrainian Republican Party therefore advocated Ukraine's recognition as a de facto nuclear state, which will participate in nuclear disarmament not unilaterally but with all the world's states. Until a collective security system and a global nuclear disarmament program have been created, the Ukrainian Republican Party proposes the following: To take full control of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory; to create a Ukrainian command of strategic nuclear troops; to devise its own system of nuclear warning; to re-aim nuclear weapons according to the principle of "security in all directions;" and to provide Kravchuk with not only a control button, but also a launch button.

Belarus

Shushkevich Begins Official Visit to Romania

LD0605204693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1750 GMT 6 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Dmitriy Dyakov]

[Text] Bucharest May 6 TASS—Chairman of the Belarus Supreme Soviet Stanislav Shushkevich arrived here for a two-day official visit today. At the international Otopeni airport, decked out with national flags of the two countries, the guest was welcomed by Romanian President Ion Iliescu.

The two leaders made brief press statements in the airport building after the welcoming ceremony. Noting that Romanian-Belarusian relations grew much more dynamic immediately after the declaration of the Belarus Republic's independence, the head of the Romanian state stressed that Shushkevich's current visit to Romania was regarded as "an important event" in the development of contacts between the two countries.

In turn, Shushkevich went on record for the continuation of the search for ways to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the current transitional period, during which both countries "are experiencing substantial difficulties". "In light of this," Shushkevich stressed, "the treaty of friendship, cooperation and goodneighbourly relations, which is to be signed tomorrow, will be of great importance."

An eye to eye meeting of the leaders of Romania and Belarus is now under way at the presidential palace here. Then the delegations of the two countries will begin negotiations. Shushkevich will meet speakers of both chambers of the Romanian Parliament later in the day.

Meets With Iliescu

LD0605214093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1916 GMT 6 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Dmitriy Diyakov]

[Text] Bucharest May 6 TASS—The talks between chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus, Stanislav Shushkevich, and Romanian President Ion Iliescu, which started in Bucharest today, are characterized by the similarity of views on social, political and economic problems facing now the peoples of Romania and Belarus. The two leaders stated with satisfaction that the establishment of contacts on the highest level at such a short period of time after the proclamation of independence by Belarus, is an evidence of the political will of the two countries to develop and deepen bilateral cooperation. It was noted that the meetings and talks between the leaders of both states and the agreements and documents signed by representatives of their governments are furthering the efficiency of Romanian-Belarusian interaction.

"Our countries are situated in the 'hot zone', nonetheless they are a stabilizing factor in their regions," Ion Iliescu stressed. According to the Romanian president, another positive moment in relations between the two states is that "there are no differences and mutual claims" between Romania and Belarus.

It was noted during the talks that the complex and contradictory international problems emerging as a result of the large-scale processes of reforms in central and East Europe, must be resolved exclusively by political means, at a negotiating table. This concerns both the countries of the former Soviet Union and other former socialist states. The interlocutors expressed their worry about the rejection by the parliament of Bosnian Serbs of the peace plan brokered by Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen on the settlement of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both leaders spoke for the strict implementation of the decisions of the U.N. Security Council and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) aimed at the settlement of the Yugoslav conflict.

Stanislav Shushkevich and Ion Iliescu informed each other of the current political and economic processes in their countries and expressed confidence that the successful development of bilateral cooperation would promote the strengthening of the economies of both states and acceleration of the market-oriented reforms. "Both Romania and Belarus are facing the same difficulties and problems, therefore they are equally interested in establishing ever closer ties," the Romanian president pointed out.

Later today the chairman of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet and his entourage met with Oliviu Gherman, chairman of the Senate, and Adrian Nastase, chairman of the deputies' chamber of the Romanian parliament. It was agreed to intensify contacts between the supreme legislative bodies of the two countries and periodically exchange information about their work, as well as delegations of parliamentarians.

Supreme Soviet To Consider Draft Laws

WS0705100393 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0700 GMT 7 May 93

[Text] Eleven draft laws have been submitted for consideration by the Supreme Soviet Consultative Council. After a two-day-long debate they were recommended for discussion at the next Supreme Soviet session. The list of 90 issues recommended earlier has been substantiated by draft laws on public associations in Belarus, political parties, the procedure of entry and egress, protection of consumers' rights, and health care. People's deputies will also express their opinions with regard to the draft resolution on the procedure of trading apartments.

Tajikistan

Badakhshan Supreme Soviet Issues Appeal for Peace

LD0605214893 Dushanbe Radio Dushanbe Network in Tajik 1700 GMT 6 May 93

["Urgent" statement issued by the Presidium and Executive Committee of the Soviet of People's Deputies of the Badakhshan Autonomous Republic; date not given]

[Text] Dear compatriots, by supporting the legitimate government of the republic, the noble people of Badakhshan have managed to achieve peace and tranquillity and mutual understanding between the opposing sides. At the beginning of the year, the authorities, at the request of the public, gave assurances that the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan would supply essential goods to Badakhshan and that the government military forces would not enter the territory of Badakhshan.

The leadership of the Badakhshan Republic, for their part, relying on promises made by the armed groups, told the Supreme Soviet that military actions will not take place from the Badakhshan side and that the state border will be protected.

In this connection verbal assurances by Comrade Imamali Rakhmanov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan, and by Sayed Mansur Naderi, leader of the Afghan Ismailis, also helped the cause of stability and peace. The majority of armed groups supported the position of the Supreme Soviet and of the leadership of the Badakhshan Autonomous Republic.

Following this, economic difficulties were resolved by the government of the republic. A sufficient amount of foodstuffs and fuel reached Osh and it was transported here.

Peace and tranquillity made it possible for international humanitarian agencies to start work in Badakhshan. Economic relations began with Leninabad Oblast. Relations were also established with the Republic of Uzbekistan.

However, it is known to everyone that armed men from Gissar, Lenin, Dushanbe, and Garm regions took refugee in the territory of Badakhshan as refugees. In addition, at the end of 1992 dozens of armed men from these regions crossed the border from the Badakhshan Autonomous Republic to Afghanistan. This boosted the number of armed men in Badakhshan. Sometime ago these armed men disarmed internal affairs personnel of the Badakhshan Autonomous Republic, who had been sent to (Sagirdasht) by decision of the oblast soviet to carry out their duties. Although some of their weapons were returned [words indistinct] government forces were shelled in Tavildara rayon. This incident adversely affected the political and economic situation in Badakhshan.

The people of Badakhshan warmly received all refugees regardless of where they came from, and during this most difficult winter shared their bread with them.

However, unfortunately, spring came and a number of refugees again began to preach war and [word indistinct] and again tried to push the people of Tajikistan—and in particular the people of Badakhshan—to the abyss of war who only recently managed to sleep in peace.

The people of Badakhshan should not make any mistakes this time and should not believe in any kinds of propaganda and rumors.

Dear compatriots, it is in your hands to save Badakhshan. This land should not become a battleground for someone's personal interest, enmity, or grudge.

The Presidium and the Executive Committee of the Soviet of People's Deputies of Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast will today officially place the blame for starting any economic blockade, [word indistinct] of people and other manifestation of border crime on these groups, and officially demand an answer from them. The responsibility for any tragic consequences will rest with them.

We appeal to parents and elders, fathers and mothers to prevent their sons and brothers from taking this dangerous path. This road leads to disaster.

Those who are fanning the flames of war and who number less than one percent of the inhabitants of the republic, will push 99 percent of the population of Badakhshan to the flames of war.

The Presidium and the Executive Committee of the Soviet of People's Deputies of Badakhshan request from all parties and popular movements not to remain indifferent to the fate of the people of Badakhshan and to play their role in strengthening peace in Badakhshan.

We call on our dear guests who have temporarily made the territory of Badakhshan their home to assist in the cause of ensuring peace in Badakhshan and all Tajikistan. Badakhshan should not be transformed into a battleground where brothers kill brothers.

[Signed] The Presidium and Executive Committee of the Soviet of People's Deputies of the Badakhshan Autonomous Republic

Armenia

Ter-Petrosyan Rejects Russian, U.S., Turkish Peace Plan

LD0705083293 Moscow Programma Radio Odin Network in Russian 0739 GMT 7 May 93

[Text] Armenia and leaders of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh rejected on Thursday peaceful proposals by Russia, the United States, and Turkey with regard to putting an end to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. This was announced in Yerevan by Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan. In his opinion, the plan fails to provide sufficient guarantees that a truce will be observed. Azerbaijan, on the contrary, accepted the peaceful settlement plan.

Officials Explain Objections to Plan

NC0605175093 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1400 GMT 6 May 93

[Report by Lida Gazaryan from a joint news conference held by First Deputy Foreign Minister Zhirair Liparityan and the President's Ambassador on Special Missions Davit Shakhnazaryan in Yerevan on 6 May]

[Excerpts] [Gazaryan] In opening the news conference, the Republic's First Deputy Foreign Minister Zhirair Liparityan said that a package of joint proposals prepared by United States, Russia, and Turkey was handed to Armenia, Karabakh, and Azerbaijan three days ago.

Liparityan said that the purpose of the joint initiative, aimed at the peaceful resolution of the regional conflict, is to find common ground to resume the negotiations and resolve the situation emanating from the Kelbadzharskiy incidents.

Commenting on the plan, he made certain observations and expressed the Armenian authorities' stance on the subject and reported the reply given to the three parties involved in the initiative.

[Begin Liparityan recording] As you know, our approach in general has been—and we had the same approach on the UN resolution—that all the talks should be held within the CSCE framework, and all the problems should be solved through talks. But in this case, these talks were held outside the CSCE framework.

The second observation is that, though such initiatives should be confidential to a certain extent, the details of the initiative were already published and the foreign ministers of these countries issued statements even before our government or Nagorno-Karabakh could reply to them. In general, this makes it difficult to answer questions.

In addition, this initiative includes terminology and [word indistinct] which are unclear, and they made our job of giving a reply very difficult.

Finally, neither Nagorno-Karabakh nor Armenia had participated in these talks.

However, at the foundation of our policy rests the principle that we are ready to examine any initiative which might facilitate (?dialogue) and create the serious possibility for a cease-fire. Therefore, our government examined this initiative by taking into consideration the positive elements existing there, the statement issued by Nagorno-Karabakh authorities on the Kelbadzharskiy question in that these operations were the result of military necessity, and the UN resolution. We conveyed our reply to the U.S. charge d'affaires and the Russian ambassador this morning.

The Armenian stance towards this issue is very clear. You are already familiar with the details of this plan. [passage omitted]

Our government replied by welcoming any initiative on the problem and the concern shown by these three countries, and expressed the view that although the plan has basically worked out a concept for the cessation of military operations, this concept was not well defined. And considering the difficulties involved in defining the term cessation of military operations at the [CSCE] talks, we expressed our concern that this could be achieved by a mere declaration. [sentence as heard] Nevertheless, we will assume responsibility for our own borders, that is, for the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. Any date for the cessation of the military operations acceptable to Azerbaijan, including the proposed date, is also acceptable to us.

The second important point is that we consider as well-argued Nagorno-Karabakh's reply in which it proposed that the pullout from Kelbadzharskiy should be completed only when there is a [word indistinct].

In the meantime, Armenia is ready to resume the talks with the participation of all the sides in the conflict, to achieve progress at the talks, and [passage indistinct]. This is the current situation on this initiative. [end recording]

[Gazaryan] Next, Ambassador Davit Shakhnazaryan informed the reporters that Nagorno-Karabakh Republic's [NKR] reply was received late last night. It too was handed to the U.S. and Russian representatives in Yerevan. He briefly enumerated the reply.

[Begin Shakhnazaryan recording] First, NKR is welcoming this initiative as peaceful, but it draws attention to that point of the timetable which refers to the withdrawal of the NKR self-defense forces from Kelbadzharskiy on 17 May, and says this withdrawal should take place at a later date. The NKR leadership believes that withdrawal should take place only after the deployment of the CSCE observers in the region. This, in actual fact, means that the withdrawal should take place only after the establishment of a stable cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The reply also notes that such serious measures as the cease-fire and all the consequences that arise from it should be implemented by documents having stronger

legal force. That is, this should be understood as meaning that the NKR leadership is not that satisfied with the legal (?strength) of this document.

The reply also tries to clarify a number of principles which were present in the U.S.-Russia-Turkey initiative. In particular, the issue involves such concepts as the cessation of military operations, a prestigious international representative, and the phrase which says that Azerbaijan will declare it will display restraint while introducing security forces into Kelbadzharskiy Rayon. This phrase is extremely vague. The concept of cessation of military operations was given great attention during the informal contacts of the chairman of the CSCE Minsk Group, but no common ground was found. [words indistinct] In conclusion, in its reply the NKR believes that the completion of troop withdrawal should be completed only after the deployment of the international observers in the region. This is all about NKR's reply.

I would like to give you a little information. First, last year the Azerbaijani press carried large number of commentaries on the occupation of Mardakertskiy Rayon by Azerbaijan, and revealed that the Azerbaijani Army units in Kelbadzharskiy were the most active in that attack. The Azerbaijani press itself proves that Kelbadzharskiy poses a really major strategic military threat to Nagorno-Karabakh [end recording].

[Gazaryan] Finally, the First Deputy Foreign Minister Zhirair Liparityan and Ambassador Davit Shakhnazaryan answered reporters' questions.

Karabakh Envoy Says U.S. Initiative 'Somewhat One-Sided'

MK0705085093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 May 93 p 3

[Armen Khanbabyan report under "Nagorno-Karabakh" rubric: "New Peace Plan Somewhat One-Sided, Believes Manvel Sarkisyan, Nagorno-Karabakh Republic's Permanent Representative in Armenia"]

[Text] The new trilateral peacemaking initiative on Nagorno-Karabakh by Russia, the United States, and Turkey (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 5 May) is being vigorously discussed in the Armenian press, but so far there has been no official comment in either Yerevan or Stepanakert. The silence was broken only by Manvel Sarkisyan, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic's permanent representative in Armenia, who agreed to express his personal viewpoint on this subject.

The permanent representative stated that, in his view, the proposed cease-fire schedule by no means takes full account of the Armenian side's approaches and therefore looks somewhat one-sided. Armenia and Karabakh are insisting that no conditions be attached to starting the talks. But in the proposed documents the talks are conditional on the withdrawal of Nagorno-Karabakh self-defense forces subunits from the territory of Azerbaijan's Kelbadzharskiy Rayon. Although the republic's State Committee for Defense has already announced a partial withdrawal of its troops, Sarkisyan believes that the full implementation of this demand now would be one-sided and an unjustified concession by Karabakh. "The Kelbadzharskiy operation," he said, "had no aim other than to ensure the security of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic's peaceful population. It seems that the states that have come up with the settlement plan are themselves still not yet prepared to guarantee Karabakh's security somehow. Moreover, they cannot guarantee that in the upcoming talks Azerbaijan will take a sufficiently constructive position and will not exploit the peaceful breathing space to regroup and train new cadres."

The Karabakh representative's fears seem justified to a certain extent. Right after the plan's schedule was sent out to the interested sides, the Azerbaijani Army stepped up its artillery bombardment of Armenian territory along the entire length of the border. The self-defense forces headquarters' intelligence indicates major buildups of Azerbaijani infantry and armored vehicles in the south of the Lachin corridor. Flights over Armenian populated areas by Azerbaijani aviation have been stepped up in Kubatlinskiy and Fizulinskiy Rayons. At the same time the Armenian Defense Ministry reports that the airlifting of Turkish equipment and volunteers to the conflict area via Nakhichevan has now been going on for over a week. All this compels one to assume that Baku still intends to solve the problem by force and that a new offensive against Karabakh is only a question of time.

The Karabakhis are capable of agreeing to the demand finally to leave Kelbadzharskiy Rayon, but they will simultaneously demand real guarantees against the introduction of Azerbaijani troops there and the reestablishment of Azerbaijani Army strongpoints. Because this problem is vitally important to Karabakh, Yerevan will listen to Stepanakert's opinion.

The new trilateral initiative could still arouse wariness here, because the peace initiatives emanating from Moscow are not entirely consistent. Diplomatic sources have reported that President Yeltsin's personal initiative prior to the Russian referendum was the basis of the trilateral consultations between Armenia, Karabakh, and Azerbaijan. But the consultations were blocked and, judging from the Russian Foreign Ministry's new move, it did not want to develop the Russian president's initiative.

Karabakh Claims Turkey Sending Arms to Azerbaijan

NC0605131093 Yerevan SNARK in English 1010 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] Stepanakert, 6 May (SNARK)—Yesterday, on May 5, press- center of Karabakh made an announcement. According to the trustworthy sources Turkey is transferring the weapons to Azerbaijan. The transfer is being undertaken in the escort of the military specialists through the territory of Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic and Iran the declaration says. No doubts that these weapons are being transferred to the zone of military actions to intensify the Azerbaijani aggression

against Karabakh. The Azerbaijani Army is accumulating its forces at the border with Nagorno-Karabakh. It proves that Azeris are preparing for the large-scale offensive.

In connection with the existing situation the press-center of the Karabakh Parliament is authorized to declare that such actions don't contribute to the peaceful regulation of the conflict and make the Karabakh authorities to be in doubts on the sincere intermediary efforts Turkey and Iran are undertaking, their good will in the process of peaceful regulation of the problem. [sentence as received] The Karabakh Parliament is anxious with the tendencies to enlarge the conflict, to attract new forces into the conflict and calls for world community to take measures to cease the tendency.

Azerbaijan

Government Accepts U.S., Russian, Turkish Peace Proposal

NC0605182093 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] Azerbaijan has accepted the proposals made by the United States, Turkey, and Russia for the resumption of the talks which were held within the CSCE framework. The talks were cut as a result of the recent Armenian Armed Forces' attacks on Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan Presidential Press Service has reported that the decision, which has been adopted after the government carefully studied the proposals, was due to the willingness of the Republic's leaders to find a peaceful solution to the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The decision is also a sign of respect for the countries which have submitted a plan for the resumption of the negotiation process.

According to the Azerbaijan Presidential Press Service, the plan provides for the conditions required for implementing UN Security Council Resolution 822. The U.S., Turkish, and Russian embassies in Azerbaijan have been informed on the Republic's decisions and the necessary documents have been conveyed to them.

Defense Ministry Says Armenian Forces 'Violate' UN Resolution

NC0605131693 Baku AZERTAC in Azeri 1214 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] Baku, 6 May (AZERTAC)—The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry reports: "The movements of the Armenian Armed Forces violate and aim to undermine UN Security Council Resolution 822 on the peaceful resolution of the conflict."

Informing AZERTAC's correspondent, the Defense Ministry's press service cited as evidence new facts about artillery shelling of the border settlements in Azerbaijan. The Defense Ministry reported that localized fighting is continuing on the Azerbaijani-Armenian border. Some 10 settlements in Kazakhskiy Rayon are within the zone of military operations. Some 7,000 residents of these settlements have become refugees.

The situation has also worsened in Fizulinskiy Rayon, where Armenian armed formations supported by tanks attacked Ashagi- Veyselli this morning. They withdrew after encountering resistance.

Analyst Sees Little Hope of Good Relations With Russia

MK0605114093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 19, 9 May 93 (Signed to Press 4 May) p A12

[Sanobar Shermatova article published in "Authority" column: "Back to the Supreme Soviet?"]

[Text] Addressing the Azerbaijani parliament in late April, former defense minister Ragim Gaziyev called for an urgent convocation of a routine session of the Supreme Soviet that was to decide the question of resignation of President Abulfaz Elchibey and parliament Speaker Isa Gambarov.

This idea was signed off on by over 100 deputies of the Supreme Soviet. If the Supreme Soviet proves impossible to convene, they are planning to hold a session in Gyandzh, where their supporter, Surat Guseynov, former army corps commander, enjoys strong influence. The main initiators of the session, according to Azerbaijani political analysts, were the supporters of former Azerbaijani leader Geydar Aliyev.

Following the removal of Ayaz Mutalibov on 15 May 1992, the Supreme Soviet delegated its powers to a smaller parliament—the Milli Majlis. Aliyev, however, chairman of the Supreme Majlis of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, retains the post of deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet, just like its entire 360 members retain their deputy status until 1995.

According to local observers, the reanimation of the Supreme Soviet has only one aim: to bring Geydar Aliyev to power by legitimate means. The scenario is not hard to predict: The Supreme Soviet will subject Isa Gambarov to new elections and install Aliyev as Supreme Soviet chairman. As a result Azerbaijan will get the Russian version of confrontation: a reformer president and a nomenklatura-type Supreme Soviet.

Last May two causes prevented Aliyev's comeback: The communist nomenklatura, which had a majority in the Supreme Soviet, was demoralized by the People's Front's victory over Ayaz Mutalibov and by interclan divisions.

Isa Gambarov, 36, the current parliament speaker, despite his young age, is a robust political figure, quite capable of competing with Geydar Aliyev. Will these two statesmen reach compromise to ensure the preservation of the fragile

stability in Azerbaijani society that is being torn apart by economic problems and defeats on the battlefront?

For the People's Front the alliance with Geydar Aliyev, who symbolizes the communist nomenklatura, will be a painful step. Radicals in the People's Front are already accusing their leaders of abandoning the principles of democracy and independence.

Many in Azerbaijan are convinced that Moscow is trying to bring its "own" people to power in the republic. Russian Ambassador Valter Shoniya's latest interview with POST-FACTUM news agency is being cited as just another piece of evidence to that effect. The Russian diplomat used strong language to describe the regime in Azerbaijan as nationalist, calling President Elchibey a figurehead, and saying that power in the republic belongs to Internal Affairs Minister Iskander Gamidov, whom the president could not force to resign even if he wanted to. A few days later Gamidov resigned, while the unprecedented tonality of the Russian diplomat's statement in terms of its sharpness caused even optimists to start wondering about the prospect of good-neighbor relations between Russia and the present government of Azerbaijan.

Georgia

Parliament Approves Karkarashvili as Defense Minister

LD0605173693 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1500 GMT 6 May 93

[Proceedings at today's parliament session in Tbilisi, with an address by Chairman Eduard Shevardnadze; monitored in progress—live]

[Excerpts] [Shevardnadze] We must decide on the appointment. We can say that the post is vacant today. We must think a little more and decide on the appointment. You know that I have the right to appoint, and only after that to submit the nomination to parliament. But I want us to be unanimous in our decision. It is a special ministry. Public attention is focused on parliament. We considered many proposals yesterday and today. There was an opinion that a politician should fill the post, maybe the most well-known one. There were also opinions favoring the appointment of an experienced general. There were two or three candidates. But I chose a young man. [passage omitted]

I would like to propose Giorgiy Karkarashvili as the candidate [for defence minister] All of you know him. He is a young man who went to war from the very first day. He is still fighting. He is a young man, but as we say, he has been through the mill. His brother was killed in action. He is a general. Now he is the commander of a corps. He is a military leader in the [Georgian National] Guard. Nobody is without shortcomings. This applies also to the head of state and chairman of parliament. Perhaps Mr. Karkarashvili may lack experience of life, but he is a capable man. He is in love with military matters. He is a patriot and I believe in him.

I want to ask parliament to support me in this. Let us appoint him as defense minister of Georgia. I promise to him that if parliament makes this decision I will support him in my capacity as commander in chief and head of state, and as an ordinary man who is old enough to be his father. His rights will not be restricted. I will do my best to ensure that he is a worthy minister of Georgia—defense minister. We should not be put off by his youth. [passage omitted]

[Goguadze, speaker of the parliament] We know your position. Let's prepare for the vote. Who is in favor of confirming Giorgiy Karkarashvili as defense minister? [passage omitted: deputies vote]

[Karkarashvili] Thank you very much for your trust in me. [passage omitted]

[Shevardnadze] If the parliament agrees with me I would like to ask you to thank Tengiz Kitovani and Jaba Ioseliani for their role in the formation of the Georgian armed forces and in the struggle for independence.

Abkhazia Defense Council Announces Military Call-Up

LD0605160793 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in 1600 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] [No dateline as received] In view of the fact that the situation in the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic is tense and the town of Sukhumi is being subjected to heavy artillery shelling, the Defense Council of the autonomous republic has issued a statement saying that the Council has examined several problems of a military nature and made decisions on them. These problems include mobilization and conscription. Mobilization of the reserves and the spring call-up for active military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia have been announced in the autonomous republic as of today. In connection with this, the Defense Council has received lists of residents of Abkhazia who are hiding in order to avoid carrying out their civic duty.

The statement says: We appeal to these people to return and take their proper place in the ranks of the defenders of state sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Georgia.

At the same time, the Defense Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia states that the town of Sukhumi and other population centers in the autonomous republic are reliably protected by troop units made up mainly of local people.

[Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian at 0900 GMT on 7 May 93 adds: "Those citizens of Abkhazia who refuse to defend Georgia's territorial integrity will not be granted Georgian citizenship. This is said in a statement by the Defense Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and signed by Tamaz Nadareyshvili, chairman of the Council of Ministers. A tense situation has ensued in the

autonomous republic. The town of Sukhumi is regularly subjected to concentrated shelling; dozens of people have been killed and hundreds wounded.

["In this connection, the Defense Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia has examined and made a decision on a number of problems of a military nature, including mobilization and call-up. The mobilization of reservists and a spring call-up for active military service in the armed forces of the Georgian Republic have been announced. The Defense Council has received lists of those Abkhazian citizens who are shying away from discharging their civic duty outside the republic."]

Blames Escalation on Abkhazia, Russia

LD0605155993 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Russian 1600 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] Today, on 6 May, the town of Sukhumi was subjected to mass artillery shelling by the Gudauta armed units and an air-raid by the Russian Air Force. There were many casualties and much damage to property.

In connection with this, the Abkhazian Defense Council considers it vital to state that the Gudauta regime and the protectors of the Abkhazian side, who are the most reactionary political circles in Russia, bear total responsibility for the consequences of the escalation of the confrontation and the occurrence of a large-scale conflict with the involvement of other sides.

Abkhaz Leader Calls For Withdrawal of Georgian Troops

LD0705115093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1126 GMT 7 May 93

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—"We do not need war. Its continuation is fraught with the threat of the extermination of our nation. However, we have no choice. We have to defend ourselves... as long as at least one Abkhazian is alive, we shall fight for our state. We have nowhere to retreat. This is our land," Vladislav Ardzinba, chairman of the Abkhazian parliament, stressed in an interview with TRUD published today.

"We are not waging a war against the Georgian people, or Georgia either. We are fighting against the regime, Ardzinba pointed out. He is sure that the cause of the war started eight months ago was the invasion of Abkhazia by Georgian troops. In his opinion, "in order to stop the war, the cause should be removed, i.e. the troops should be pulled out." "If Georgia steps up its combat operations, we shall be forced to appeal for aid to the fraternal north Caucasian nations and ask them to resume the call-up of volunteers. I understand that this may trigger the expansion of the conflict throughout the whole of the caucasus. This is why the war in Abkhazia should be stopped. I wish both Georgia, Russia and the United Nations realise it," he said.

Ardzinba stressed that Abkhazia had nothing against talks with Georgia, but it should see for itself that Georgia really wants peace. "The problem should be settled according to the following plan: first a ceasefire, then the pullout of Georgian troops from Abkhazia, and after that it will be possible to look for mutually acceptable ways of settling the conflict," he said.

"We welcome Russia's intention to play the role of an intermediary," the Abkhazian leader continued. "We are willing to accept the mediation of any international organisation—the United Nations, the CSCE or the organisation of non-represented nations. But I believe this should be Russia ... we should consolidate relations with the Russian Federation, to restore the disrupted ties."

Estonia

President, Foreign Minister on Official Visit to Poland

WS0605111893 Tallinn BNS in English 2026 GMT 5 May 93

[Text] Tallinn, May 5, BNS—Estonian President Lennart Meri and Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste today flew to Poland for an official visit.

Meri is scheduled to meet Polish President Lech Walesa on Thursday morning. He will then lay a wreath on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, visit the Warsaw ghetto and the Polish Seim.

Meri will meet Polish Foreign Trade Minister Andrzej Arendarski at noon. Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste at the same time will have talks with his Polish counterpart Krzysztof Skubiszewski.

After a dinner Meri is scheduled to have another meeting with the Polish president and foreign minister. The delegations of both countries will then meet, a foreign ministry spokesman told BNS.

The foreign ministers will sign agreements on the protection of investments and civil aviation. The presidents will exchange the letters of ratification of the agreements.

Poland's prime minister will have talks with Meri in the afternoon.

The Estonian president will also make a speech in the University of Warsaw and attend a dinner given to his honor by President Walesa.

The president's wife, Helle Meri, together with the wife of the Polish president will visit the Chopin Museum, Teatr No Vode and the King's Castle.

The Estonian president on Friday is scheduled to fly to Gdansk, where he will visit a shipyard, lay flowers on a Solidarnosc monument, and meet the commander of the Polish navy.

Velliste Comments on Russian Withdrawal, Minority

PM0605165093 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 4 May 93 p 5

[Report on interview with Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste by Bjarne Nitovuori; place and date not given]

[Text] The withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia has come to a standstill. It is possible to question whether any troop withdrawals are taking place.

So said Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste.

"We are very dissatisfied that the troop withdrawal is taking place so slowly," he said.

He pointed to the final document from the CSCE summit in Helsinki in July last year which held out the prospect of a "rapid, orderly, and full" withdrawal of troops from the Baltic region. One of the document's signatories was Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

"It is no longer possible to speak of a rapid withdrawal, now that a year has passed."

A few days ago the Estonian Foreign Ministry protested at an exercise by the Russian Army.

"The maneuver was special in the sense that its theme was how to capture the Baltic countries' strategic points. In other words, they were practising how to reconquer the Baltic region. This was completely improper. The exercise was also arranged without advance warning and without advance permission."

The only explanation that has been given is that the military is not the military, that it does not hold exercises, and that when exercises are held the next theme on the list is chosen.

"We consider that an army of occupation which is in a quandary about leaving the country does not need to hold exercises. The only exercises we agree to are exercises about leaving the country," Velliste pointed out.

In Estonia people have attached great importance to an article in a Russian foreign policy journal in which the Baltic countries and other former Soviet republics are described as "internal foreign parts" [inre utlaender], that is, they are brought into the Russian sphere of influence.

"We take this very seriously. Russia has no right to demand a sphere of interest or to act as a peacekeeping force in the former Soviet Union," Velliste said.

He said that in Bonn recently he met his German counterpart, Klaus Kinkel, who reiterated the German position that Russia cannot unilaterally take on a peacekeeping role.

There has been no clear official statement dissociating the authorities from the journal article.

Another worrying development was the Russian note to Latvia condemning the Latvian decision to grant Russian soldiers permission to stay in the country for only one year and even using the expression "ethnic cleansing" to describe the decision.

"Even so it was a question of Latvian generosity since it gives the soldiers the right to remain for a whole year," Velliste pointed out.

The negotiations between Estonia and Russia have made slow progress and then only on lesser issues of a practical nature.

"All the fundamental political questions remain open."

The fundamental reason for this is that the two sides have totally different points of departure. Russia interprets the situation as a divorce, while the Estonian side considers that Estonia is liberating itself from an occupation.

One of the unresolved questions is to do with the border between the two countries. There is only one legal border between Estonia and Russia—the border established under the Peace of Dorpat. Estonia will not make concessions on this point in order to make negotiations easier, Velliste affirmed.

"When the Russians point to the CSCE document which states that postwar borders cannot be altered, we share that view. But we are talking only about the legal borders," he said.

In some circles the Vancouver summit between President Bill Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin has been seen as a sign that the superpowers are again reaching agreement over the heads of the world's small peoples. Some people have even talked of a new "Molotov-Ribbentrop pact."

Velliste does not share this concern.

"Vancouver should be examined against the background of Russian domestic politics and in the light of the fact that the summit took place at a point in time when Russia was on the verge of its referendum.

"In Estonia the concern has been limited to journalists and some analysts. It has not been felt in the government," Velliste claimed.

He said that the United States has given assurances that the West will not let the Baltic countries down.

It has become a standard argument in the Baltic region to describe Russian leaders' attacks as "Russian domestic politics." If it is essential for reasons of domestic politics to attack the Baltic region verbally, is there not a risk that these attacks could become a concrete reality?

"That risk does exist in theory. However, in practice developments have slowly been moving in a satisfactory direction from the Baltic countries' viewpoint," Velliste said.

The Western understanding for Russia's criticism of the treatment of Russians and other Slav minorities in the Baltic region has also decreased, Velliste noted with satisfaction.

"Estonia has succeeded in spreading information about its legislation and about the steps it has taken to meet the Council of Europe's membership criteria. More than a dozen delegations of investigation have visited us and all have produced positive reports on human rights and minority questions."

According to Velliste, this means that Russian propaganda is no longer having any effect in the West. Another contributory factor is that Estonia is now beginning to win a firm footing as an independent state: The country has a democratic constitution, a system of border surveillance that is working, and above all its own currency.

The fact that living standards in Estonia have risen has meant that the Russian propaganda no longer has any effect on the Russian population in Estonia.

"A large part of those who a few years ago were opposed to independence now support it, for they vote with their stomachs. This is one of the reasons why the Russian population has remained calm in the past few years," Velliste said.

Despite the change of attitude only a few percent of Russians and other Slavs have applied for Estonian citizenship.

"It is not easy for people to reach a rapid decision on so fundamental a question, especially for people who belong to a nation as big as the Russian nation. When they are suddenly confronted with the chance to become citizens of a small state, they need more time," Velliste said.

He believes that the trend toward acquiring Estonian citizenship will grow as living standards rise. He does not think that the Estonians would ideally like to see the Russians leave.

However, there is a willingness to provide financial help for those people who want to move to Russia but cannot afford to. This is a humanitarian activity and takes place on a voluntary basis, Velliste stressed.

Finland has made its contribution to the efforts to get the West not to forget the Baltic region. Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen reminded a recent meeting of EC ministers that the West should also support the Baltic region and not only Russia. Vayrynen has indicated that he has also pleaded the Balts' cause in talks with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev.

"Finland is important to us. We are happy that Finland has now voiced its support pretty unambiguously," Velliste said.

Estonia has been active in the field of cooperation between the three Finno-Ugric states—Estonia, Finland, and Hungary—in part to support the small Finno-Ugric peoples in Russia. In October the three countries' prime ministers will meet in Tallinn.

However, Velliste denied that for Estonia this has primarily been to create a counterweight to the Russian interest in the Russian minority in Estonia. "We consider that it is our moral duty at least to protect the Finno-Ugric peoples."

The most central concern in relations between Finland and Estonia at present is to see to it that trade between the two countries flourishes.

"Russia is no longer Estonia's trading partner number one—something that people generally believe in the

West. It is Finland which has become an economic superpower from the Estonian viewpoint.

"Finland has a key position in Estonia's economic development. If trade works well, Estonia will manage very well."

That is why it is of great importance that in their EC negotiations Sweden and Finland should succeed in retaining their free trade arrangement with Estonia.

"For us this is vitally important. It would be a real shock if Brussels were suddenly to raise a new Iron Curtain before the eyes of the Estonians," Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste said.

Parliament Adopts Land Taxation Law

LD0705102993 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 0615 GMT 7 May 93

[Text] The Riigikogu adopted the law on a tax on land at its third reading [on 6 May]. Tax on land is a tax that is calculated from the taxable value of land and is made up of state tax on land and a local tax. The rate of the state tax on land amounts to 0.5 percent of the taxable value of land and the local rate amounts to 0.3 to 0.7 percent. Only land on which a law or a government resolution has established a protection order and where no business activity is allowed, land attached to buildings and parts thereof of foreign countries' diplomatic and consular representations, land under cemeteries, and land under churches and congregations' places of worship are exempt from the tax.

The law on tax on land will come into effect on 1 July. Tax on land for the second half of 1993 is due by 15 November at the latest.

Lithuania

Slezevicius Comments on Talks With IMF, Wage Hikes

LD0605171593 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1320 GMT 6 May 93

[Excerpts] [Announcer] A news conference was given today by Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius and Mr. Adalbert Knobel. Correspondent Zenonas Miksys reports:

[Miksys] The government press representative, Mr. Baublys, presented to journalists the head of the IMF mission in Lithuania, Adalbert Knobel, the representative of this fund in Lithuania, Peter Cornelius, and other representatives of this organization. [passage omitted]

Opening the news conference, Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius informed journalists:

[Begin Slezevicius recording] Rather intensive discussions have taken place with the IMF on the planned increase of wages to culture, education, and health service workers, and to those employed at budget institutions. As you know, we announced a few weeks ago that we intended to increase the wages of these workers up to 40 percent. However, during the discussions with the mission experts, we were categorically asked to refrain from such drastic increase in wages. We agreed and adopted the following decisions on the increase of wages to the groups which, in our opinion, should be socially supported in various departments. To teachers—an increase of 30 percent, to heath service workers—20 percent, to the workers of culture and art—25 percent, and to the workers of other budget institutions—an average 0f 10 percent.

The average increase in wages in the organizations financed from the budget must constitute on average not more than 15 percent. We discussed with the leaders of the mission the possible revision of wages within the next few months if the budget revenue progresses in a normal way, that is, constantly observing that the budget deficit does not exceed the limit fixed by the IMF. Pensions are to be increased from 1 May by 20 percent. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Miksys] Adalbert Knobel, replying to questions, described the stand of the IMF toward Lithuania, and spoke of the government's efforts to stabilize the economic situation. He stressed that so far statistical data is unsatisfactory in the sphere of the balance of payments, and expressed his opinion about the progress of economic reform. He expressed his belief that the IMF will continue closely to cooperate with the Lithuanian state institutions. In his opinion, following the example of Latvia and Estonia and by adopting effective measures, it is possible to stop inflation in Lithuania. [passage omitted]

Slezevicius stated in conclusion:

[Begin Slezevicius recording] The transition of the planned economy to the liberal economy of free market has, without doubt, severely affected many people, but we are well aware of the fact that there is no alternative to the reforms, as there is no alternative to privatization, which must and will be developed. The heads of the mission also expressed their concern about a very low rate of privatization in agriculture. Three percent of the returned land is obviously insufficient during three years of the reform. If we continue at this rate we will destroy agriculture. We, together, found solutions on how to step up agricultural reform, first, by returning land to the former owners and granting them the opportunity freely to dispose of this wealth. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Memorandum on Trade, Cooperation Signed With Finland

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[Text] Vilnius, May 06, BNS—Leaders of a Lithuanian-Finnish committee signed a memorandum Wednesday on provisional trade and economic cooperation between the two countries.

The document was signed after two days of consultations between Algimantas Miskinis, Lithuanian vice minister

of foreign affairs, and Kari Mitrunen, head of a department at the Finnish Foreign Ministry.

The committee met to exchange information about the prospects for the developing the national economy in both states and to analyze bilateral economic ties, Lithuania's foreign ministry reported.

The committee adopted a series of new regulations, which will come into effect July 1.

Participants of the meeting also discussed a project on bilateral agricultural trade, proposed by Finland. The Finns are offering rebates to Lithuania, similar to the one EFTA applies to Finland.

Lithuania offered a list of tax exempt products for bilateral trade.

The foreign ministry said Lithuania and Finland may sign a supplementary agreement on agricultural trade at the next meeting, scheduled for June in Helsinki.